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A fundamental aspect of successful social interactions is the ability to 
accurately infer others’ verbal communication, often including information related to 
the speaker’s feelings. Autism spectrum disorder is characterized by language and 
social-affective impairments, and also aberrant functional neural responses to 
socially-relevant stimuli. The main objective of the current research was to examine 
the behavioral and neural effects of making affective inferences from language 
lacking overt prosody or explicit emotional words in individuals with and without 
autism. In neurotypical individuals, the current data are consistent with previous 
studies showing that verbal emotional stimuli enhances activation of brain regions  
generally responsive to discourse, and also “social-affective” brain regions, 
specifically medial/orbital frontal regions, bilateral middle temporal areas, temporal 
parietal junction/superior temporal gyri and pCC/PC. Moreover, these regions 
  
respond differentially to positive and negative valence, most clearly in the medial 
frontal area. Further, results suggest that mentalizing alone does not account for the 
differences between emotional and neutral stories, as all of our stories required 
similar inferencing of the feelings of the protagonist. In autism, there is general 
agreement that the neurodevelopmental disorder is marked by impairments in 
pragmatic language understandings, emotional processes, and the ability to 
“mentalize,” others’ thoughts, intentions and beliefs. However, findings are mixed 
regarding the precise nature of emotional language understandings. Results of the 
present study suggest that autistic individuals are able to make language-based 
emotional inferences, and that like neurotypical controls, social-affective brain 
regions show task-related facilitation effects for emotional compared to neutral 
valence. However, the neural activations in the autism group were generally greater 
than controls, especially in response to emotion. Additionally, results showed greater 
difficulty with incongruent judgments in participants with autism. Together, these 
findings represent a first step toward revealing social-affective abilities in the 
language context in autism, despite irregular brain response. Such understandings are 
critical to generating effective intervention strategies and therapeutic practices for 
autistic individuals and their families. For remediation to be most beneficial, one must 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder marked most notably by a profound 
and life-long social disability affecting one’s ability to establish and maintain 
reciprocal relationships and further defined by language and communication 
impairments, behaviors that are repetitive or ritualistic, and affective abnormalities. 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 
2002; Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz, & Klin, 2004; Westphal & Volkmar, 2008). 
Due to the integral nature of social functioning for humans, this core deficit is highly 
detrimental as it concerns the ability to form and maintain relationships (Baron-
Cohen, 1988; Baron-Cohen, Tager-flusberg, & Cohen, 1994; Landa, Holman, & 
Garrett-Mayer, 2007) which can negatively impact one’s overall well-being and 
mortality (Achat et al., 1998; Berkman & Syme, 1979; Pearlin, 1985). Autistic 
adolescents1 with autism report frequent feelings of loneliness, depression, 
dissatisfaction with the quality of their friendships, lower quality of life (QOL) 
ratings and higher rates of depression than their typically developing peers 
(Bauminger & Kasari, 2000; Bauminger et al., 2008; Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, 
Meerumterwogt, & Stegge, 2008; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Ikeda, Hinckson, & 
Krageloh, 2014; Kamp-Becker, Schröder, Remschmidt, Bachmann, & Schroder, 
2010; Mayes, Calhoun, Murray, Ahuja, & Smith, 2011), and they are 28 times more 
likely to have suicide ideation or attempts than typical children (Mayes, Gorman, 
Hillwig-Garcia, & Syed, 2013). Similarly, autistic adults express lower QOL ratings, 
                                                 
1 The terminology autistic individuals will be used to reflect preferred terminology of individuals with 




dissatisfaction in the quantity and quality of their social relationships, and also a 
desire for more meaningful social-emotional interactions (Grandin & Scariano, 1986; 
Grandin, 2009; Howlin, Mawhood, & Rutter, 2000; Khanna, Jariwala-Parikh, West-
Strum, & Mahabaleshwarkar, 2014; Mazurek, 2013). These findings contradict Leo 
Kanner’s initial belief that children with autism preferred solitude over the company 
of people: “so long as they left the child alone, [people] figured in about the same 
manner as did the desk, the bookshelf, or the filing cabinet” (Kanner, 1943, p. 246). 
The pervasive social impairments in autism also affects family members and loved 
ones; research suggests that parenting an autistic child is more stressful than raising 
one who is typically developing or one with Down syndrome (Baghdadli, Pry, 
Michelon, & Rattaz, 2014; Donovan, 1988; Morgan, 1988). The struggle to form a 
natural bond contributes to the stress; compared to typical children, autistic children 
are less likely to smile in response to their mother’s smiles (Dawson, Hill, Spencer, 
Galpert, & Watson, 1990), attend to their mother’s face (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 
1997), orient to social stimuli (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; 
Geraldine Dawson et al., 2004), and share positive affect in social contexts (Kasari, 
Sigman, Mundy, & Yirmiya, 1990). 
In summary, among the triad of deficits that define autism, the social 
impairments are putatively the most serious concern for individuals with autism and 
also for their families. It is therefore not surprising that a longstanding goal of the 
research in autism has been to describe the systems involved in the hallmark social 




Theoretical approaches to autism 
 
According to one theoretical model, “weak central coherence” (WCC), 
difficulties in understanding emotions in language are due to a more general deficit in 
formulating global inferences (Happé & Frith, 2006). This model was first proposed 
to explain the unique profile of superior performance in some areas requiring “local” 
processing, for example in visual discrimination tasks (O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001; 
Plaisted, Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998) along with impairments with more abstract 
tasks like arranging sentences in coherent order (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2000).  
Recently, it has been refined to predict reduced integration of global information 
(Happé & Booth, 2008). This is consistent with behavioral evidence suggesting 
autistic individuals are able to decode at the word level, but experience greater 
difficulties as text increases in complexity and requires more integration with other 
cognitive domains (Tager-flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005), as even high-functioning 
autistic individuals have difficulty with inferential language (Dennis, Lazenby, & 
Lockyer, 2001) and in disambiguating meaning from sentence context (López & 
Leekam, 2003). As such, this model is useful in explaining difficulties that autistic 
individuals may have with processing the “whole picture” of a social situation, and 
more specifically with making inferences from language per se.  
A second theory—impairment of complex processing—proposes that multiple 
primary cognitive deficits are responsible for the unique behavioral profile observed 
in autism (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998). Accordingly, this model predicts that autistic 
individuals have relative strengths in the areas of attention, sensory perception, 




occur in concept formation, complex language and complex memory. More recently, 
this theoretical model has been refined to predict that autism is predominantly a 
disorder of neural connectivity, particularly intrahemispheric connectivity (Minshew 
& Williams, 2007). This is compelling, and provides a common thread between these 
theories in that each is explained by the absence of a “central executive,” or a failure 
of the top-down control processes to modulate bottom-up information processes. 
Neuroimaging studies showing reduced connectivity provide evidence of this 
abnormality. In addition to examples provided above (in emotion- and language 
tasks), this neural profile is also shown in executive functions (Just, Keller, Malave, 
Kana, & Varma, 2012) visual processing tasks (Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 
2006; Vandenbroucke, Scholte, van Engeland, Lamme, & Kemner, 2008) working 
memory tasks (Koshino et al., 2005) and during rest (Pierce & Redcay, 2008; Redcay 
& Courchesne, 2008).   
 A third theoretical model suggests that social impairments in autism are due 
to “mentalizing” or “theory of mind” (ToM) deficits (Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003; Frith, 
2001). The concept of mentalizing refers to the ability to understand, describe and 
explain others’ behaviors in terms of their mental processes (beliefs, intents, desires, 
etc.). As emotions are at least partially a mental state, it is easy to see how 
impairments in mentalizing would impact one’s social understandings. Proponents of 
this theory postulate that this is not a learned skill, or a product of logical inference, 
but instead rooted in a neurocognitive system comprised of a subgroup of the “social 
brain” network: medial prefrontal regions and bilateral posterior superior temporal 




Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006). Impaired 
connectivity within this network (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Castelli, 2005; Kana, 
Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009; Piggot et al., 2004) is believed to 
underlie the social deficits seen in autistic individuals because they are unable to 
conceive mental states (like others’ beliefs), and cannot predict or anticipate others’ 
behaviors or actions. By extension, the ToM network is associated with the 
communicative deficits in autism as language development is closely linked to joint 
attention and understanding the communicative intent of others’ (Baron-Cohen, 1997; 
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). However, an important distinction is made between 
mental states (associated with verbs like want, know, pretend) and  emotional states 
(associated with adjectives like disappointed, sad, ecstatic); as such the notion of 
“mind blindness” does not directly account for impaired emotional processing in 
autism, but considers it a secondary deficit, dissociable from mentalizing. This 
distinction has also been made at the neurophysiological level, as emotional stimuli 
are associated with brain activations in the “emotional brain network” specifically the 
amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex. In neurotypical 
adults, for example, the medial orbitofrontal lobe is preferentially involved with 
emotional processing (Beauregard et al., 1997; Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006; 
Maratos, Dolan, Morris, Henson, & Rugg, 2001), and in autism, response differences 
have been shown in emotion-related brain regions (e.g., the amygdala and ventral 
prefrontal cortex) during processing of emotional facial expressions (Ashwin, Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, O’Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 




al., 2011) or during processing of emotional prosody (Tesink et al., 2009; Wang, Lee, 
Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006). In summary, the ToM proposal may not fully 
characterize the nature of the putative relationship between language- and emotional 
processing deficits and social functioning in autism, but provides a framework for 
understanding how impairments within ToM regions and the emotional network may 
be underlying factors.  
In summary, there is considerable evidence suggesting that there is a neural 
basis for the social impairments that characterize autism, but disentangling the factors 
associated with this social dysfunction is challenging. The current research study 
focuses on two domains critical to social functioning: emotions and language 
processing. The fact that both figure prominently among the diagnostic criteria begs 
the question: “Are language- and emotional processing deficits related to the 
observed social impairments in individuals with autism, and if so, what is the nature 
of this relationship?” The first goal of this dissertation is to summarize the empirical 
findings related to affective language processing in autism. 
Behaviorally, many recent studies suggest autistic individuals can adequately 
process emotional words in the context of language. However, processing of 
emotional words may rely on a purely abstract semantic index of meaning rather than 
evoking an emotional response from the linguistic information. Because this is often 
difficult to tease apart in behavioral paradigms, neuroimaging methods are ideal to 
determine whether the same emotional systems are activated for autistic individuals 




Thus the second goal of this research is to conduct a neuroimaging study that 
may provide insight into the differential processing of emotional language for autistic 
individuals relative to typically developing individuals. The main hypothesis is that 
neural activations in language and emotional regions will be atypical in autistic 
individuals compared to neurotypical controls.   
The following chapters adhere to the aforementioned goals. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of how emotional understandings develop in typical 
individuals, and also describes the interdependence between communication and 
emotional competence; both are presented as they relate to social abilities and 
interactions. This is followed by a summary of the empirical findings related 
specifically to affective language processing in autism. Chapter 3 reports the results 
of Study 1, designed to investigate the neural processes of affective language 
processing in neurotypical individuals2. This study provided the background for 
extending the paradigm to individuals with autism, details of which are presented in 









                                                 





Chapter 2 - Literature review 
 
While defined by a triad of deficits, autism is most notably recognized by 
impaired social abilities (Klin et al., 2002), which can lead to significant difficulties 
in personal relationships and quality of life (Achat et al., 1998; Berkman & Syme, 
1979; Pearlin, 1985). This review will address two domains essential to social 
interactions: emotion- and language processing. Due to the complex nature of both 
areas, it is useful to view these findings in concert with related skills and processes 
(Figure 1). Therefore, I first provide a brief overview of how emotional 
understandings develop in typical individuals, and also describe the interdependence 
between communication and emotional competence. Both are presented in light of 
their relationship to social abilities and interactions. Next, I summarize the empirical 
findings related specifically to the ability of autistic individuals to make affective 
inferences from language. 
Background and overview 
Social interactions are complex; necessarily involving the experience of 
feelings, as well as the ability to send and receive emotional messages (Adolphs, 
2002, 2003; Denham, Bassett, & Wyatt, 2007; Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 
2001; Salovey & Grewal, 2005). Throughout life most emotions are anchored in 
interactions with others, and the exchange of emotions defines interpersonal 
relationships. Similarly, social behaviors are regulated by an individual’s ability to 
experience feelings and both send and receive affective messages (Adolphs, 2003; 





Figure. 1. Summary of mechanisms related to social interactions. The main focus of this 
research is the ability of individuals with ASD to infer others’ emotions; this implies 
receptive language skills.  However, emotional understandings include both one’s own 
physical feelings and expressions of emotion as well as the ability to extend these 
understandings to others’, and language skills include both expressive and receptive 
capacities. Neural systems related to both language- and emotion processes are well-
defined, and impaired in autism. 
 
 
social interactions that the term “emotional intelligence”  was coined to describe the 
ability to perceive, use, understand, and manage emotions and to use this information 
to guide one’s thinking and actions (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1989; Salovey & Grewal, 2005), thus tying these skills to social relationships. 
In fact, one’s emotional intelligence predicts success in both personal and 
professional relationships (Brackett, Warner, & Bosco, 2005; Lopes et al., 2004; 
Lopes, Grewal, Kadis, Gall, & Salovey, 2006). Like adults, children’s emotional 
understandings enhance their ability to relate to others and also impact their 
reputations. Youngsters scoring highest on emotional understandings tests are more 
popular among peers and display more socially acceptable behaviors (Cassidy, Parke, 




elementary school children able to quickly and accurately infer emotions from facial 
expressions are more popular with their classmates (Edwards, Manstead, & 
MacDonald, 1984). 
Like emotional understandings, fluent communication skills are integral to 
successful relationships and social interactions (Snow, 1999; Tomasello & Farrar, 
1986; Tomasello, 2009). This relationship too, is symbiotic: children’s language 
development is linked to their social environment (Hoff, 2006) and social 
understandings (Snow, Pan, Imbens-Bailey, & Herman, 1996; Snow, 1999), and 
emotional systems contribute to language comprehension (Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 
2007). In typical children, the interplay between these systems is evident in their 
development and appears to emerge effortlessly as they interact with others.  
Infants’ early communication is founded upon emotional impulses, and their 
emotions are almost exclusively associated with their caretakers (Dunn, 2003). They 
quickly learn to comprehend the others’ emotions by associating a verbal label or 
visual cue (e.g., facial expression) with their own emotion (Brown & Dunn, 1992; 
Edwards et al., 1984; Pons, Harris, & Rosnay, 2004). Later, processing these 
symbolic cues requires integrating the present situation to memories of a remote 
event. While both language capacities and cognitive factors are necessary for 
acquiring symbolic representation of feelings (e.g., emotional labels), intrapersonal 
perceptions of the symbol influence one’s interpretation of that stimulus (Dolan, 
2002). Thus, differentiating between emotions is suggested to be contingent upon a 




before experiencing it first-hand, and further being able to compare one’s own 
behavior to a standard (Yarrow, 1979).   
It follows that both emotional impairments (Begeer et al., 2008; Gaigg, 2012; 
Nuske, Vivanti, & Dissanayake, 2013; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013), and language 
deficits characteristic of autism may be related to their social deficits. Indeed, 
language is a primary mechanism by which emotional states are communicated, 
specifically the ability to infer emotions implied from language context is a critical 
aspect of fluent communication in everyday social interactions. The question remains 
whether the locus of the emotional impairments is in: a) the perception of nonverbal 
cues of emotion, b) the physiological response to emotion, or c) processes related to 
encoding emotional information and/or d) how these factors contribute to the 
difficulties with understanding others’ emotions via language.   
Nonverbal emotion perception in autism 
In autism, many studies investigating emotional perception abilities have used 
facial stimuli, possibly due to the importance of facial expressions in social 
competence (Calder & Young, 2005). Results from behavioral studies are mixed, with 
some studies suggesting impaired perception of emotion from faces (Adolphs, Sears, 
& Piven, 2001; Bormann-Kischkel, Vilsmeier, & Baude, 1995; Grossman & Tager-
Flusberg, 2008; Hubl et al., 2003), while others suggest intact abilities (Gross, 2004; 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990). A recent review (Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 
2010) sheds light on these behavioral findings, concluding that autistic individuals 
infer emotion from facial expressions differently from neurotypical controls. 




however appear to converge on a profile of behavioral impairment. Examples include 
difficulties in recognizing complex emotions and mental states from pictures of the 
eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) through inflections of 
the voice (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007; Mazefsky & Oswald, 
2007; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002), and in films depicting social 
situations (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000).   
Other nonverbal cues of emotion fail to elicit typical responses in autistic 
individuals as well, as autistic children pay less attention and show reduced affect 
toward an experimenter who pretends to hurt herself (Corona, Dissanayake, Arbelle, 
Wellington, & Sigman, 1998; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, & Yirmiya, 1992) and do not 
display normal neurophysiological responses to others’ pain (Minio-Paluello, Baron-
Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009). Neuroimaging studies also reveal 
differences in cortical and subcortical responses between autistic and typically 
developing participants in emotion-related brain regions (e.g., the amygdala and 
ventral prefrontal cortex) during processing of emotional facial expressions (Ashwin 
et al., 2007; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2000; Dapretto et al., 2005; 
Gaigg, 2012; Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010; Piggot et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2004; 
Weng et al., 2011). A related study by Hubert, Wicker, Monfardini, & Ceruelle 
(2009) also supports the notion of impaired neural processing; they showed that, 
unlike the control group, autistic individuals failed to exhibit changes in skin 
conductance responses (SCRs) to emotional expressions (but see Corden, Chilvers, & 
Skuse, 2008), and researchers have shown the importance of the amygdala in 




encoding or retrieval of emotional information from memory can give insight into 
difficulties with emotion processing in autism.  
Encoding emotional information 
A plethora of studies have shown that emotional stimuli are more salient than 
neutral, and that humans remember emotional stimuli more effectively than neutral 
(Hamann, 2001; Reisberg & Hertel, 2004). This is true for experiences (Adolphs, 
Cahill, Schul, & Babinsky, 1997; Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch, & McGaugh, 1995; 
Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000), pictures (Cahill et al., 1996; Hamann, 
Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999; Harris & Pashler, 2005; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & 
Moscovitch, 2007), as well as for language (Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; 
Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Kensinger, 2007; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Maratos et al., 
2001). Additionally, emotional words evoke faster (Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 
2009) and more accurate (Eviatar & Zaidel, 1991) responses than do neutral. While 
the influence of emotion on memory is well established in typically developing 
individuals, in autism findings suggest processing deficits specific to emotionally 
laden stimuli. For example, autistic adults failed to show an advantage for emotional- 
relative to neutral (Rosch, 1999) pictures (Deruelle, Hubert, Santos, & Wicker, 2008), 
words (Kennedy, Redcay, & Courchesne, 2006) and sentences (Beversdorf et al., 
1998), but have shown intact short-term recall of emotionally salient (South et al., 
2008) and taboo words (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). In the latter study, the authors noted 
that autistic participants also remembered more (neutral) semantically-related words, 
and suggest that the enhanced recall in both instances could be due to semantic 




autistic individuals failed to show enhanced memory for either the emotional or 
semantically-related words either one hour or one day later, suggesting atypical 
encoding (interestingly, the autism group forgot the arousing- but not the neutral 
words). Another study designed to tease apart the influence of valence and semantic 
category on memory (Gaigg & Bowler, 2009a) used a memory illusion paradigm, as 
evidence suggests that individuals with autism are susceptible to illusory memories 
for semantically related target lures (Beversdorf et al., 2000; Bowler, Gardiner, Grice, 
& Saavalainen, 2000; Hillier, Campbell, Keillor, Phillips, & Beversdorf, 2007). 
While the control group showed less susceptibility to illusory memories for 
emotionally charged compared to the neutral words, the adults with autism did not 
show this effect. These findings, when taken together with results from their previous 
study (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008) as well as those from semantically related illusory 
memories in autism, suggest that encoding of affective words is generally indistinct 
from neutral words in autism. This leads me to my primary question, that is, how is 
emotional or affective language processed in individuals with ASD? 
Affective Language Processing in Autism 
Language competence is complex, including a) expressive and receptive 
skills, b) verbal and non-verbal cues (pragmatic language), and c) explicit (“He felt 
sad.”) or implied (“Her bike was stolen.”) messages.  The latter may well present the 
greatest challenge to individuals with autism due to their unique language profile.  In 
autism, lower level processing skills (phonology and syntax), are generally intact, 
while the “higher level” functions, including semantic (Harris et al., 2006) and 




Gaag, & Buitelaar, 2008; Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009; Rapin & Dunn, 2003; Tesink 
et al., 2009). Pragmatics is the linguistic domain concerned with the appropriate use 
of language in social contexts, and incorporates social, emotional and communicative 
behaviors (Adams, Baxendale, Lloyd, & Aldred, 2005). As such, pragmatics forms a 
critical intersection for language competencies and social interactions. Thus, even 
though many individuals with autism have some language capacities, rather than 
enhancing social exchanges and interpersonal relationships, evidence suggests that 
language weaknesses in autism may contribute to deficiencies in the social realm 
(Baron-Cohen, 1988; Kuhl, Coffey-Corina, Padden, & Dawson, 2005; Mundy, 2003).  
This is shown through weaknesses in identification of topic and making a relevant 
response (Adams, 2002; Tager‐Flusberg & Anderson, 1991), maintaining a topic 
(Baltaxe & D’Angiola, 1992; Baltaxe, 1977), and gauging the quantity and quality of 
an utterance (Volden, 2002). Autistic individuals also show marked difficulties in 
taking account of the listener’s perspective, and instead “lecture” about their own 
interests (Baltaxe, 1977; Fine, Bartolucci, Szatmari, & Ginsberg, 1994).   
Weaknesses in understanding pragmatic language also reflect fundamental 
problems in knowing that one must infer the intended meaning of a message versus 
the literal content (Happé, 1993). In addition to being overly literal, (Attwood, Frith, 
& Hermelin, 1988; Attwood, 2006), autistic individuals also show weak inferencing 
skills (Ozonoff & Miller, 1996; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1990) difficulty 
understanding humorous material and jokes (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Emerich, 




Hegenloh, 2010), and interpreting figurative speech like lies, sarcasm, irony and 
metaphor (Happé, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 1999). 
Language competence is also an integral part of successful social-emotional 
processes in typical individuals (Havas et al., 2007; Tomasello, 2009), strongly 
suggesting that the hallmark pragmatic language deficits characterizing autism 
contribute significantly to deficiencies in the social realm (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Kuhl 
et al., 2005). The degree of social impairment in children with autism is in fact 
correlated positively with their language (dis)ability (Dawson et al., 2004; Tager-
flusberg et al., 2005). Despite this, relatively few studies have systematically explored 
the ability of individuals with autism to understand emotions through the language 
context. Specifically, the ability to: a) identify and describe one’s own emotions, and 
b) understand the emotions of others via language. 
Identifying and describing one’s own emotions 
The acquisition of emotional language incorporates a myriad of facilities, 
including social development, cognitive abilities, and variables like linguistic 
abilities, age, and cognitive maturity (Van Lanker, Cornelius, & Needleman, 1991), 
suggesting that even though a child may have experienced an emotion, he may not yet 
be able to apply to appropriate lexical term (Lewis & Michalson, 1983). According to 
Wellman, and colleagues (1995), children as young as two years of age talk about 
both positive and negative emotions in themselves and others and frequently attribute 
emotions to dolls and pretend characters. Between 3 and 4, children recognize and 
label emotions based on expressive (facial) cues, and appreciate how external causes 




understand that people may feel different emotions in the same situation depending 
on their desires and/or beliefs. By eight, children begin to appreciate “mixed 
emotions” and ambivalence, and also understand the emotional consequences of their 
actions (positive feelings follow praise-worthy actions, negative feelings are 
associated with shameful actions). By the age of ten, children’s abilities to decode 
emotions are generally adult-like (Custrini & Feldman, 1989; Pons et al., 2004), and 
characterized by a sophisticated reliance on situational cues to infer others’ emotional 
states (Camras, 1986) underscoring the complex interrelatedness of social cues—both 
verbal and nonverbal—with language and feelings. Not surprisingly, an important 
predictor of a child’s acquisition of emotional understandings is his or her rearing 
environment and use of language.   
Two year olds’ talk about feelings correlates positively with the quality and 
quantity of references to emotional states made by their mothers and siblings six 
months earlier (Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987), and mother’s use of mental state 
language, not necessarily directed at the child, supports their children’s acquisition of 
internal state as well as their ability to correctly attribute emotions to story 
protagonists (Booth, Hall, Robison, & Kim, 1997; Pons et al., 2004). Frequent 
discourse about feelings in the family unit also enhances emotional understandings in 
children, as expressed both in their ability to identify emotions in pretend characters 
at three years of age and in more sophisticated affective understandings three years 
later (Brown & Dunn, 1992; Dunn et al., 1991). In these ways, language serves to 
enhance children’s emotional competence, which in turn effectively enriches their 




In summary, for typically developing individuals,emotional processes are 
contingent upon using and understanding emotional language, and affective verbal 
expressions carry complex information from several sources, including introspective 
information, observations relevant to one’s own behavior, and semantic information.  
Adding to this complexity, emotions can be categorized differently, for example 
“simple” or “non-social” emotions (e.g., fear and happiness) are often juxtaposed to 
“complex,” “abstract” or “social” emotions (e.g., pride and embarrassment) 
(Levenson, 1999). In the autism research, some studies suggest that the differentiating 
factor between ability and impairment lies in this qualitative distinction, whereas 
others report adequate abilities in both areas. In general, task demands appear to be a 
factor. 
Identifying emotional words 
 
The most rudimentary tasks regarding emotional language processing are at 
the single word level. For example, autistic children were able to accurately match 
simple emotional adjectives, e.g., hurt and sad (Van Lanker et al., 1991), to a line 
drawing, but autistic adults showed impairments when matching complex emotional 
words, e.g., disagreement and embracing to line drawings (Hobson & Lee, 1989). 
These divergent findings could be due to the level of difficulty of the words (see 
Appendix A for stimuli from both studies) and also because Van Lanker et al. (1991) 
included  words that could describe a physical state (e.g., lazy, sleepy) in their 
emotional adjectives, and such words can be considered less abstract that strictly 
emotional state words. During another matching task, like typical controls subjects 




scared) to corresponding faces (Fink, de Rosnay, Wierda, Koot, & Begeer, 2014; 
Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000) but showed significant difficulty 
identifying simple emotions when a face was paired with a mismatched label, e.g., a 
happy face with the word afraid  (Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000).  
Interestingly, Fink et al. (2014) found that the autistic children had 
significantly higher accuracy rates during the pre-test phase of word-word matching, 
but when controlling for pre-test accuracy, their accuracy performance in the word-
face test was significantly lower than controls. Other studies also highlight the finely-
tuned distinction between ability and disability. Using an attentional blink (AB) 
paradigm with negative and neutral words, Corden et al. (2008) showed that autistic 
individuals performed equally well as controls in identifying the emotional words in 
general, but that controls demonstrated significantly greater accuracy at the shortest 
(120 ms) time lag. In a related AB study (Gaigg & Bowler, 2009b) using negatively 
valenced (profanity, taboo) words along with neutral words and male proper names, 
the emotional words failed to capture the attention of the ASD participants as readily 
as did the controls. Further, during a lexical decision task (word vs. nonword), like 
the control group individuals with ASD responded more quickly to emotional (both 
positive and negative) words than to neutral words, but their overall reaction times 
were significantly slower (Lartseva, Dijkstra, Kan, & Buitelaar, 2014). A final study 
revealed that autistic teens were significantly less able to identify one unpleasant 
word among three pleasant words compared to control participants (Han, Yoo, Kim, 
McMahon, & Renshaw, 2014). 





More challenging tasks require verbal descriptions or responses regarding 
emotion, and here too results are mixed. For example, when asked to explain feelings 
of simple emotions like happiness or sadness, both autistic children and adults were 
able to provide contextually appropriate responses (Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992; 
Jaedicke, 1994; Losh & Capps, 2006; Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Kotronopoulou, 
2007; Van Lanker et al., 1991; Yirmiya & Sigman, 1992), although their narrative 
descriptions differed from typical controls in terms of quality and content (fewer 
synonyms, fewer generalizations and examples, more concrete responses). However, 
deficits were revealed when autistic children were asked to describe complex 
emotions, e.g., curious and surprised (Losh & Capps, 2006) and also complex self-
conscious emotions, e.g., pride and embarrassment (Capps et al., 1992; Losh & 
Capps, 2006; but see Yirmiya & Sigman, 1992). During more free-form 
conversations and narratives, most evidence suggests that autistic individuals use 
fewer emotional references. For example, autistic children showed “pragmatically 
problematic” responses to social-emotional- relative to neutral questions (Adams, 
Green, Gilchrist, & Cox, 2002), included less emotional information when retelling a 
story after a slide show compared to both controls and participants with Williams 
syndrome (Pearlman-Avnion & Eviatar, 2002), and used fewer emotional terms when 
dicussing memories (Brown, Morris, Nida, & Baker-Ward, 2012) and storybook 
characters (Siller, Swanson, Serlin, & Teachworth, 2014). In contrast, others have 
shown that autistic individuals are unimpaired in describing both social and non-
social emotions, and providing examples of experiences of the same. For example, 




describe past experiences of pride and guilt (Hobson, Chidambi, Lee, & Meyer, 
2006), and replicating Losh and Capps (2006), Williams & Happé, (2010) failed to 
find differences between children with autism and matched controls in either 
definitions of emotional terms or in reflecting on an emotional experience. Similarly, 
Bang, Burns, & Nadig (2013) failed to show between-group differences in autistic 
childrens’ production of emotional terms during conversations. 
Other findings suggest anomalous causes of emotions, even though their 
responses were considered to be accurate. For example, autistic participants offered 
objects or material events as causes for feeling happy, sad, afraid, worried or angry 
(e.g., parties, living situations, or toys), while the majority of the comparison group 
made references to interpersonal or social causes (Jaedicke, 1994). Rieffe et al. 
(2007) corroborated these findings; 90% of their 10 year old subjects with autism 
gave a material reason for feeling happy (“when I am looking at my science book”) 
while at least half of the comparison group provided social examples (“when I am 
with my friends”). Together, the findings related to identifying simple versus 
complex emotions in autistic individuals appear to be inconclusive, at least in the 
laboratory setting. However, both descriptions and causes of  emotions in autism are 
more often noted as being abnormal or anomalous compared to typically developing 
individuals, which could reflect a) language deficits or b) aberrant 
encoding/processing of emotions. 
Understanding others’ emotion from language 
The relatively sparse literature on situated social-emotional experiences with 




studies reveal that individuals with autism are able to infer others’ emotions—both 
simple and complex—from the language context. Autistic children successfully 
predicted a protagonist’s emotion from stories designed to evoke a single emotion 
(Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stockmann, 2000) and also in stories depicting more 
than one emotion of the opposite- (happiness/sadness) or same valence 
(anger/sadness) (Rieffe et al., 2007). Additionally, autistic individuals successfully 
recognized social factors that would increase the potential for embarrassment—
presence and type of audience or the act being witnessed by another person—and 
ably rated the level of embarrassment felt by the protagonist from short vignettes 
(Hillier & Allinson, 2002).   
Real-time emotional processing in actual social situations requires fluid and 
simultaneous understanding of other’s emotions inherent in their verbal and 
nonverbal cues. More challenging ecologically-valid paradigms attempt to use stimuli 
that presents information in multiple modalities, more closely associated with these 
experiences (Noller, 1985). As inferring emotion from multiple channels has been 
shown to be difficult for individuals with autism (Charbonneau et al., 2013; Hobson, 
1986; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Hobson, 1988; Loveland et al., 1995; 
Woynaroski, Stevenson, & Wallace, 2013), efforts have been made by researchers to 
disentangle the contributing factors, be they verbal or nonverbal in nature. Here, too, 
however, contributions are few, and findings are mixed. Autistic adults were able to 
judge an actor’s feelings from audiovisual clips where emotion was implied or 
explicit based on the verbal content of the script (explicit, implicit or neutral) and the 




facial expression and tone of voice) (Loveland et al., 1997), and like controls they 
exhibited greater difficulty in the mismatched conditions (explicit verbal content/flat 
affect and neutral verbal content/animated affect). Autistic children and adolescents 
also demonstrated competence in judging videotaped scenes from the Perception of 
Emotions Test (Egan et al., 1998). Each scene includes actors depicting an emotion 
(happy, angry, sad, or neutral) in a different modality (static face, dynamic face, 
prosody, verbal content or combined), and autistic participants performed as well as 
the typically developing children in the two tasks including verbal content: the audio 
recordings and the scenes using combined modalities. However, their performance on 
the other three tasks (static face, dynamic face and tone of voice) was impaired 
compared to the control subjects (Lindner & Rosen, 2006). Downs and Smith (2004) 
evaluated emotional understandings in autistic children using a battery of questions 
developed by Howlin, Baron-Cohen, & Hadwin, (1999). While the children with 
autism were significantly worse at identifying facial affect in photographs than the 
comparison groups, there were no differences between groups in any of the tasks 
involving verbal scenarios, suggesting that autistic children are equally able to infer 
other’s emotions from verbal content paired with pictures as are typical children. 
Together, these findings suggest that autistic individuals are generally as able as 
ability-matched controls in inferring emotion from both implicitly- and explicitly 
stated verbal content, both independently and when combined with other modalities. 
Interestingly, like Grossman et al. (2000) and Fink et al. (2014), findings suggest that 
autistic individuals may have an overreliance on verbal information in the presence of 




of the evidence suggests that while the semantic content of words may be normally 
processed, emotional information may be abnormally encoded in individuals with 
autism. One’s own emotional understandings subserve the ability to make inferences 
about others’ emotional states, indeed this is at the heart of empathy. To make these 
inferences, however, one must quickly process both verbal and nonverbal cues, map 
them to one’s own experiential store of emotional states, and apply this knowledge to 
another human actor. While the behavioral literature indicates that autistic individuals 
appear perform similarly to typically achieving peers when comprehending emotional 
language, the neuroimaging literature suggests that the processes underlying this 
process are quite different. Thus, the question is: in autistic individuals, how are 
verbal cues of emotion represented, or encoded within their own emotional systems, 
at the cortical and subcortical level? 
Neural processing of emotional language 
Although contributions are few, neuroimaging studies suggest differential 
processing of affective language in ASD as compared to typically developing 
controls. During complex text comprehension for example, participants with ASD 
failed to demonstrate differential cortical activations in response to any of the 
conditions (intentional-, emotional- or physical context), while the control group 
showed differential processing among inference types (Mason, Williams, Kana, 
Minshew, & Just, 2008). Further, autistic participants recruited both left and right 
hemisphere language areas (including the right middle- and superior temporal gyrus) 
to a larger extent than the control group in all conditions, suggesting a) they did not 




they engage putative semantic regions more heavily when comprehending discourse. 
(See Table 1 for general acronym definitions, and the Glossary for a complete list.) 
Functional connectivity was also aberrant in these participants with ASD: during the 
intentional passages, the autism group showed reduced connectivity between the ToM 
and language networks (left inferior frontal gyrus and left superior temporal gyrus). 
While behavioral results were not reported for this study, the authors reported that for 
individuals with autism, regional activation showed similar processing patterns 
regardless of task difficulty, and that this pattern reflected the brain areas activated in 
controls in the most difficult condition.   
Table 1. 
    
Acronyms for brain regions 
    
X/Y Z Lobe/region Gyrus/sulcus/cortex 
a = anterior S = superior F = frontal G = gyrus 
p = posterior M = middle T = temporal S = sulcus 
l = left I = inferior P = parietal C = cortex 
m = medial  C = cingulate  
r = right  PF = prefrontal  
b = bilateral  TPJ = temporoparietal junction  
 
Differences in neural activations between autistic and control participants 
were also found during a task requiring congruency judgments using sentence context 
(emotional-, physical state- and concrete conditions). While there were no behavioral 
differences between groups, the emotional condition elicited activations within the 
fusiform gyri, right inferior parietal region and left superior temporal gyrus in the 
control group, while cortical activations in the autism group failed to reach 
significance (Catarino et al., 2011). Further, in an emotional counting Stroop task, 




medial prefrontal cortex in neurotypical adults but no difference between conditions 
was seen in autistic adults (Kennedy et al., 2006). Finally, during an word 
identification task, emotion (positive and negative combined) words (compared to 
neutral) elicited significantly more activation in right fusiform gyrus and right middle 
temporal gyrus in autistic teens relative to neurotypical controls (Han et al., 2014). 
Taken together, a pattern emerges of differential or abnormal integration of 
neural networks used for language and emotion processing in autism even in the face 
of equivalent behavioral competence. To our knowledge no one has investigated the 
combined behavioral profile and neural mechanisms specifically related to emotional 
inferencing abilities from language in autism. Such investigations are necessary to 
disentangle whether the presumed deficits in inferring emotions in others is due to 
difficulties in the evoking of emotion, making complex inferences in language, or an 
interaction of the two.   
Discussion 
The behavioral evidence suggests subtle deficits in emotional language 
processing in autistic individuals, especially during narrative production where they 
use fewer emotional terms and references (Adams et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2012; 
Pearlman-Avnion & Eviatar, 2002; Siller et al., 2014, but see Bang et al., 2013). In 
other areas, a profile of relative competence emerges from these empirical 
investigations. First, autistic individuals seem to be able to correctly identify and 
describe basic emotions/emotional words (Capps et al., 1992; Jaedicke, 1994; 
Kennedy et al., 2006; Lartseva et al., 2014; Losh & Capps, 2006; Rieffe et al., 2007; 




inconclusive, with several studies suggesting impairments (Capps et al., 1992; Han et 
al., 2014; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1989; Losh & Capps, 2006), others suggesting 
intact or at least adequate abilities (Hobson et al., 2006; Williams & Happé, 2010; 
Yirmiya & Sigman, 1992), and still others are mixed depending on the task (Corden 
et al., 2008; Fink et al., 2014). Furthermore, evidence suggests intact abilities when 
judging other’s feelings from verbal description, and also in identifying contexts 
which would contribute feelings of embarrassment (Catarino et al., 2011; Downs & 
Smith, 2004; Hillier & Allinson, 2002; Loveland et al., 1997; Rieffe et al., 2000; 
Rieffe et al., 2007). These findings may add a complicating element to theories (Frith 
& Happé, 1994) and studies that have shown impairments in the ability to understand 
intentions in language (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2000). Additionally, when affective 
language is paired with other modalities, findings suggest difficulties assimilating 
several signals simultaneously as well as a preference for verbal information in the 
face of multiple cues (Downs & Smith, 2004; Fink et al., 2014; Grossman et al., 
2000; Lindner & Rosén, 2006).  
This summary of the literature (see Table 2) raises an important consideration: 
Even though emotional concepts are inherently abstract, they are associated with 
words, or labels, and these can be learned in a more systematic fashion, at least at the 
level of semantics. That is, the use of a verbal label may help make these 
relationships explicit. In comparison it is more difficult to assign a rule, or label, to a 
facial expression or gesture because these are more implicit and difficult to decode 
without the advantage of explicit references to the cause and content of the 




simple words either as stimuli or as response choices (Appendix A); distilling the task 
to include a narrow range of possible words, or labels. I propose that abilities 
displayed at the behavioral level are due to the learned semantic meaning of these 
simple labels, but that the ability to engage or activate these emotional states or 
feelings from language is much more tenuous. That is, emotional labels are subject to 
abnormal encoding, or processing at the neural level in autistic individuals, because 
of the failure to systematically engage the emotional system. Studies examining 
memory for emotional words and sentences as well as neuroimaging results provide 
support for this theory. In the former, short-term abilities and long-term and illusory 
memory deficits suggest that emotional information is processed similarly to neutral 
information. The argument is that emotional information is remembered semantically 
or categorically, but not for affective content (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; South et al., 
2008). These studies raise the possibility that autistic individuals may rely more 
heavily on semantics in order to process affective language, at least as measured in 
these behavioral experiments. An overreliance on semantics might also account for 
abilities in other domains described above, for example immature or idiosyncratic 
descriptions of emotion (Capps et al., 1992; Losh & Capps, 2003; Van Lanker et al., 
1991), short term memory abilities for simple emotional words or taboo words (Gaigg 
& Bowler, 2008; South et al., 2008 but see Kennedy et al., 2006), and impairments in 
matching abstract emotion words  (which are unfamiliar, and thus not committed to 
memory) to pictures (Hobson & Lee, 1989). Functional neuroimaging provides a 
valuable tool to examine behavioral abilities in concert with brain activity, and as 




affective language processing in autism.  The following chapters describe two studies 
related to this goal. The first was a study of emotional language processing conducted 
with neurotypical individuals, and the second study extends the findings of the first 














Table 2.  
 
Summary of affective language competence in ASD 
 
Author (year) Stimuli  Findings: ASD relative to NT 
 Processing one’s own emotions  
Expression/Experience   
Hobson and Lee (1989) Verbally presented complex words with 
emotional (e.g., surprise), social (e.g., 
embracing), or abstract (e.g., tranquil) 
content 
Impaired for complex emotion 
Van Lanker et al. (1991) Verbally presented simple emotional 
adjectives (e.g., happy, sad) object nouns 
(e.g., table), and neutral adjectives (e.g., 
furry) 
Intact for simple emotion 
Anomalous description 
Capps et al. (1992) Visually presented simple emotions 
(happy, sad) and complex (proud, 
embarrassed)  
Intact for simple emotion; 
Impaired for complex emotion; 
Anomalous description 
Yirmiya et al. (1992) Visually presented simple (happy, sad, 
afraid, angry) and complex (proud) 
emotions 
Intact for simple emotion;  
Intact for complex emotion 
Jaedicke et al. (1994) Verbally presented simple emotions 
(happy, sad, afraid, worried, angry)  
Intact for simple emotion 
Anomalous description 
Adams, et al. (2002) Verbal questions regarding social-
emotional- or neutral topics 
Anomalous for social-
emotional  
Hobson et al. (2006) Verbally presented self-conscious 
complex (proud,  guilty) emotions  
Intact for pride; 
Adequate for guilt; 
Anomalous  description 




Author (year) Stimuli Findings: ASD relative to NT 
 Processing one’s own emotions  
Expression/Experience   
Losh and Capps (2006) Verbally presented simple (happy, sad, 
afraid, angry, disgusted), complex 
(curious, disappointed, surprised), self-
conscious complex (proud, embarrassed, 
guilty, ashamed) emotions and non-
emotions (tired, sick) 
Intact for simple emotions; 
Impaired for complex & self- 
conscious emotions 
Anomalous  description 
Rieffe et al. (2007) Verbally presented simple emotions 
(happy, sad, afraid, angry)  
Intact for happy 
Impaired for negative emotions 
Anomalous description 
Williams et al. (2010) Verbally presented simple/non-social 
(happy, sad, scared, surprised, disgusted) 
and complex/social (proud, guilty, 
disappointed, embarrassed ) emotions  
Intact for simple and complex 
emotion 
Brown et al. (2012) Autobiographical memory interview Impaired inclusion of 
emotional terms 
Bang et al. (2013) Free conversation with researcher Intact inclusion of emotional 
terms 
   
Memory   
Beversdorf et al. (1998) Verbally presented sentences with 
emotional or neutral valence 
Impaired ST memory 
Kennedy et al. (2006) Visually presented counting Stroop task 
using negative, neutral and number 
words 
Impaired memory 
South et al. (2008) Visually presented words with emotional 
or neutral valence 




Author (year) Stimuli Findings: ASD relative to NT 
 Processing one’s own emotions  
Memory   
Gaigg and Bowler (2008) Visually presented emotionally valent 
(taboo, profanities and sexually explicit), 
semantically related (fruit) and unrelated 
neutral words  
Intact ST memory;  
Impaired LT memory  
Gaigg and Bowler (2009) Visually presented orthographically 
related neutral words and emotionally 
valent target lures 
Impaired illusory memories 
   
 Understanding others’ emotions  
Words and stories   
Grossman et al. (2000) Emotional faces (happy, sad, angry, 
afraid, surprised)  paired with matched- 
and mismatched label  
Intact identification matched 
Impaired identification 
mismatched  
Rieffe et al. (2000) Verbally presented stories conveying 
typical and atypical emotions (happy, 
sad, angry,  afraid)  
Intact identification  
Hillier and Allinson (2002) Visually and verbally presented stories 
conveying varying degrees of complex 
emotion (embarrassment)  
Intact identification 
Pearlman-Avnion & Eviatar (2002) Visually presented slide show with 
emotional elements, retell story  
Impaired inclusion of 
emotional terms 
Downs and Smith (2004) Visually and verbally presented stories 
conveying simple emotion (happy, sad)  
Intact identification  
 
   
   




Author (year) Stimuli Findings: ASD relative to NT 
 Understanding others’ emotions  
Words and stories   
Kennedy et al. (2006) Visually presented counting Stroop task 
using negative, neutral and number 
words 
Intact identification 
Rieffe et al. (2007) Verbally presented stories conveying 
single- and multiple  emotions (happy, 
sad, angry, afraid)  
Intact for single emotions; 
Adequate for multiple emotions 
Corden et al. (2008) Visually presented negative and neutral 
words in attentional blink paradigm 
Intact identification overall; 
Impaired identification at 
shorter (120ms) time lags  
Gaigg & Bowler (2009b) Visually presented negative and neutral 
words in attentional blink paradigm 
Impaired identification 
Catarino et al. (2011) Visually presented sentences with 
emotional-, physical state- and concrete 
context 
Intact congruency judgment 
Fink et al. (2014) Emotional faces (happy, sad, angry, 
afraid, surprised) paired with matched 
label 
Impaired identification after 
accounting for pre-test 
accuracy scores  
Han et al. (2014) Visually presented pleasant and 
unpleasant words  
Impaired identification 
Lartseva et al. (2014) Lexical decision (word-nonword), 
positive, negative, neutral words 
Intact identification (shorter 
RT to emotion) 
Impaired overall RT   
Siller et al. (2014) Retelling a story from a picture book Impaired inclusion of 
emotional terms 
   




Author (year) Stimuli Findings: ASD relative to NT 
 Understanding others’ emotions  
Multimodal   
Loveland et al. (1997) Videos conveying simple emotion 
(happy, sad, angry, surprised, neutral) 
verbally, nonverbally or both  
Intact identification  
Lindner and Rosen (2006) Videos conveying simple emotion 
(happy, sad, angry, neutral) in different 
modalities  
Intact for verbal content; 
Impaired for nonverbal 
contexts 
Note.  Only information relating to emotional language is included from these studies.  Abbreviations: ASD, individuals with 








This chapter is reprinted from a manuscript in preparation by: Sand, L., Redcay, E., 
Zeffiro, T. and Bolger, D.J.  
 
Abstract 
 A fundamental aspect of successful social interactions is the ability to quickly 
and accurately comprehend the implied meaning of others’ verbal messages, an 
ability requiring that the listener draw inferences often related to how the speaker 
feels. The objective of this study was to examine the neural correlates of language 
processing specifically related to emotional messages that require inferencing using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). For example, hearing “My bike was 
stolen” suggests that the speaker is unhappy, or angry. Participants (n = 22) listened 
to short vignettes describing a protagonist’s emotional state (positive, negative or 
neutral), then responded to a true or false decision. Changes in the Blood Oxygenated 
Level Dependent (BOLD) contrast were analyzed separately for the story and the 
response period. Consistent with previous studies, emotional conditions elicited areas 
of activation in medial and orbital frontal regions as well as bilateral middle temporal 
areas, temporal parietal junction/superior temporal gyri and precuneus/cingulate 
cortex, regions that have been associated with both the processing of affective stimuli 
as well as social cognition in general. Moreover, these regions responded 
differentially to stimuli with either positive or negative valence, especially in the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), where negative stories elicited more dorsal mPFC 




that activity in regions typically associated with belief representation (mPFC, anterior 
temporal lobes, and temporal/parietal junction) was significantly greater for 
emotional stories compared to neutral, demonstrating a role of these regions in 
making inferences about others emotional states beyond simply belief representation. 
Finally, contrary to previous research on emotional inferencing, we did not find 
subcortical activity, in the amygdala and striatum, during the story phase. However, 
this subcortical activation was exhibited in the context of the true/false congruency 
judgment, including the putamen, caudate, insula and amygdala, suggesting that 
previous findings may be due to decision-making factors on emotion.    
Introduction 
The study of language comprehension or discourse processing has generally 
focused on the ability to extract meaning from language form (the spoken or written 
content) and connect it to our extant knowledge of the world and how it works 
(Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Kintsch, 1998; Walter Kintsch & Dijk, 
1978). This process entails drawing inferences about content that is not explicitly 
stated but is dependent on the schemas activated from prior knowledge and our ability 
to access them. One specific aspect of discourse that is often implied, but not stated 
explicitly, is the affective context of the actors in a story, or of conversational 
partners. When a listener of a story hears about a particular event (e.g., a house fire), 
they are often left to infer how the actors in the story feel. These types of bridging 
inferences are elaborations on the information directly presented and, from a 
psycholinguistic perspective, are not obligatory or necessary to maintain the 




involving human actors involve social processes of mentalizing or Theory of Mind 
(ToM), in which the listener may more readily construct a situation model 
representation of the discourse. In such cases, it is argued that the listener engages “a 
mental model of the situation” including the social-emotional processes that would be 
evoked by the actor(s) in the story (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). As such, the 
processes involved in drawing such inferences may go beyond the simple 
linguistic/semantic and perceptual systems engaged in building such a representation 
to include emotion and ToM. The fundamental research question posed here is 
whether neural systems engaged when inferring an actor’s emotional state differ 
compared to physical states such as energetic or fatigued.  
Overall, the majority of findings on narrative comprehension in general reveal 
activation of medial frontal and bilateral temporal and parietal regions (Ferstl & 
Neumann, 2008; Kuperberg, Lakshmanan, Caplan, & Holcomb, 2006; Mar, 2004, 
2011; Prat, Mason, & Just, 2012). More specific investigations of the neurobiology of 
inferential processing have generally shown a consistent set of cortical regions which 
include: bilateral anterior temporal lobes (aSTS) extending to the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and 
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (pCC/PC). This network is argued to be engaged 
when elaborating upon the linguistic information presented beyond processing syntax 
and maintaining coherence, such as elaborative, bridging, or causal inferences (Jung-
Beeman, 2005; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Tyler & Marslen-Wilson, 2008; Virtue, 
Haberman, Clancy, Parrish, & Jung Beeman, 2006). Additionally, discourse 




states (e.g., beliefs or desires) to others and use this information to explain or predict 
their actions, motivations, intentions, etc. (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002; Mar & Oatley, 
2008). Brain regions typically involved in story-based ToM processing include 
medial PFC, temporal poles, bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus and the 
posterior cingulate (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006). While this network (which overlaps with the putative 
“default mode network”; Spreng & Grady, 2009) is generally associated with 
mentalizing, functional divisions arise depending on the type of mental state 
attribution. Specifically, bilateral TPJ respond more to stories requiring representation 
of a character’s thoughts than their physical description or enduring personality traits 
(Heberlein & Saxe, 2005) or to physical pain of that character (Bruneau, Pluta, & 
Saxe, 2012). Midline structures (mPFC and pCC/PC), however, are associated both 
with judgments about the transient contents of one’s mind (e.g., thoughts and beliefs) 
as well as enduring personality traits or physical characteristics of the self and other 
(Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Moran, Lee, & Gabrieli, 2011). What is apparent 
is that there is overlap in the cognitive and neural mechanisms for narrative 
comprehension and mentalizing (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Mar, 2011) in general a topic 
that we will directly address momentarily.  
During verbal communication, knowledge or understanding of the speaker’s 
emotions are made both from explicit emotional statements (e.g., “I hate my teacher”) 
as well as language that implies an emotion or an emotion may be inferred (e.g., “I 
got a new bike for my birthday”). However, the majority of investigations of 




eliminating the need for inferencing (see Citron, 2012 for review). Recent studies in 
this area suggest that processing single affective words engages brain areas known to 
be associated with emotion. For example, the amygdala is activated in response to 
both highly negative (Isenberg et al., 1999; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Maddock & 
Buonocore, 1997; Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003; Maratos, Dolan, Morris, 
Henson, & Rugg, 2001; Nakic, Smith, Busis, Vythilingam, & Blair, 2006; Tabert, 
Borod, Tang, & Lange, 2001) as well as positive words (Briesemeister, Kuchinke, 
Jacobs, & Braun, 2014; Hamann & Mao, 2002; Harenski & Hamann, 2006; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Maddock et al., 2003). Additionally, both positive and 
negative words evoke activations in medial/orbital frontal regions and cingulate 
cortex (Beauregard et al., 1997; Maddock et al., 2003; Maratos et al., 2001). 
However, emotionally arousing words—especially in isolation—do not reflect every 
day social discourse. Instead, verbal interactions typically consist of narratives that 
frequently connote mild and/or mixed emotions, and often require the listener to infer 
the feeling of the speaker. For example, if a listener hears, “Frank worked all night on 
his report, but his computer crashed and he lost his work,” it is immediately 
understood to involve negative emotions, e.g., distress or frustration.  
Whereas the literature on mentalizing and emotion are quite robust, 
neuroimaging studies of affective semantics at the sentence and story level are less 
prevalent. One report showed that listening to short emotional sentences spoken by 
both actors and machines (lacking prosody) recruited two general networks: 1) 
bilateral IFG, bilateral anterior insula, pre-supplementary motor area (SMA) as well 




frontal gyrus and left posterior STS (Beaucousin et al., 2007). In another study, 
participants listened to longer emotional scenarios (~45 sec) with inconsistencies 
embedded in the stories. When the inconsistency concerned emotion, activations were 
revealed in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), dorsal precuneus and left 
amygdaloid complex (Ferstl, Rinck, & von Cramon, 2005). Most social interactions, 
however, are not characterized by lengthy monologues. An investigation (Ferstl & 
von Cramon, 2007) using very short visually-presented emotional scenarios showed 
that aSTS, but not vmPFC or amygdala, was sensitive to the emotional content of the 
scenario. The authors suggested that the lack of response in medial structures may 
have been due to shallower processing of the short stimuli.  
The bulk of the literature on inferring emotional states of others has generally 
been in comparison with more cognitive constructs of mentalizing (e.g., false beliefs, 
strategic thinking, or intentions etc.) to support specific representational models of 
ToM processing (Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Hofstetter, & Vuilleumier, 2014; Saxe, Xiao, 
Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004). For instance, Mason et al. (2008) compared 
stories requiring an inference about a character’s intentions or emotional state and 
found rTPJ activation for intentions but not emotions. Similarly, Corradi-Dell’Acqua 
et al. (2014) demonstrated in a univariate analysis selective engagement of bilateral 
TPJ and pCC/PC when listening to stories about other’s beliefs but not their 
emotions. The vmPFC was responsive to both belief and emotion stories. However, 
they found equivalent activation within these regions when making judgments about a 
character’s belief or emotion. Moreover, they found high correlations between beliefs 




(MVPA) approach. Variations between analytic approaches were also seen for 
Zaitchik and colleagues (2011) who found greater activation for mentalizing 
(belief/representation) relative to emotion in bilateral STS and IPL in an ROI analysis 
when adding mental state words (e.g. “thought”, “remember”, etc.) to the emotional 
sentences. In contrast to these past studies, several studies have shown no differences 
in the general ToM network between emotion and belief stories (Bruneau et al., 2012; 
Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006). Hynes and colleagues (2006) found no differences 
comparing cognitive perspective taking and emotion perspective taking in the general 
ToM network (right TPJ, bilateral STS, dmPFC and mPFC), but observed some 
variation in lateral orbital frontal cortex and inferior frontal gyri. Bruneau and 
colleagues (2012) asked participants to (Task 1) rate the amount of pain felt by 
protagonists or (Task 2) actively empathize with the protagonist in stories of physical 
pain, emotional pain, or false beliefs and compared activation to matched control 
stories. They found generally similar activation patterns across tasks with greater 
activation in bilateral TPJ for empathizing. Importantly, they found that while 
emotional pain and false beliefs similarly activated the ToM network, physical pain 
stories activated an “empathy network” including insula, secondary sensory 
(supramarginal gyrus), middle frontal, and mid aCC all bilaterally (Decety & Lamm, 
2007; Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). 
Variation between emotional pain and physical pain was explored further by Bruneau 
and colleagues (2013) who analyzed cortical response to the same stories using an 
item-level regression approach with ratings of emotional pain, physical pain and 




network, whereas emotional pain correlated with activation in the dorsal and ventral 
aspects of the mPFC and the pCC/PC region. In short, it is unclear how unique the 
neural network for understanding emotion is from other aspects of mentalizing and 
these effects may be driven by analytic method. 
In the previous findings introduced, the degree to which the individual has to 
“infer” the emotion of the protagonist is confounded by several factors. In each of the 
studies above, the scenarios used explicitly mention the emotional state of the 
protagonist or combined story and judgment in the analyses eliminating the need for 
inferential processes with the exception of Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al. (2014) and 
Bruneau et al. (2012), however, both of these studies use mental or other (non-target) 
emotional state words in their stories. As such, the patterns of activation seen in these 
studies could equally reflect the response to emotion or mental state words without 
providing much insight into inferential process what a protagonist is experiencing. 
Furthermore, the previous studies have generally included a behavioral response 
specific to the emotion or mental state in the window of analysis (Beaucousin et al., 
2007; Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007; Hynes et al., 2006; Zaitchik et al., 2011) with the 
exception of a few which separated the response period (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 
2014) or contained an unrelated response (e.g., respond when finished reading, Saxe 
& Powell, 2006). The inclusion of a response specific to the mental state/emotion 
may similarly engage regions artificially and not reflect a pure inferential process. For 
instance, it may be the case that activation of the amygdala is a product of such 
decision responses to affective stimuli as has been shown with viewing faces with 




In summary, the literature on processing emotion from language has been 
limited to explicit references of emotion words either in the target statements (e.g., 
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2014; Zaitchik et al., 2011) or in a decision making 
component (Beaucousin et al., 2007; Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007; Zaitchik et al., 
2011). Thus, it remains unclear what neural mechanisms are involved when one must 
actually infer the emotional state of others from situational contexts as described in 
language as opposed to explicitly being made aware of them. The question posed in 
our study is whether affective verbal utterances—lacking explicit lexical references of 
emotion and therefore necessitating inference—would recruit only regions associated 
with discourse processing or additional regions associated with mental state or 
emotional processing.  
Present study 
The aim of this investigation was to identify the underlying network of 
cortical regions involved in making inferences of affect from spoken discourse 
context. To achieve this goal, positive, negative and neutral scenarios (with natural 
but unaffected prosody) were presented to healthy participants during functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). During the scan, subjects listened to the 
scenario then made a true-false (T/F) congruency judgment related to the emotion of 
the protagonist. Changes in the Blood Oxygenated Level Dependent (BOLD) contrast 
were analyzed on two periods. First, activations elicited by listening to the scenario 
and second, activations during the response period. While previous research has 
examined neural activations associated with emotional inferencing at the 




positive and negative scenarios separately and which avoids the confound of explicit 
labels of emotion.   
With respect to language processing systems in the brain, we hypothesized 
that listening to stories in all three conditions would elicit activations in regions 
involved in language comprehension, namely activation of medial frontal along with 
bilateral temporal and parietal regions (Ferstl & Neumann, 2008; Kuperberg, 
Lakshmanan, Caplan, & Holcomb, 2006; Mar, 2004; Prat, Mason, & Just, 2012). 
Additionally, given the previous findings of Ferstl and von Cramon (2005) as well as 
selected single word studies (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Maddock et al., 2003; 
Straube et al., 2011), we expected that emotional scenarios would involve areas 
consistent with processing emotions, i.e.,  bilateral amygdala, cingulate, and 
orbitofrontal cortices (reviews: Dolan, 2002; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003; 
Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). However, by temporally separating the 
cortical response to our decision probe from the story phase we can determine 
whether particular structures such as the amygdala are involved in the online 
inferential processing of emotion from the scenarios or if it is activated as a result of 
the decision-making process in which reference to emotion is explicit. Because all of 
our scenarios involve reflecting on the experience of a protagonist, we assume that all 
conditions (positive, negative and neutral) involve some degree of social processing. 
Thus, the resulting differences between conditions will reflect the influence of affect 
in the inferential process. Given previous behavioral research on affective word 




predicted that the positive scenarios would evoke faster responses than the negative 
(compared to neutral). 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-two native English speakers recruited from the greater Washington 
DC area contributed data to the present study (11M; mean age 21.3).  Data from two 
individuals (and one run from one participant) were excluded due to low accuracy 
resulting in a final sample size of 20. All subjects reported being free of auditory 
deficits, neurological and major medical conditions, and had no history of head 
trauma (loss of consciousness of more than ten minutes and/or head injury). 
Participants also reported that they had no history of any substance dependence and 
were not currently medicated.  
All participants completed the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 
1971), and received behavioral assessments including the Oral Language 
Comprehension (test 15) from the Woodcock Johnson III Ability Tests (Woodcock, 
McGrew, & Mather, 2001), and two social measures: the Autism Spectrum Quotient  
(AQ)3 (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) which is 
aimed at identifying symptoms or behaviors of autism in adults or adolescents of 
average intelligence, and the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) (Ingersoll, 
                                                 
3 Findings from a recent systematic review of AQ since its inception in 2001 show AQ scores for 
nonclinical individuals: M = 16.94 (SD = .8 - 9.7), with males scoring slightly higher M = 17.89 (SD = 
11.4 - 19.0) than females M = 14.88 (SD = 10.4 – 17.4).  Scores for matched autism spectrum 
individuals: M = 35.19 (SD = 27.6 – 41.1), with males scoring slightly lower M = 36.40 (SD = 28.0 – 
40.1) than females in this group M = 38.83 (SD = 31.9 – 42.5) (Ruzich et al., 2015).  This is consistent 




Hopwood, Wainer, & Brent Donnellan, 2011) completed by a family member or 
close friend, and designed to identify the presence and extent of autistic social 
impairment. (The former were administered as future plans include extending this 
paradigm to individuals with autism.) All study participants received a thorough 
explanation of the experimental procedures, and written consent was obtained in 
accordance with the requirements of the Institutional Review Board of University of 
Maryland. Subjects received monetary compensation for participation. 
Task Procedures 
Trial structure of the EIT is presented in Figure 2. A total of 72 passages with 
24 positive, 24 negative and 24 physical state trials and a congruent and incongruent 
Target sentence for each were evenly distributed over four runs using an event-related 
paradigm (see Appendix B for details regarding stimuli production and selection, and 
Appendix C for EIT stimuli). The congruent and incongruent items were randomized 
such that each participant randomly received 12 congruent and 12 incongruent Target 
sentences per condition (positive, negative, and physical).  Each run began with the 
display of a fixation cross for 500 msec, followed by the aurally-presented passage 
(~10-12 seconds). A blank screen followed for a duration that was jittered between 3-
6 seconds. Then, the target sentence stating “He/She felt …” with a congruent or 
incongruent word was presented visually for 3 seconds during which a true or false 
congruency judgment was made via a button press. Each trial (from Cue to Target 
sentence) was presented for 16-18 seconds, with an inter-trial interval jittered 3-5 
seconds. Participants were instructed to listen carefully to each scenario, and think 




sentence, to which they would respond “true” or “false” by pressing a button on the 
response box. The tasks were implemented with MATLAB version 2010b 
(MATLAB, 2010), using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997). 
Acquisition of Functional MR Data 
Subjects were scanned using a Siemens 3T Trio MRI system with a 32-
channel head coil. Functional images to estimate task-related activity were obtained 
with a gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition time=2000 msec, 
echo time=2400 msec, 64 × 64 matrix, flip angle 70°, FOV 192 mm). Whole brain 
coverage was obtained with 36 axial slices (thickness=3.2 mm; in-plane 
resolution=3.0 × 3.0 mm). A high-resolution T1-weighted MPRAGE scan (repetition 
time=1900 msec, echo time=2320 msec; field of view=230 mm; flip angle=9°; 192 
sagittal slices; thickness=0.9 mm; 0.9 × 0.9 matrix) was obtained covering the whole 
brain. 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of behavioral data 
Performance measures were accuracy and response time (calculated on correct 
trials only) to the EIT Target sentence recorded during fMRI acquisition.  We 
examined the effect of valence and congruency on accuracy and response time 
separately with a two (group: congruent, incongruent) by three (valence: positive, 
negative, neutral) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons were Bonferroni corrected. Statistical analyses of behavioral 






Figure 2.  Experimental Design. 72 passages (24 each positive, negative, physical state) 
and a congruent and incongruent Target sentence were evenly distributed over 4 runs using 
an event-related paradigm. Congruent and incongruent items were randomized. Each run 
began with the display of a fixation cross for 500 msec, followed by the aurally-presented 
passage (~10-12 seconds). A blank screen followed for a duration that was jittered between 
3-6 seconds. Then, the Target sentence “He/She felt …” with a congruent or incongruent 
word was presented visually for 3 seconds during which T/F judgment was made via a 
button press. Each trial was presented for 16-18 sec; inter-trial interval jittered 3-5 sec. 
 
Analysis of functional MR data 
 
Data analysis was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM12b, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing of the EPI time series included: (1) 
realignment for head motion correction, (2) spatial normalization into the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) anatomical space, and (3) spatial smoothing (6mm 
FWHM). Data were high pass filtered at 128 Hz, and examined for excessive motion 
and spiking artifacts using the Artifact Detection Tool (ART) software package. 




1.0 mm) were identified and excluded from subsequent statistical analysis (4.6% of 
the data).  
For each participant, a general linear model (GLM) was used to estimate the 
parameters for the stories and probe separately. The story model included three story 
factors: positive (“POS”), negative (“NEG”), and neutral (“NEUT”) as well as a 
factor for each of the two probe conditions, congruent and incongruent. In order to 
evaluate the effect of response time (RT), an additional model including individual 
RT times as a parametric modulator for each of the probe conditions was employed.  
All factors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(Friston, Frith, Turner, & Frackowiak, 1995). Six realignment parameters as well as 
outlier time points were included in the models as regressors of no interest. The 
contrast images from the first level analyses were then subjected to second level 
random effects analyses.   
To determine regions of increased task-related signal change for the overall 
effect of listening to stories (POS+NEG+NEUT) relative to the implicit (fixation) 
baseline at the group level, we performed a one-way ANOVA and reported the 
overall effects of condition. To examine the effect of valence, whole brain analysis of 
stories was performed using a within subjects repeated measures design. The main 
contrasts of interest were the effect of emotion compared to neutral (POS+NEG vs. 
NEUT) as well as the individual contributions of NEG vs. NEUT and POS vs. NEUT. 





Whole brain analysis of the probe was performed using t-tests for the event-
related response to the congruent and incongruent conditions.  An additional first-
level model was conducted using item-level RT as a parametric modulator for 
condition effects on the probe (Grinband et al., 2011). As a factor, RT did not account 
for any activation in cortex. There was little difference in activation patterns with the 
addition of RT compared to the original, thus the analyses reported are those without 
the modulator. As behavioral results did not reveal statistically significant differences 
between conditions of valence, the main contrasts of interest were congruent and 
incongruent items separately. Whole brain contrasts were corrected at FWE p < 0.05. 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
A 2 (CON, INCON) x 3 (POS, NEG, NEUT) repeated measures ANOVA for 
response times to correct trials (RT) revealed a significant main effect for valence 
F(1.444, 27.431) = 30.126, p < .001. Contrasts revealed that RTs to POS stories F(1, 
19) = 52.193, p < .001, r = .86, and NEG stories F(1, 19) = 8.996, p = .007, r = .57, 
were significantly faster than NEUT stories. There were no significant differences 
between RTs to POS and NEG stories. There was also a significant effect of 
congruency F(1, 19) = 9.189, p = .007. RTs were significantly longer for INCON 
than CON trials.  Accuracy scores were also subjected to a factorial repeated-
measures ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of valence F(1.252, 23.796) = 




.52, was significantly better than NEUT; no significant differences were revealed for 
accuracy between the other conditions. See Table 3 for results. 
Table 3.  
 
Behavioral results, Study 1 
 Response time in msec Accuracy % correct 
Condition Mean (SD) Standard error Mean (SD) Standard error 
PosCon 1164.67 (280.66) 62.72 98.75 (3.35) .75 
PosIncon 1228.31 (297.88) 66.61 98.74 (2.40) .54 
NegCon 1316.06 (243.86) 51.21 96.65 (5.18) 1.16 
NegIncon 1320.83 (303.28) 67.82 96.45 (4.14) .93 
NeutCon 1351.70 (330.08) 73.83 97.48 (3.94) .88 
NeutIncon 1570.82 (309.98) 69.11 95.40 (6.33) 1.42 
Note.  Response time (RT) and accuracy results. 72 stories were distributed over 3 
conditions of valence (36 positive, negative and neutral) and congruency (18 congruent and 
incongruent. Values are reported as mean, standard deviation (SD) and standard error. RTs 
are reported in milliseconds. 
 
Functional MRI Results  
Stories 
 
The overall effect of processing verbal scenarios was determined by 
collapsing across positive, negative and neutral stories. As depicted in Figure 3A (and 
Appendix D, Table 1), the analysis revealed activation in left inferior frontal 
(triangularis) and both dorsal and ventral aspects of medial frontal cortex. There were 
also broad areas of significant activity in both temporal lobes, extending from 
posterior superior temporal gyri (pSTG) to the anterior temporal poles (aTP), and 
including bilateral fusiform and right inferior temporal gyri. In addition, significant 
activation was found in areas of the parietal lobe comprised of bilateral postcentral 
and right angular gyri and in the occipital cortex including right superior- and middle 




activation including right hippocampus, left middle cingulate and bilateral calcarine 
was found. The cerebellum also showed extended bilateral activation.  
 
Figure 3 Activation maps illustrating the presence of significant functional activity associated 
with listening to stories.  A) We show t-values for regions showing signal increases for the 
average effect of stories (POS + NEG + NEUT) vs. baseline contrast.  B) We show t-values 
for signal increases associated with effect of emotion (POS + NEG) vs. NEUT in red, neutral 
vs. emotion in green, and neutral vs. baseline in blue.  Regional variations in task-related 
activity are displayed using a threshold of p < .001 corrected with cluster extent FWE 




To examine the contribution of emotion to the overall effect, we compared 
emotional stories (collapsing across positive and negative) to neutral stories (Table 4).  
As shown in Figure 3B, medial frontal areas (dmPFC, vmPFC and orbital frontal 
gyrus), pCC)/PC, bilateral angular and temporal gyri, and right inferior temporal 
gyrus had significantly greater activation for emotion relative to neutral stories. 
Interestingly, the analysis also revealed clusters of activation that were greater to 
neutral relative to emotional stories located in left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; 




from areas activated by the stories in general (Figure 3A) and the neutral stories 
relative to the implicit baseline (Figure 3B in blue)4. Parameter estimates for the story 
conditions at these clusters revealed that the contrast is a result of deactivation of 
these regions to emotional stories (both positive and negative, see bar plots Figure 4). 
Valence  
 
To further investigate the effects of emotion, we examined the contribution of 
POS and NEG through whole brain contrasts comparing NEG vs. NEUT and POS vs. 
NEUT. NEG < NEUT revealed greater activity in both dorsal and ventral mPFC, 
right inferior frontal gyrus, and large extents of activation along the superior temporal 
sulci bilaterally encompassing the anterior temporal poles, mid temporal cortex 
(including STG and MTG) extending to the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) 
(including angular gyri). Similarly, POS > NEUT elicited activation along the STS 
bilaterally including the aTP, STG, MTG and peaks in left angular gyrus, pCC/PC 
and additionally in mPFC, where activation was greater compared to the NEG > 
NEUT contrast (see Figure 4 images). Table 5 presents results of individual contrasts 
from the repeated-measures ANOVA. As many of the areas sensitive to valence are 
overlapping, we extracted the intensity of activation in selected regions of interest 
described above. Figure 4 (surrounding graphs) shows that the effects of both positive 
and negative valence were quite similar, and were stronger than neutral valence in all 
regions. In a direct comparison of POS and NEG valence, the regions that survived 
corrected threshold were the MTG for NEG > POS and the pCC for POS > NEG. 
                                                 
4 Note that right IFG also appears to be significant for neutral stories in Figure 4B, but does not appear 
in Table 5. This is due to the figure showing activation at an uncorrected voxel level threshold 
(p<0.001) but a cluster corrected threshold (FWE<0.05) whereas the table on included peaks with 





Figure 4.  Activation maps illustrating the presence of significant functional activity associated 
with valence; effect of positive vs. neutral is shown in green, negative vs. neutral is shown in red, 
and neutral vs. emotion (positive + negative) is shown in blue. Yellow indicates areas of overlap. 
Regional variations in task-related activity are displayed using a threshold of p < .001 cluster 
corrected for t-statistic maps. Error bars show standard error. 
 
The effects of NEUT stories contrasted with both NEG and POS was also 
examined using individual contrasts from the repeated measures ANOVA. These 
contrasts showed that NEUT > NEG stories revealed two left frontal peaks, superior 
orbital gyrus and IFG (triangularis), as well as significant activity in supramarginal 
gyrus. As discussed in the contrast of NEUT > POS+NEG, this effect is the result of 
deactivation to emotional stories. The comparison of NEUT > POS showed nearly 
identical peaks (to that of NEUT > NEG) in both superior orbital gyrus and IFG. 
Decision-making response 
To investigate the effect of RT, we calculated a one-sample t-test for the 




covariate. Results for RT were not significant, suggesting that the effects can be 
attributed to the condition of congruency and not to task difficulty. Several areas were 
activated for both the CON and INCON (compared to baseline), including left- aTP, 
inferior temporal gyrus, angular gyrus, and right insula. Common bilateral activations 
were found in IFG, putamen, occipital area and cerebellum. Additional significant 
peaks related to the CON condition included right aTP, and left MTG, insula, 
Heschl’s gyrus, postcentral gyrus, insula and thalamus. Peaks of significant activation 
for the INCON condition included SFG, right MTG, as well as bilateral amygdala, 
right caudate and left hippocampus (Figure 5 and Appendix D, Table 2).   
 
 
Figure 5.  T/F response results. Activation maps illustrating the presence of significant 
functional activity in subcortical areas associated with probe; effect of CON is shown in 
green, INCON is shown in red; areas of overlap are yellow. Regional variations in task-









Brain activity associated with EMO and NEUT stories, Study 1 
   
 Left Right 
Region label x y z t d x Y z t d 
Emotion > Neutral           
Frontal           
  vmPFC -2 38 -22 7.48 3.16      
 -4 42 -20 7.17 2.67      
  dmPFC -10 54 38 8.73 4.00 6 52 20 7.65 3.51 
 -8 56 22 7.92 3.63 4 50 44 6.74 3.09 
 -2 58 36 6.52 2.99      
 -4 60 10 6.40 2.94      
Temporal           
  STS -60 -16 -6 8.62 3.95 52 -6 -12 7.65 3.51 
  MTG -54 -12 -12 9.91 4.55 58 -18 -10 10.24 4.70 
 -52 -2 -26 8.82 4.05 64 -10 -18 9.03 4.14 
 -52 -20 -12 8.56 3.93 48 -34 0 8.76 4.02 
 -56 -2 -24 8.55 3.92 56 -38 0 8.41 3.86 
 -52 -36 -2 7.95 3.65 58 -34 -2 8.25 3.79 
 -50 -6 -20 7.71 3.54 50 -6 -20 8.23 3.78 
 -64 -16 -14 7.67 3.52 50 -2 -22 8.12 3.73 
 -56 -30 -6 6.69 3.07 58 -36 -8 7.86 3.61 
        58 4 -26 7.58 3.48 
      50 4 -22 7.56 3.47 
      58 -4 -10 7.36 3.38 
      52 -60 24 6.23 2.86 
  Middle temporal pole -54 8 -30 9.05 4.15 46 12 -28 7.98 3.66 
      46 20 -28 7.06 3.24 
  ITG -50 0 -30 8.04 3.69      
           
Parietal           
  Supramarginal gyrus      62 -54 26 6.39 2.93 
  Angular gyrus -60 -60 28 8.84 4.06 56 -62 32 6.46 2.96 
 -42 -58 28 8.80 4.04      
 -48 -60 32 8.70 3.99      
           
Subcortical           
  aCC -4 52 20 8.18 3.75      
 -8 50 18 7.98 3.66      
  mCC -2 -52 34 10.22 4.69      
  Precuneus -2 -58 26 7.55 3.46      
Cerebellum           
  Cerebellum crus I -20 -76 -34 8.21 3.77      
 -20 -82 -28 7.17 3.29      
  Cerebellum crus II -28 -80 -34 7.48 3.43 24 -76 -34 6.72 3.09 
 -16 -84 -36 6.46 2.97      
Neutral > Emotion           
Frontal           
  vmPFC  -22 32 -16 9.42 4.32      
  IFG (tri) -42 36 14 8.23 3.78      
           
Parietal           




 -60 -32 44 6.2 2.84      
Note. We show t-values for signal increases associated with emotion using Positive + 
Negative vs. Neutral, signal increases associated with neutral using Neutral vs. Positive + 
Negative.   Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold: t = 6.14, P < .05, FWE corrected.  




Our aim was to understand the neural mechanisms supporting emotional 
inferences made from discourse context without direct references of emotion from 
verbal (“sad, happy, and mad”) or non-verbal (prosody, facial expression) cues. To do 
this, we used vignettes devoid of overt emotional words or prosody, such that 
listeners were required to infer the protagonist’s emotion using linguistic information 
only. Although previous studies have examined the neural correlates related to 
inferring emotion from language (Beaucousin et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 
2014; Ferstl et al., 2005; Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007; Mason, Williams, Kana, 
Minshew, & Just, 2008), to our knowledge this is the first to investigate the neural 
correlates related to processing scenarios of positive, negative and neutral valence 
separately without explicit use of emotion words. In addition, we analyzed the BOLD 
response to the verbal scenarios and response periods separately, allowing us to 
differentiate between neural activations during the period of inference from those 











Brain activity associated with valence, Study 1 
   
 Left Right 
Region label x y z t d x y Z t d 
Negative > Neutral           
Frontal           
  vmPFC -2 40 -22 6.29 2.04      
  dmPFC -4 52 22 8.40 2.73 6 52 20 8.09 2.62 
 -2 46 32 6.53 2.12 6 50 42 7.0 2.27 
 -2 58 36 6.29 2.04 6 42 36 6.47 2.10 
  mPFC -10 54 38 8.27 2.68      
  IFG      48 32 -10 6.33 2.05 
Temporal           
  STS -42 -58 28 8.58 2.78      
 -68 -50 20 6.70 2.17      
 -68 -44 4 7.07 2.29      
 -44 14 -22 6.92 2.25      
  MTG -54 8 -30 10.29 3.34 52 -22 -12 11.37 3.69 
 -54 -12 -12 10.03 3.25 58 -18 -10 10.85 3.52 
 -54 -36 -2 9.55 3.10 48 -34 0 9.64 3.13 
 -52 -2 -26 9.30 3.02 56 -34 -4 9.33 3.03 
 -52 -22 -10 9.06 2.94 50 6 -22 9.11 2.96 
 -58 -30 -6 8.43 2.74 58 -38 0 8.96 2.91 
 -60 -16 -6 8.21 2.66 50 -2 -22 8.87 2.88 
 -54 2 -18 7.83 2.54 64 -14 -16 8.38 2.72 
 -46 -42 0 7.20 2.36 54 -6 -12 8.21 2.66 
 -68 -44 4 7.07 2.29 54 -4 -10 8.16 2.65 
 -64 -16 -14 6.64 2.15 52 -30 -8 8.07 2.62 
      48 6 -30 7.96 2.58 
      56 6 -26 7.89 2.56 
      60 2 -14 7.87 2.55 
  Middle temporal pole -60 6 -16 6.75 2.19 46 12 -28 9.23 2.99 
      48 18 -26 8.24 2.67 
Parietal           
  Inferior parietal       52 -46 28 6.38 2.07 
  Angular gyrus -60 -60 28 9.58 3.12 56 -62 32 7.10 2.30 
 -48 -58 30 8.65 2.81 62 -54 32 6.86 2.23 
      44 -50 24 6.68 2.17 
Subcortical           
  Precuneus -4 -54 34 7.79 2.53      
Cerebellum           
  Cerebellum lob VIIa crus I -20 -76 -34 9.23 2.99 24 -82 -30 7.22 2.34 
 -20 -82 -28 7.71 2.50 26 -76 -34 7.15 2.32 
Neutral > Negative           
Frontal           
  vmPFC -22 34 -16 9.05 2.94      
  IFG (tri) -40 36 14 8.08 2.62      
Parietal            
  Supramarginal gyrus -64 -28 28 7.25 2.35      
 -60 -32 44 6.83 2.22      
 -54 -30 40 6.34 2.06      
Positive > Neutral           




  vmPFC -6 46 -4 6.29 2.04      
   -4 38 -22 6.27 2.03      
  dmPFC -10 54 38 7.0 2.27      
 -4 60 10 6.86 2.23      
 -8 56 22 6.81 2.21      
 -10 52 20 6.59 2.14      
Temporal           
  MTG -52 -14 -16 7.57 2.46 64 -10 -18 8.14  
 -60 -14 -8 6.89 2.24 58 -18 -10 6.99  
 -64 -16 -14 6.83 2.22 44 -44 4 6.61  
 -56 -2 -24 6.80 2.21 50 -6 -20 6.17  
Parietal           
  Angular gyrus -42 -58 28 6.81 2.21      
 -46 -60 32 6.77 2.20      
Subcortical           
  pCC -2 -50 32 10.76 3.49      
 -2 -46 30 10.48 3.40      
  Precuneus -2 -58 26 7.64 2.48      
Neutral > Positive           
Frontal             
  vmPFC -22 32 -16 7.70 2.50      
  IFG (tri) -42 36 14 6.53 2.12      
Negative > Positive           
Temporal           
MTG -56 -34 -4 6.69 2.17 52 8 -20 6.3  
Positive > Negative           
Subcortical           
  Cuneous -12 -72 34 6.77 2.20      
  mCC      8 -30 32 6.16  
Note. We show t-values for signal increases associated with valence using four contrasts 
from repeated measures ANOVA: Negative vs. Neutral, Neutral vs. Negative, Positive vs. 
Neutral, Neutral vs. Positive, Negative vs. Positive and Positive vs. Negative.  Coordinates 
are MNI space. Height threshold: t = 6.14, P < .05, FWE corrected. Extent threshold: k = 0 
voxels. 
     
Our primary hypothesis argued that emotionally valent stories would activate 
regions associated with social-affective processing in addition to regions associated 
with discourse processing and inference making in general. Our findings revealed that 
the set of cortical regions more responsive to emotional relative to neutral stories 
generally overlap with regions activated by the neutral stories (see Figure 4B) 
suggesting that emotional stimuli enhances activation in regions responsive to 
discourse. This set of regions surrounding the mid-section of the STS bilaterally and 




narrative processing (Ferstl & Neumann, 2008; Kuperberg, Lakshmanan, Caplan, & 
Holcomb, 2006; Mar, 2004, 2011; Prat, Mason, & Just, 2012). As shown in meta-
analyses of narrative processing (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007; Mar, 2011), these 
regions are engaged irrespective of the inclusion of human characters or mentalizing 
processes in the stories themselves. These regions are also engaged whether the 
stories are presented auditorally or visually (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Jobard, 
Vigneau, Mazoyer, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2007). As shown by Mar’s (2011) meta-
analyses (see Figure 6), the mid STS and temporal poles are engaged in studies of 
ToM whether they are story based or not. Beyond the network associated with neutral 
stories, the emotionally valent stories elicited activation in medial and orbital 
prefrontal regions as well as bilateral temporal parietal junction/superior temporal 
gyri and precuneus/pCC. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
inferring the emotional state of another engages regions associated with mentalizing, 
or ToM, as all of these regions are part of the putative ToM network (Frith & Frith, 
2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006).  
Contrary to our hypotheses, we did not find greater activation for emotional 
stimuli in the insula, dorsal aCC, or amygdala, regions traditionally associated with 
emotion processing and empathy (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et 
al., 2011). To the contrary, the contrast of neutral relative to emotional stimuli 
showed greater activation in IFG and supramarginal gyrus (SMG) bilaterally which 
tend to be associated with empathy for physical pain (Bruneau et al., 2013; Bruneau 
et al., 2012) or bodily sensations (Saxe & Powell, 2006). Given the nature of the 




temperature, the engagement of secondary somatosensory regions (SMG) and IFG 
regions just anterior to the insula suggests that these components of the empathy 
network are reflective of the physical, rather than emotional nature of the empathy 
response. Thus, our contrast of emotional relative to neutral stimuli reveals greater 
engagement of the network of regions associated with language and mentalizing, 
whereas the inverse contrast engages areas involved in empathy for physical 
sensations.  
Narrative processing or mentalizing networks 
Our theoretical aim was to determine whether drawing inferences regarding 
the emotion of another person is reflected in cortical regions beyond the language 
network. However, it is unclear exactly how unique the networks for language 
processing and mentalizing (Deen, Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015; Ferstl & 
von Cramon, 2001; Mar, 2011; Spreng & Mar, 2012). For instance, Figure 6 shows 
the spatial overlap in activation patterns reported in one meta-analysis conducted on 
studies of narrative processing (red) and studies of mentalizing or ToM in the context 
of stories (dark blue; Mar, 2011). The remarkable amount of overlap in the networks 
particularly along the STS (particularly, the TPJ and ATL), the dorsal and ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and insula bilaterally suggests common underlying 
processes involved in these domains (Deen et al., 2015; Redcay, 2008). Whereas 
some have suggested the common patterns of activation are indicative of processes of 
mental simulation of the thoughts and perspective of others (Mitchell, Banaji, & 
Macrae, 2005; Mitchell, 2009; however see Saxe, 2005), others have similarly argued 




understanding the goals and intentions of others are invoked (Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2009; Spreng, Mar, & 
Kim, 2008) or that these networks reflect the control of cognition from externally 
modulated toward internal mental processes (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008). It 
has also been argued that processes of ToM and narrative inferencing may 
independently activate a region such as mPFC (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002) or that 
subnetworks such as a medial (mPFC and pCC system) modulate mental/emotional 
reactivity (Bruneau et al., 2013; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002), whereas 
the lateral network (bilateral TPJ) reflects a cognitive appraisal of the situation 
(Decety & Lamm, 2007; Mars et al., 2012). Despite the competing theories, it is 
necessary to determine the networks involved when actually inferring a protagonist’s 
emotional state absent of the potentially confounding elements of explicit 
mental/emotional state words and task response. Whereas previous studies of 
emotional processing of scenarios have generally found engagement of the ToM 
network including bilateral TPJ, STS, and medial regions including dmPFC, vmPFC, 
and pCC/PC (Bruneau et al., 2012; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2014; Hynes et al., 
2006; Zaitchik et al., 2011), most of these studies have focused on negative affect of 







Figure 6. Emotion (EMO) > neutral (NEUT) activation (green) shown together with 
regions associated with narrative comprehension (NARR; Mar, 2011; red), ToM stories 
(TOM; Mar, 2011; dark blue), areas where (EMO > NEUT) ∩ NARR (yellow), (EMO > 
NEUT) ∩ TOM (light blue), NARR ∩ TOM (pink) and the overlap of all (white). Regional 
variations in task-related activity are displayed using a threshold of p < .001 corrected with 
cluster extent FWE threshold (p<0.05) for t-statistic maps. 
 
Effects of valence  
The direct comparisons of positive and negative valence at the stringent 
voxelwise correction threshold reported in Table 5 revealed that negative stories 
produced greater activation in the left lateral MTG/STS region whereas positive 
stories yielded greater activation in the mid/posterior cingulate region.  However, 
when looking at these conditions relative to baseline, as in Figure 4, a clear pattern is 
revealed in which negative stimuli more strongly activate the lateral temporal regions 
and the dorsal aspect of mPFC (Figure 4 in red) whereas positive stories are more 




significant cluster in the ventral aspect of the medial orbital frontal area (xyz = -8, 60, 
-4) for positive versus negative stories, whereas the negative versus positive contrast 
reveals a cluster located more dorsally in the frontal superior medial region. When 
using a clusterwise correction (FWE p<0.05) for voxels at the uncorrected p <0.001 
threshold (Figure 7) it is clear that there is greater activation for negative relative to 
positive stories in the TPJ regions bilaterally and along the mid-STS extending down 
toward the ATLs in addition to the dmPFC. Moreover, the positive stories show 
greater activation in the posterior medial regions including the pCC/PC and 
neighboring posterior parietal and cuneus region in addition to the vmPFC region. 
 
 
Figure 7. Contrasts of negative compared to positive (NEG > POS; red) and POS > NEG 
(green). Regional variations in task-related activity are displayed using a threshold of 
p<.001 corrected with cluster extent FWE threshold (p<0.05) for t-statistic maps. 
 
With respect to the putative TOM and NARR networks discussed, positive 
stories are generally associated with the vmPFC and pCC, both of which are 




across conditions revealed deactivation for neutral items and more positive activation 
for emotional items with positive stimuli being most active (see bar plot in Figure 4). 
As discussed, the pCC (in conjunction with the mPFC and TPJ) has been implicated 
as part of the brain’s default mode network (DMN) which is often shown as anti-
correlated with task demands and the cognitive control system (Fox et al., 2005). 
Based upon our behavioral results, it appears that our neutral condition was more 
difficult than the emotion conditions with respect to the EIT task and thus the pCC 
activity, and the similar pattern in vmPFC, could reflect effort in cognizing (the DMN 
explanation). On the other hand, the pCC has also been associated with the processing 
of pain and emotion (Maddock & Buonocore, 1997; Maddock et al., 2003), ToM 
(Saxe & Powell, 2006), and self-referential and other-referential processing (Spreng 
& Grady, 2009). Interestingly, meta-analyses reveal slight spatial variation in the pCC 
for investigations of memory relative to pain, and the invocation of emotion and 
cognitive effort is topographically indistinct (Nielsen, Balslev, & Hansen, 2005). 
Together with regions of the dmPFC, the pCC has been proposed to invoke episodic 
traces in the service of retrospective memory or prospective construction of scenarios 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2009; Spreng et al., 
2008). Because the neutral stimuli in our study also engages these episodic traces, 
simulation alone does not account for the greater activation for emotional stories. 
Similarly, the vmPFC has been implicated in discourse processing (Ferstl & von 
Cramon, 2002) and in processing emotional words (Beauregard et al., 1997; Maddock 
et al., 2003; Maratos et al., 2001), higher level inferencing of emotional discourse 




as self-referential processes and reasoning about another person’s thoughts (Ferstl & 
von Cramon, 2002; Frith & Frith, 1999; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). More interestingly, 
the contrast between positive and negative valence within our stories revealed a 
differentiation in activation in the dorsal and ventral aspects of mPFC. These findings 
are consistent with a recent meta-analysis showing that the dorsal medial PFC is more 
active in response to negative feedback while the orbital/ventral PFC is more 
responsive to positive feedback and social acceptance (Crone, 2014). According to 
Crone, the connections to the dorsal mPFC from the dorsal anterior cingulate (daCC) 
and the supplementary motor area (SMA) serve as a negative feedback loop in social 
and cognitive functioning, whereas the ventral mPFC has more direct connections 
with the reward system in the subgenual aCC and ventral striatum and responds to 
positive social-affective feedback. 
In addition to the dorsal aspect of the mPFC, the negative stories are also 
associated with bilateral TPJ, ATL, and STS all of which are regions that show 
relative overlap between narrative processing (NARR) and mentalizing (TOM). 
Bilateral posterior temporal/parietal (TPJ) regions were significantly more active for 
stories eliciting emotional inferences compared to stories eliciting inferences about 
bodily states. These findings are consistent with a role for this region in narrative 
comprehension as well as inferences of others’ mental or emotion state above and 
beyond narrative comprehension alone (Beaucousin et al., 2007; Deen et al., 2015; 
Mar, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006). While our results are at 
odds with others who have shown that TPJ activation is related to mental/belief states 




negative scenarios had greater activation than even positive suggests that this region 
is not only responsive to emotion, but also to valence. This is consistent with recent 
findings from Bruneau et al (2012) who found greater activation to emotionally 
painful stories relative to non-painful (yet emotional) stories. Our findings are also 
consistent with Saxe and Powell (2006), who showed the bilateral TPJ was activated 
for the processing of others mental states, but not their bodily sensations or 
appearance. The content of our neutral items included bodily sensations such a 
fatigue and hunger that may be more akin to their “non-mental” manipulations. This 
study extends these findings to demonstrate that inferences about emotional states 
(without reference to beliefs or desires) engage the TPJ to a greater extent than non-
mental bodily states.   
Negatively valent stories engaged the anterior temporal lobes (aTL) bilaterally 
to a greater extent than positive stories. In studies of discourse processing, there is 
strong evidence for involvement of the aTLs for language comprehension in general 
(Ferstl & Neumann, 2008), and more specifically for semantic integration over 
sentences and texts (see Stowe, Haverkort, & Zwarts, 2005 for review). However, 
findings of emotional valence in the aTL have not been documented previously. 
Other lines of research implicate the aTL for ToM processes (Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003) and for making inferences about others’ emotional state 
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Maratos et al., 2001; Völlm et 
al., 2006). In fact, Völlm and colleagues (2006) showed overlapping areas of 
activation in aTLs for empathy and theory of mind tasks. A recent review proffers the 




require one to analyze other agent’s emotions, intentions or beliefs” (Olson & 
Plotzker, 2007). Our data are consistent with past findings and extend them to 
demonstrate that aTL plays a role in making emotional inferences from sentence 
context without explicit lexical reference to the emotion. This effect appears to be 
enhanced for negatively valent stimuli. Thus, as with the dmPFC and TPJ, the aTL 
likely plays a role in the evaluation of emotionally-relevant mental states conveyed 
through linguistic stimuli beyond the semantic information. 
Effects of decision making in EIT task 
Based on previous studies of processing emotion in language (Beaucousin et 
al., 2007; Ferstl et al., 2005), we hypothesized that the amygdala would be involved 
in the inferential process. While we did not see subcortical activity in the amygdala 
and striatum during the story phase, this region was engaged in the context of the 
true/false congruency judgment including the putamen, caudate, insula and amygdala 
(see Figure 5 and Appendix D, Table 2). This is consistent with research that has 
shown that the striatum is centrally involved in decision-making processes (Balleine, 
Delgado, & Hikosaka, 2007), particularly those involving a social component (Rilling 
et al., 2002; Sanfey, 2007).  Emotional processes, too play a role in decision-making 
(Grecucci, Giorgetta, van’t Wout, Bonini, & Sanfey, 2013; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 
2006). This may explain why, in contrast to previous studies of emotional words 
(Maddock et al., 2003; Maratos et al., 2001; Nakic et al., 2006; Straube et al., 2011) 
and stories (Beaucousin et al., 2007; Ferstl et al., 2005), our emotional vignettes 




references to emotion or b) a response condition, suggesting that previous findings 
were due to decision making factors on emotion (Pérez-Edgar et al., 2007).   
Conclusion 
The present study extends previous research on inferential processing of 
emotional language (Beaucousin et al., 2007; Bruneau et al., 2013; Bruneau et al., 
2012; Ferstl et al., 2005; Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007) by differentiating positive and 
negative emotion, and also by examining the BOLD response to vignettes separately 
from the response condition. We showed that verbal emotional stimuli enhances 
activation of cortical regions generally responsive to discourse, and also regions 
associated with affective processing and social cognition, specifically medial and 
orbital frontal regions, bilateral middle temporal areas, temporal parietal 
junction/superior temporal gyri and pCC/PC. We also showed that these regions 
respond differentially to positive and negative valence, most clearly in the medial 
frontal region where activation was more dorsal for negative stories and ventral for 
the positive condition. The findings of the present study also suggest that mentalizing 
alone does not account for the differences between emotional and neutral stories, as 
all of our stories required similar inferencing of the feelings of the protagonist. 
Finally, our results for the judgment task showed striatal and amygdala activations, 
whereas we failed to show similar activations for stories, suggesting the importance 







Chapter 4 - Emotional language processing in autism 
 
Purpose 
The overall goal of the study presented herein was to extend the paradigm 
used in Study 1 to include autistic individuals. Specifically, to determine a) whether 
individuals with autism are able to make emotional inferences in the language 
context, and b) to investigate the extent to which autistic individuals use the neural 
systems typically associated with language and/or social-affective processes when 
making these inferences as compared to typically achieving peers.  
As described in detail in preceding chapters, social-emotional understandings 
require that one is able to both understand the message explicitly stated in spoken 
communications, as well as to draw inferences implicitly conveyed in others’ 
verbalizations. These inferences often include information related to emotion, as in 
the negative feelings implied in, “When I went to my car this morning I saw there 
was a large dent in it.” Such inferences—as they relate to others—also require social 
processes of mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to attribute mental 
states to others and use this information to explain or make predictions about them. 
Thus, making such inferences about others’ emotional states requires processes 
associated with both mentalizing and language comprehension. 
In autism, deficits have been shown in processes related to mentalizing (Frith 
& Frith, 1999; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2001) and to emotions (Begeer et al., 2008; 
Nuske et al., 2013). Findings regarding emotional language specifically in ASD are 
mixed, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2, although the evidence suggests that 




question posed in this study is whether the process of making emotional inferences 
from spoken language in autism is associated with reduced neural activity in the brain 
regions typically linked to the ToM network, including medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (pCC), bilateral- anterior and posterior superior 
temporal sulci (aSTS, pSTS), and temporal parietal junction (see Mar, 2011 for 
review), those implicated in processing emotions, i.e., anterior cingulate cortex 
(aCC), medial- and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (mPFC, vmPFC), and amygdala 
(see Citron, 2012 for review), or whether autistic individuals engage compensatory 
neural activity in areas typically involved in inferential language processing, i.e., 
aSTS, pCC, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG), superior temporal gyrus (STG) bilaterally (see Ferstl & Neumann, 2008 for 
review). 
To investigate this question, functional MRI data from adolescents and adults 
with autism was compared to typically developing peers on an Emotional Inference 
Task (EIT). This study replicates the one described in Chapter 3 in terms of stimuli 
and design, with improvements made to the scanning protocol (see Methods). Briefly, 
emotionally valent (positive or negative) and neutral (physical state) short stories 
were presented verbally in an event-related fMRI study, and subjects were asked to 
make a true-or-false (T/F) congruency judgment pertaining to the inference to be 
drawn. This experimental design allowed me to compare cortical responses to the 
scenario from which the emotional inference is drawn as well as from the congruity 
judgment in both neurotypical and autistic individuals. This is an improvement on 




language processing in autism. For example, Catarino et al. (2011) presented written 
emotional (and concrete) sentences with congruent or incongruent final words. Their 
analysis focused solely on the decision-making component of the judgment, and 
therefore failed to determine whether the core deficit in emotional inferences for ASD 
was in the response to the event/context or the subsequent task component (congruity 
judgments or word selection). In addition, this study identified neural activity in 
response to both positive and negative valence separately (rather than collapsing the 
conditions of emotion) without the use of emotionally explicit language (Han et al., 
2014; Mason et al., 2008). Finally, this study employed simultaneous accelerated 
multiband (MB) imaging (Moeller et al., 2010) in an interleaved echo planar imaging 
(EPI) pulse sequence which has been shown to result in a higher (temporal and 
spatial) resolution thus enabling more accurate measurement of functional responses 
(Feinberg & Stetsompop, 2013; Xu, Kemeny, Park, Frattali, & Braun, 2005). At the 
time of this writing, no reported studies have employed these methods in autism.   
Hypotheses  
Research shows that emotional deficits are one characteristic of autistic 
individuals (Chapter 2 and Begeer et al., 2008; Nuske et al., 2013). One hypothesis 
suggests that emotional deficits in autism are due to the inability to understand what 
others are thinking or feeling, that is, more generalized ToM deficits (Frith & Frith, 
1999; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2001) occurring with abnormal functioning of 
associated brain regions: medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex 
(pCC), bilateral- anterior and posterior superior temporal sulcus (aSTS, pSTS), and 




2004; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006). In autism, aberrant brain 
activity in regions of the ToM network (mPFC, pCC, bpSTS, bTPJ) have been shown 
during mental state attribution tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Castelli, 2005; Kana 
et al., 2009; Piggot et al., 2004), in narrative comprehension (Happe, Ehlers, Fletcher, 
& Frith, 1996; Mason et al., 2008) and specifically during emotional narratives 
(Mason et al., 2008). A second hypothesis is that emotional deficits are driven by a 
failure to elicit appropriate emotional responses to depicted events. Generation of an 
emotional response to stimuli can also be assessed in terms of brain activation. 
Individuals with autism often show reduced response (particularly in amygdala and 
prefrontal regions) to emotion in faces (Ashwin et al., 2007; Critchley et al., 2000; 
Dapretto et al., 2006; Piggot et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2004) and negatively valenced 
words (Kennedy et al., 2006), but few studies have looked at response to emotional 
inference from linguistic stimuli in autism (Catarino et al., 2011; Han et al., 2014; 
Mason et al., 2008). Neurotypical (NT) individuals activate several regions in 
response to emotionally valent linguistic stimuli including: the rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex (raCC; Whalen et al., 1998), orbitofrontal cortex (Hynes et al., 2006; 
Maratos, Dolan, Morris, Henson, & Rugg, 2001), and bilateral amygdala (Ferstl, 
Rinck, & Von Cramon, 2005; Isenberg et al., 1999; Kiehl et al., 2001; Strange, 
Henson, Friston, & Dolan, 2000). No study has yet examined whether these “social-
affective” brain regions, that is, the ToM network and/or regions associated with 
emotion (mPFC, aCC and amygdala), show reduced activation in autism when 




Using fMRI in the design described above, neural activations were measured 
in response to both the emotional events described in the passages as well as the 
congruity judgment to the emotion word. Behavioral measures of response time and 
accuracy on the judgments were also collected. My primary hypotheses (Table 6, 7) 
were that autistic individuals would show adequate abilities in making congruency 
judgments but will fail to show typical cortical activations in social-affective brain 
areas to emotional story context (excepting the aCC, which may be recruited at it is 
implicated in both emotional processes and comprehending inferential language). 
According to this hypothesis, relative to NT individuals, autistic individuals would: 1) 
elicit little to no activity in areas associated with social-affective processes while 
listening to the stories describing an emotional event, 2) show more activation in 
response to the incongruent target items compared to the congruent condition. 
Specifically, activation will be seen in the cognitive control network including the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and posterior aCC (as opposed to rostral aCC) 
involved in error monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). In 
terms of accuracy and response times, the autistic group should exhibit similar 
characteristics to the NT group (and to the pattern shown in Study 1): 1) correct 
identification of target, 2) faster and more accurate responses to emotional compared 
to neutral stories and 3) faster responses to congruent relative to incongruent targets 
(Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2009), but overall slower response 
times (Table 8). Another possibility is that individuals with ASD do elicit emotion to 
the described events but fail to link these responses to the appropriate labels (e.g., 




these referents. According to this hypothesis, relative to NT individuals, individuals 
with ASD should: 1) elicit reduced activity in the social-affective areas of the brain 
while listening to the stories describing an emotional event, and 2) show less 
activation to incongruent items as they do not detect the incongruency between the 
verbal label for emotion and the sentence context in the cognitive control network 
(above). A third prospect is that it is the label of emotion that is problematic not the 
failure to elicit emotion, autistic individuals would elicit a response (activation) to the 
emotional passage in the social-affective regions, but still fail to detect the 
incongruity both behaviorally and cortically on the Target Sentence which is 
determined by the label of the emotion. 
Table 6.      
 
Primary hypotheses: neural response to scenarios, Study 2 
 
 EMO NEUT 
Regions ASD NT ASD NT 
Theory of mind        
  mPFC  <     
  pCC  <     
  baSTS  <     
  bpSTS  <     
  bTPJ  <     
Emotion        
  aCC  =     
  mPFC  <     
  vmPFC  <     
  Amygdala   <     
Inferential language       
  dmPFC  =   =  
  aCC  =   =  
  baSTS  =   =  
  bIFG  =   =  
  bSTS/MTG  =   =  
Note. Summary of predictions for brain areas associated with theory of mind, emotion and 
inferential language in response to emotional (EMO) and neutral (NEUT) scenarios for 





Table 7.  
 
Primary hypotheses: neural responses to judgments, Study 2 
 
 Congruency 
 INCON > CON CON > INCON 
Regions ASD NT ASD NT 
aCC  <     
dlPFC  <     
Right IPL  <     
Precuneus     <  
pCC     <  
Insula     <  
Note. Summary of predictions for brain areas associated with 
cognitive control. Abbreviations: aCC, anterior cingulate cortex; 
ASD, individuals with autism; CON, congruent; dlPFC, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; INCON, incongruent; NT, 











My primary hypothesis is that correct identification of depictions of socially-
relevant emotional situations (in language) is associated with a failure to elicit social-
emotional responses to affective stimuli. An alternative hypothesis is that autistic 
individuals will fail to elicit social-affective responses to emotional story contexts due 
to generalized language deficits or to more specific difficulties with engaging 
Table 8.  
 
Primary hypotheses: behavioral results, Study 2  
  
Measure                    Contrast 
Response times    
  Story valence  EMO < NEUT 
  Target CON < INCON 
  Group NT < ASD 
    
Accuracy    
  Story valence  EMO = NEUT 
  Target CON = INCON 
  Group NT = ASD 
Note.  Abbreviations: ASD, individuals with autism; CON, 
congruent; EMO, emotion; INCON, incongruent; NEUT, neutral; 




emotion from linguistic context. It has been shown that individuals with autism have 
greater difficulty with drawing global inferences from language in general (Joliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 2000; Losh & Caps, 2003). Additionally, neuroimaging studies find 
abnormalities in activation patterns during non-social or emotional language 
processing (review, see Groen et al., 2008). In this case, failure to infer the emotional 
consequences of the events described in a story would be due to this generalized 
language deficit. Thus, autistic individuals would have similar difficulties making 
emotional and non-emotional inferences and would perform poorly on the congruity 
judgment in the EIT for both items. The processing of both incongruent vs. congruent 
items would then fail to elicit activation in cognitive control networks in ASD for 
both emotional and neutral words.   
Methods 
Participants 
Fifteen participants with autism (ASD; ages 16 - 29, 13 males) and 16 
neurotypical controls (NT) (ages 16 - 29, 13 males) were recruited. Data from one 
participant in the autism group was excluded due to movement. Six of the 14 autistic 
participants were medicated when scanned: 5 received SSRIs, 3 CNS stimulants, 2 
antipsychotic drugs and 3 other antidepressants (note that two of the medicated 
autistic participants were treated with more than one drug). One of the control 
participants was medicated with an antidepressant. Besides the ASD diagnosis in the 
autism group, all participants reported being free of auditory deficits, major medical 




minutes and/or head injury). Participants received a thorough explanation of the 
experimental procedures, and written consent was obtained in accordance with the 
requirements of the Institutional Review Board of University of Maryland. Subjects 
received monetary compensation for participation. 
Behavioral assessments  
Full scale IQ was assessed with the Vocabulary and Matrix Design subtests of 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) or Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Language ability was further assessed using the Sentence 
Memory (test 15) from the Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning 
(WRAML-2; Sheslow & Adams, 1990), a sentence repetition task shown to be 
closely related to general language ability in autism (Kenworthy et al., 2012), and the 
Oral Language Comprehension (test 15) from the Woodcock Johnson III Ability 
Tests (Woodcock et al., 2001). Diagnoses for participants in the autism group were 
confirmed with the Autism Diagnostic Observational Scales-Revised (ADOS-R; Lord 
et al., 2000), administered by a trained and research-reliable clinician, and ASD 
symptomatology was further assessed using two measures. The first, the Autism 
Quotient (AQ; Appendix F, Table 1; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 
2001), is a self-administered questionnaire designed to measure autistic symptoms in 
adults with normal intelligence. While not diagnostic, the scale was developed using 
diagnostic criteria. Scores range from 0-50, higher scores being indicative of more 
autistic symptoms. In a large pilot study, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) showed 
that adults with autism had a mean AQ score of 35.8 (SD = 6.3), which was 




control group but not in the autism group, men (M = 17.8, SD = 6.8) scored 
significantly higher than women (M = 15.4, SD = 5.7), and more males than females 
(40% versus 20%) scored in the intermediate range (20+ points). The AQ underscores 
the theory that autistic traits occur on a continuum in the ASDs and the neurotypical 
population, as similar processing styles are seen in those with high scores on the AQ 
and autistic individuals (Almeida, Dickinson, Maybery, Badcock, & Badcock, 2010; 
Clark, Hughes, Grube, & Stewart, 2013; Robertson & Simmons, 2013; Wainer, 
Ingersoll, & Hopwood, 2011). The second measure, the Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ; Appendix F, Table 2; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) is a list of 
yes/no questions focused on an individual’s early development in terms of language 
use and social functioning. Out of a total possible 40 points, a score of 15 or higher is 
used to differentiate autism from other diagnoses. Two separate studies have 
demonstrated the questionnaire’s internal consistency (.81-.93; Naglieri & Chambers, 
2009).  
Several additional self-report instruments were also included to evaluate 
characteristics and traits commonly associated with autism spectrum disorders. The 
first three are general measures of social- and emotional functioning. Firstly, 
participants completed the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Appendix F, Table 3; Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), consisting of 40 empathy items and 20 fillers, with 
higher scores being associated with higher empathic abilities. In their pilot data, 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2004) show that, out of a total possible 80 points, 
adults with ASDs scored significantly lower (M = 20.4, SD = 11.6) than matched 




their AQ scores (r = -0.56, p < .001). The second is designed to evaluate alexithymia, 
a condition characterized by reduced ability to interpret emotional states, both one’s 
own as well as others. Several studies have suggested that the emotional impairments 
in autism are due to alexithymia, rather than this being a feature of autism, (Bird & 
Cook, 2013; Bird et al., 2010; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013). The 20-Item 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Appendix F, Table 4; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994; Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003) results in 
scores from 1-100, and scores ≥ 61 are suggestive of high alexithymia, while those ≤ 
51 = low symptomatology. Autistic individuals (M = 60.44, SD = 10.84) generally 
score higher than matched controls (M = 42.51, SD = 9.09) (Hill et al., 2004). 
Thirdly, to measure “mentalizing” abilities, the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes-
Revised” (MinE; Appendix F, Table 5; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) 
was employed. In this test, participants identify emotion conveyed in 40 black & 
white photographs of eye regions by matching one of four emotional words to the 
image. Out of the 40 possible points, pilot data shows autistic individuals make fewer 
accurate decisions (M = 21.9, SD = 6.6) compared to IQ matched controls (M = 30.9, 
SD = 3.0). Two more questionnaires were included, the first to evaluate overall “trait” 
anxiety levels (as compared to “state”) because anxiety disorders are prevalent in 
autism (Gillott & Standen, 2007; Simonoff et al., 2008; van Steensel, Bögels, & 
Perrin, 2011). For this, the STAIT (Appendix F, Table 6; State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory; Spielberger, 2010) was administered, a 20-item self-report assessment that 
has undergone various reliability and validity tests, providing evidence that it is an 




Higher scores (on a scale of 1-80) suggest higher anxiety levels. The next 
questionnaire concerns levels of loneliness, also associated with autism disorders 
(Mazurek, 2013). The 20-item UCLA Loneliness Scale (version 3) is shown to be 
highly reliable, both in terms of internal consistency and test-retest reliability (UCLA; 
Appendix F, Table 7; Russell, 1996), and out of a possible 60 points, higher scores 
suggest higher degrees of loneliness. Finally, all participants completed the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).  
Group characteristics  
Table 9 summarizes the demographic information and assessments the both 
groups. Notably, there are no group differences for age (t(28) = -.95, p = .368; ASD: 
M = 26.36, SD = 13.7; NT: M = 20.63, SD = 12.2), gender (χ2 (1) = 0.11, p = .743), 
full scale IQ (t(28) = -1.90, p = .067; ASD: M = 116.8, SD = 13.8; NT: M = 126.2, SD 
= 13.2), Matrix Reasoning IQ (t(28) = -1.27, p = .214; ASD: M = 56.1, SD = 6.9; NT:  
M = 60.1, SD = 9.5), or WJIII Oral Comprehension scores (t(28) = -1.42, p = .809; 
ASD: M = 27.0, SD = 4.3; NT: M = 28.8, SD = 2.6). However, between-group 
differences were revealed in the verbal IQ scores (t(28) = -2.41, p = .023; ASD: M = 
62.6, SD = 9.3; NT: M = 69.5, SD = 6.4) and WRAML-2 (t(28) = -2.27, p = .031; 
ASD: M = 10.07, SD = 3.0; NT: M = 12.4, SD = 2.5) scores in this sample. Boxplot 
diagrams comparing the results of each of the behavioral assessments for both groups 
are found in Appendix E. In the measures designed to assess autistic characteristics, 
results are consistent with expectations, that is, the group with autism shows more 
autistic symptomatology than the controls. Specifically, the Autism Quotient (AQ; 




autistic traits compared to NT (M = 15.0, SD = 8.5), likewise the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: t(28) = 5.77, p < .0001), suggests that the ASD 
group (M = 20.9, SD = 4.4) displayed more early autistic symptomatology compared 
to NT (M = 9.6, SD = 6.0). Additionally, the Empathy Quotient (EQ; t(28) = -5.75, p 
< .0001), suggests that the ASD group (M = 24.9, SD = 11.9) has impaired 
empathizing abilities compared to controls (M = 46.4, SD = 9.4), the Mind in the Eyes  
(t(28) = -2.58, p = .015), suggests that ASD group (M = 22.9, SD = 4.7) is less able to 
empathize via photos of eyes relative to controls (M = 27.06, SD = 4.3), and the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scales (TAS-20; t(28) = 2.26, p = .032), shows that autistic 
participants (M = 52.6, SD = 14.6) have impairments in identifying emotions 
compared to NT (M = 42.6, SD = 9.6). However, the same is not observed for either 
the anxiety scales (STAIT; t(28) = 1.42, p = 1.66), [ASD (M = 48.2, SD = 10.2); NT 
(M = 42.5, SD = 11.4)] or the loneliness assessment (UCLA; t(28) = 1.21, p = .418), 
where the groups’ scores were equal [ASD (M = 26.36, SD = 13.7); NT (M = 20.63, 
SD = 12.2)]. In order to further investigate the nature of these metrics within each 
group and determine their relationship, within-group correlations were conducted. 
Results of these analyses are summarized in Tables 10 and 11 for the ASD group and 
the NT group respectively. In the autism group, measures of autistic characteristics 
covary, but not with language or IQ, suggesting that ASD symptomology is separate 
from cognitive and linguistic ability in this sample. Specifically, for cognitive 
measures, Full-Scale IQ scores are significantly correlated with Verbal IQ, r =.912, 
Matrix Reasoning IQ, r =.846, and oral comprehension abilities (WJIII), r =.765 (all 




however, we see a significant relationship between Matrix Reasoning IQ, r =.614, 
sentence repetition (WRAML-2), r =.656 and oral comprehension scores (WJIII), r 
=.722 (all ps < 0.05). For measures concerning autistic characteristics, Autism 
Quotient scores are significantly related to other social-emotional measures, 
specifically one’s social communication development scores (SCQ), r = .564, p < 0.5, 
poor empathy abilities (EQ), r = -.817, p < 0.01, and impaired mentalizing abilities 
(Mind in the Eyes) r = -.643, p < 0.5. Further, there were also significant relationships 
between this group’s mentalizing (Mind in Eyes) (in)abilities and their empathy 
ratings (EQ) r = -.738, p < 0.01, alexithymia (TAS-20) scores r = -.746, p < 0.01, 
levels of anxiety (STAIT) r = -.583, p < 0.5 and degree of loneliness (UCLA) 




Table 9.     
     
Demographic and symptoms assessment information, Study 2  
     
 ASD NT   
  (n = 14)  (n = 16) Statistics p 
Age (years) 21.26 ± 4.1 22.70 ± 4.5 t(28) = -.95 .368 
  (range) (16 – 29) (16 – 29)   
Gender (M/F) 12/2 13/3 χ2 (1) = 0.11 .743 
Full IQ 116.8 ± 13.8 126.2 ± 13.2 t(28) = -1.90 .067 
  (range) (89 – 133) (88 – 140)   
Verbal IQ 62.6 ± 9.3 69.5 ± 6.4 t(28) = -2.41 .023* 
  (range) (47 – 71)  (54 – 76)    
Matrix Reasoning IQ 56.1 ± 6.9 60.1 ± 9.5 t(28) = -1.27 .214 
  (range) (40 – 61)  (29 – 68)   
WRAML-2  10.07 ± 3.0 12.4 ± 2.5 t(28) = -2.27 .031* 
  (range) (3 – 15) (7 – 17)   
WJIII  27.0 ± 4.3 28.8 ± 2.6 t(28) = -1.42 .809 
  (range) (15 – 31) (23 – 32)   
AQ  28.5 ± 8.2 15.0 ± 8.5 t(28) = 4.41 < .001** 
  (range) (17 – 45) (6 – 37)   
SCQ  20.9 ± 4.4 9.6 ± 6.0 t(28) = 5.77 < .001** 
  (range) (13 – 28) (3 – 23)   
EQ 24.0 ± 11.9 46.4 ± 9.4 t(28) = -5.75 < .001** 
  (range) (3 – 37) (33 – 60)    
Mind in Eyes 22.9 ± 4.7 27.06 ± 4.3 t(28) = -2.58 .015* 
  (range) (15 – 29) (17 – 33)    
TAS-20 52.6 ± 14.6 42.6 ± 9.6 t(28) = 2.26 .032* 
  (range) (32 – 76)  (32 – 63)    
STAIT 48.2 ± 10.2 42.5 ± 11.4 t(28) = 1.42 .166 
  (range) (31 – 69) (23 – 60)   
UCLA 26.36 ± 13.7 20.63 ± 12.2 t(28) = 1.21 .418 
  (range) (2 – 49)  (3 – 47)    
ADOS-R total 9.64 ± 3.0 -   
ADOS-R communication 3.21 ± 1.4 -   
ADOS-R social 7.07 ± 2.2 -   
Manual preference 54.6 ± 67 78.0 ± 34 t(28) = -1.2 .229 
Note. Data represent average scores ± standard deviation. IQ scores from the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Intelligence Scales (WASI) or Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS). 
WRAML-2: Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning scaled (age-adjusted) 
scores (Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003). WJIII: Oral Language Comprehension (test 15) from 
the Woodcock Johnson III Ability Tests (Woodcock et al., 2001).  AQ: Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). SCQ: Social 
Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003). EQ: Empathy Quotient 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Mind in Eyes: Reading the Mind in the Eyes-
Revised (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). TAS-20: Toronto Alexithymia 
Scales (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994; Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994). STAI: State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger, 2010). UCLA: UCLA Loneliness Questionnaire (Russell, 1996). 
ADOS-R: Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord et al., 2000). Manual preference is 
reported as the Edinburgh score (from -100 completely left-handed to +100 completely 
right-handed). 






             
Demographic and systems assessment information for autism group, Study 2: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics  
             
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Full IQ -            
2. Verbal IQ .912** -           
3. Matrix IQ .846** .614* -          
4. WRAML2 .531 .656* .456 -         
5. WJIII .765** .722* .722** .766** -        
6. AQ .148 .230 .097 .245 .171 -       
7. SCQ -.105 -.026 -.237 -.273 -.172 .564* -      
8. EQ .195 .094 .225 -.090 .047 -.817** -.611* -     
9. Eyes .406 .256 .442 .219 .267 -.643* -.729** -.738** -    
10. TAS-20 -.452 -.400 -.355 -.136 -.321 .515 .368 -.563* -.746** -   
11. STAI -.238 -.008 -.341 .204 -.052 .278 .142 -.414 -.583* .553* -  
12. UCLA -.265 -.074 -.261 .250 .108 .268 .166 -.510 -.583* .498 .762** - 
M 116.79 62.57 56.14 10.17 27.00 28.5 20.86 24.00 22.86 52.64 48.21 26.36 
SD 13.80 9.29 6.90 3.02 4.31 8.24 4.36 11.88 4.67 14.56 10.21 13.68 
Range 89 - 133 47 - 71 40 - 61 3 - 15 15 - 31 17 - 45 13 - 28 3 - 37 15 - 29 32 - 76 31 - 69 2 - 49 
Note. N = 14. 1-3. Full-, Verbal- and Matrix Reasoning IQ scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scales (WASI) or Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scales (WAIS), Verbal- and Matrix IQ scores = t-scores. 4. WRAML2, Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning age-
adjusted scaled scores (Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003). 5. WJIII, Oral Language Comprehension (test 15) from the Woodcock Johnson III Ability 
Tests (Woodcock et al., 2001).  6. AQ, Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). 7. SCQ, 
Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003). 8. EQ, Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 9. Eyes, 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes-Revised (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). 10. TAS-20, Toronto Alexithymia Scales (Bagby, 
Parker, et al., 1994; Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994). 11. STAI, State Trait Anxiety Inventory  (Spielberger, 2010). 12. UCLA, UCLA Loneliness 
Questionnaire (Russell, 1996).  






             
Demographic and systems assessment information for neurotypical group, Study 2: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
             
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Full IQ -            
2. Verbal IQ .869** -           
3. Matrix IQ .880** .621* -          
4. WRAML2 .569* .595* .480 -         
5. WJIII .701** .664* .673** .440 -        
6. AQ -.463 -.284 -.608* -.197 -.283 -       
7. SCQ -.562* -.496 -.554* -.512* -.484 .727** -      
8. EQ .585* .539* .390 -.506* .542* -.382 -.664** -     
9. Eyes .767** .615* .781** .668** .644** -.527* -.531* -.542* -    
10. TAS-20 -.576* -.392 -.676** -.132 -.783** .456 .596* -.533* -.502* -   
11. STAI -.323 -.102 -.321 -.163 -.336 .342 .244 -.484 -.163 .435 -  
12. UCLA -.153 -.077 -.324 -.146 .302 .125 .108 -.331 -.224 .490 .520* - 
M 126.19 69.5 60.0 12.38 28.81 15.00 9.63 46.38 27.06 42.56 42.56 20.63 
SD 13.25 6.39 9.54 2.53 2.59 8.45 6.02 9.42 4.25 9.64 11.38 12.21 
Range 88 – 140 54 – 76 29 – 68 7 – 17 23 – 32 6 – 37 3 – 23 33 – 60 17 – 33 32 – 63 23 - 60 3 - 47 
Note. N = 16. 1-3. Full-, Verbal- and Matrix Reasoning IQ scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scales (WASI) or Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scales (WAIS), Verbal- and Matrix IQ scores = t-scores. 4. WRAML2, Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning age-
adjusted scaled scores (Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003). 5. WJIII, Oral Language Comprehension (test 15) from the Woodcock Johnson III Ability 
Tests (Woodcock et al., 2001).  6. AQ, Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). 7. SCQ, 
Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003). 8. EQ, Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 9. Eyes, 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes-Revised (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). 10. TAS-20, Toronto Alexithymia Scales (Bagby, 
Parker, et al., 1994; Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994). 11. STAI, State Trait Anxiety Inventory  (Spielberger, 2010). 12. UCLA, UCLA Loneliness 
Questionnaire (Russell, 1996).  




  The pattern observed in the neurotypical group is dissimilar to that of the 
autism group. That is, IQ and language scores show significant relationships both to 
one another and to several of the social-affective measures. For cognitive/language 
measures, Full scale IQ was significantly correlated with Verbal IQ, r =.869, Matrix 
Reasoning IQ, r =.880, oral comprehension scores (WJIII), r =.701 (all ps < 0.01), 
and sentence repetition abilities r = .569, p < 0.5. Further, IQ correlated significantly 
with all autism measures except AQ scores, specifically, higher IQ scores were 
related to better social communication development ratings (SCQ), r = -.562, p < 0.5, 
empathetic abilities (EQ), r = .585, p < 0.5, ability to understand emotions from eyes 
(Mind in Eyes), r = .767, p < 0.01, and low alexithymia scores (TAS-20), r = -.576, p 
< 0.5. For non-cognitive measures, social and communication development (SCQ) 
scores covaried with several scales, including the autism quotient (AQ), r = .727, p < 
0.01, ability to empathize, r = -.664, p < 0.01, intact mentalizing (Mind in Eyes), r = -
.531, p < 0.05, and low levels of alexithymia (TAS-20), r = .596, p < 0.05. Unlike the 
autism group, in the neurotypical sample, AQ ratings bore a significant relationship to 
only social and communication development (SCQ) scores, r = .727, p < 0.01, and 
mentalizing abilities (Mind in Eyes), r = -.527, p < 0.05.   
Task Procedures 
 See Chapter 3. 
 
Acquisition of functional MR data 
Subjects were scanned using a Siemens 3T Trio MRI system with a 32-




procedures performed, two high-resolution scans covering the whole brain were 
obtained to facilitate spatial normalization and positioning of subsequent scans. First, 
a 3D T1-weighted, magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo 
(MPRAGE) scan (repetition time=2530 msec, echo time 1=2.15 msec, echo time 
2=4.03 msec, echo time 3=5.91 msec, echo time 4=7.79; flip angle=7°, 
bandwidth=651 Hz/pixel, echo spacing=1.6 msec, field of view=230 mm, 176 sagittal 
slices; thickness=0.9 mm; 0.9 × 1.0 matrix); and second, a 3D T2-weighted scan 
matched to the T1 (repetition time=3200 msec, echo time=483 msec, variable flip 
angle, bandwidth=751 Hz/pixel, echo spacing=3.32 msec, Turbo Factor=145, field of 
view=230 mm, 224 sagittal slices; thickness=0.9 mm; 0.9 x 1.0 matrix). Functional 
images to estimate task-related activity were obtained with simultaneous accelerated 
multiband (MB) imaging in an interleaved EPI pulse sequence (repetition time=1000 
msec, echo time=31 msec, multiband acceleration factor=6, 64 × 64 matrix, flip angle 
90°, FOV 210 mm). Whole brain coverage was obtained with 66 transversal slices 
(thickness=2.2 mm; in-plane resolution=2.2 × 2.2 mm).   
Data Analysis  
Analysis of behavioral data 
Performance measures were accuracy and response time (calculated on correct 
trials only) to the 3sec EIT Target sentence epoch during fMRI acquisition. Group 
effects were calculated for accuracy and response time separately with repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), using between-subject factor of group 
(ASD versus NT), and with-in subjects factors of 2 (congruent, incongruent) by 3 




incongruent) by 3 (positive, negative, neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs for each 
group. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were Bonferroni corrected. Statistical analyses 
of behavioral data were performed using IBM SPSS (version 23.0).   
Functional MRI data preprocessing and statistical analysis 
Data analysis was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM12, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing of the EPI time series included: (1) 
realignment for head motion correction, (2) spatial normalization into the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) anatomical space, and (3) spatial smoothing (5mm 
FWHM). Data were high pass filtered at 128 Hz, and examined for excessive motion 
and spiking artifacts using the Artifact Detection Tool (ART) software package. 
Outliers in the image time series (Z-threshold: 3.0, scan to scan movement threshold 
1.0 mm were identified and excluded from subsequent statistical analysis (5.0% of the 
data). A functional run with > 20% outlier time points was excluded from the 
analysis, and individuals with more than one run with 20% outliers were excluded 
from the analyses. One functional run (of 4) from each of three of the autistic 
participants was not included in the analyses, one due to excessive motion, one due to 
participant’s inability to hear, and one was not collected due to time constraints. One 
run from four control participants was excluded, two for low accuracy, one due to 
motion artifacts, and one was corrupted. For the remaining data, there were no 
significant differences in the number of outliers between groups, either across all four 
runs t(28) = .820, p = .419 or at the individual run level: run 1 t(26) = -.646, p = .524, 





First level analyses were conducted separately for the story and target 
response (probe). In the story model, each participant’s design matrix contained the 
five stimulus conditions, three story factors: positive (“POS”), negative (“NEG”), and 
neutral (“NEUT”) as well as the two probe conditions, congruent (“CON”) and 
incongruent (“INCON”). The probe model contained seven conditions, the congruent 
and incongruent response to each level of valence (“PosCon,” “PosIncon,” 
“NegCon,” “NegIncon,” “NeutCon,” and “NeutIncon”) as well as one factor for the 
stories. In both models, all factors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (Friston et al., 1995). Six realignment parameters as well as outlier 
time points were included in the models as regressors of no interest. Each stimulus 
condition was compared with the implicit baseline condition to generate first-level 
contrast images (five per subject for story model, six for the probe model). Group 
results were obtained using random-effects analyses by combining subject-specific 
summary statistics across the group as implemented in SPM12. 
For the stories, for each group, weighted contrasts combining the contrasts of 
all scenarios (POS+NEG+NEUT), the combined emotional (EMO) conditions 
(POS+NEG), and each condition separately POS, NEG and NEUT relative to the 
implicit baseline were computed. Despite having no specific predictions for autism 
regarding POS and NEG valence, these were included on an exploratory basis, and 
because results from Study 1 (neurotypical individuals) revealed clear differences 
between the conditions. A second set of between-group contrasts were computed to 
investigate the effects of the combination of contrasts of each story condition. T-




regions showing activity related the different conditions. A cluster corrected threshold 
of p < .001 was used. Results for contrasting conditions of valence, e.g., EMO > 
NEUT and NEUT > EMO, were also calculated, but unlike Study 1 (Chapter 2), these 
contrasts yielded few significant between-group activations and are therefore not 
reported herein.  
For the response epoch, a two (group) x six (condition) ANOVA was 
performed for the three-second time window during which participants made 
congruency judgments. The main contrasts of interest were congruent and 
incongruent items separately, as well as the group * condition interactions. A cluster 
corrected threshold (FWE p < .05) was used on voxels surviving an initial threshold 
of p < .001.   
Region of interest analyses 
 
In order to further examine the putative systems underlying the neural 
activations to scenarios in greater detail, region of interest (ROI) analyses were 
conducted on the effects of interest for networks related to theory of mind- (TOM) 
and narrative (NARR) comprehension (See Chapter 3 for network definitions). 
(Separate ROI for emotion were not tested, as the main interest herein is the type of 
emotion processing consistent with making inferences about others’ emotional states, 
as such it is expected to overlap with regions associated with mentalizing and 
language comprehension.) ROI were created from the results of an ALE meta-
analysis, thus reducing Type I errors dramatically (Poldrack, 2007). ROI using data 
from Study 1 were not used as one goal of the present research is to disentangle 




present stimuli (used in both studies) involves both processes. Importantly, Mar’s 
(2011) narrative analysis included no ToM-related stories, and results for both story-
related and nonstory-related ToM were reported separately. In order to identify the 
ToM network that is most like the stimuli in the present study, only the results for the 
ToM story (hereafter referred to as ‘TOM’ in the context of ROI analyses, and ‘ToM’ 
for theory of mind in general) were used. Regions of interest were generated by 
extracting significant clusters of activity for both TOM and NARR, as well as the 
conjunction of the two (TOM ∩ NARR) (MarsBaR; Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & 
Poline, 2002). Table 12 provides coordinate details and extent of the three ROI maps, 
Figure 8 illustrates the same. Regions of interest comprised voxels showing 
significant activation centered on the coordinate with peak intensity for that region for 
each of the contrasts of interest (2-sample t-tests for ASD, NT, ASD > NT, NT > 
ASD; EMO, NEG, POS, and NEUT). For these analyses, a threshold of p < .002, k = 
10 was used (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). Percent signal change values were 
then extracted from 1-sample t-tests (FWE p < .05) for each ROI yielding significant 
activation.  
Region of interest statistical analyses 
 
 In order to determine whether or not task-related neural activations were more 
or less predominant in language or mentalizing regions, three separate repeated 
measures ANOVA were run, one for each of the networks above (TOM, NARR, and 
TOM ∩ NARR), with condition (POS, NEG, NEUT) as the within-group measure 
and group (ASD, NT). Individual conditions and their parameter estimates for each 




group x valence interactions in each ROI. Univariate ANOVAs were used to examine 
the effect of valence within each group, with parameter estimates for each ROI as the 
dependent variable, and valence as the fixed variable. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Maps for ROI analyses. Narrative comprehension (NARR, red) story-
based theory of mind (TOM, green; Mar, 2011) and conjunction of the two (TOM 
∩ NARR, yellow). Labels correspond to regions in TOM ∩ NARR. See Table 12 














Table 12.      
      
Labels and coordinates for regions of interest (ROI), Study 2  
    
   MNI coordinates  
(maximum foci) 
Region label Lat Number of voxels x y z 
TOM      
mPFC - 7624 -1 54 31 
TPJ L 4072 -51 -59 27 
TPJ R 3696 54 -53 24 
Precuneus - 3392 -2 -55 29 
IFG  R 1552 56 -17 -18 
dmPFC L 496 -18 54 31 
sFG L 336 -21 -3 -22 
STS L 328 -56 -29 -9 
aCC R 312 13 28 25 
IFG  L 288 -52 -4 -30 
Amygdala L 168 -26 -3 -22 
MOcc R 152 -43 -71 35 
aSTS L 120 -52 12 -34 
      
NARR      
STS L 18288 -53 -12 -9 
aSTS R 3256 50 11 -27 
IFG (triangularis) L 2792 -50 26 10 
STS  R 2728 57 -13 1 
Precentral gyrus L 1568 -45 1 49 
mPFC - 952 -1 59 23 
MTG R 840 56 -8 -24 
TPJ R 696 59 -58 15 
dmPFC - 328 -9 51 45 
IFG (triangularis) R 320 58 33 -1 
IFG L 312 -43 -17 -34 
pSTS R 288 55 -41 4 
MTG R 112 53 -33 -12 
Parahippocampus L 112 -19 -21 -14 
IFG (opercularis) L 80 -44 11 22 
TPJ L 64 -47 -67 18 
      
TOM ∩ NARR      
dmPFC - 469 3 59 23 
TPJ R 400 59 -57 16 
 L 208 -55 -55 21 
MTG R 112 56 -10 -21 
 L 32 -51 -2 -26 
IFG L 8 -54 -6 -28 
Note. Table presents results for clusters from the theory of mind (TOM) story and narrative 
(NARR) comprehension meta-analyses (Mar et al., 2011) as well as the conjunction of the 
two (TOM ∩ NARR) used as basis for region of interest (ROI) analyses. Laterality right 





Exploratory brain-behavior analyses 
 
To examine whether neural activation was associated with cognitive and 
social-affective abilities as expressed in the behavioral assessments, exploratory 
correlation analyses were conducted for TOM ROI yielding task-related activity in 
POS, NEG and NEUT comparisons for each group separately. The reason for 
choosing TOM ROI—and for testing groups individually—is because research shows 
anomalous brain activity in regions of the ToM network (mPFC, pCC, bpSTS, bTPJ) 
in autism during mental state attribution tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Castelli et 
al., 2005; Kana et al., 2009; Piggot et al., 2004) narrative comprehension (Happe et 
al., 1996; Mason et al., 2008), and specifically during emotional narratives (Mason et 
al., 2008). The individual valence contrasts (POS, NEG and NEUT) were chosen 
rather than the combined EMO condition in order to probe possible differences 
between conditions of valence. For social-affective processing, behavioral variables 
included AQ, EQ, SCQ, TAS-20, ADOS scores (Communication, Social, and 
Combined), and Reading the Mind in the Eyes. Cognitive and language measures 





Between-group. For accuracy, a 2 (group) x 2 (congruency) x 3 (valence) 
repeated measures (RM) ANOVA showed a main effect of congruency (F(1,28) = 
11.13, p = .002); responses to CON trials were more accurate than INCON. No other 




congruency between POS and NEUT, F(1,28) = 6.20, p = .019. Contrasts revealed 
that accuracy responses to CON were higher than for INCON in both condition. 
There was also a significant group x valence x congruency interaction between POS 
and NEUT, F(1,28) = 4.90, p = .035. Here, in the ASD group, responses to PosCon 
were less accurate than PosIncon, but NeutCon were more accurate than NeutIncon. 
However, in the NTs, accuracy was greater in the CON condition compared with 
INCON in both POS and NEUT.  
Within-group. Repeated measures ANOVAs [2 (congruency) x 3 (valence)] 
for ASD showed a main effect for congruency, F(1,28) = 4.90, p = .035 such that 
CON trials (M = 95.82, SE = 2.20) received higher accuracy than INCON (M = 90.80, 
SE = 3.42). No significant effects were shown for NT. 
Response time 
 
Between-group. Statistical tests for RTs were conducted on correct trials only 
(5.46% of the trials removed). A 2 (group) x 2 (congruency) x 3 (valence) RM 
ANOVA showed a main effect of valence F(2,56) = 29.66, p < .001. Contrasts 
revealed that responses to both POS, F(1,28) = 56.60, p < .001, and NEG, F(1,28) = 
6.622, p < .016, were significantly faster than for NEUT. There was also a main effect 
for congruency F(1,28) = 21.63, p < .001, where CON trial were faster than INCON 
F(1,28) = 21.67, p < .001. There was also a significant main effect of congruency on 
valence F(2,56) = 7.06, p = .002. Contrasts revealed that the difference between 
PosCon and PosIncon were significantly smaller than between NeutCon and 
NeutIncon, F(1,28) = 18.44, p < .001, and the same effect was seen between NegCon 




Within-group. For accuracy in the ASD group, there was a significant main 
effect of congruency, F(1,13) = 15.78, p = .002, as well as for valence F(2,26) = 
19.78, p < .001. Contrasts reveals that POS was more accurate than NEUT, F(1,13) = 
30.81, p < .001. In the NT group, a main effect was revealed for congruency 
F(1.34,20.10) = 11.73, p < .001, and valence, F(1,15) = 5.52, p = .033. Contrasts 
revealed that POS responses were faster than NEUT, F(1,15) = 25.51, p < .001. A 
significant interaction was shown for congruency on valence, F(2,30) = 8.512, p = 
.001, where responses to POS, F(1,15) = 13.61, p = .002, and NEG, F(1,15) = 11.70, 
p = .004, were faster than for NEUT (Figure 9 and Table 13, 14; Appendix G).  
 
 
Figure 9. Behavioral effects for autism (ASD, red, n = 14) and neurotypical (NT, green, n = 
16) for A: accuracy (% correct, T/F judgments) and B: response times (time from 
appearance of probe to button press.  
Error bars: 95% CI. 






Table 13.      
      
Between-group behavioral effects, Study 2 
    
  ACC RT 
 df F p F p 
Valence (2,56) 3.14 .051 29.66 .001** 
Congruency (1,28) 11.13 .002* 21.63 .001** 
Valence * group (2,56) .94 .396 1.33  .274 
Congruency * group (1,28) 3.10 .090 3.13 .088 
Valence * congruency (2,56) 2.82 .068 7.06 .002* 
Valence * congruency * group (2,56) 2.99 .058 1.03 .365 
Note. Effects of accuracy (ACC) and response time (RT): 2x2x3 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with between-group factor (ASD, NT), and within-group 
factors: valence (POS, NEG, NEUT) and congruency (CON, INCON) for both accuracy 
and response time (RT) for autism (ASD) and neurotypicals (NT).  





Within-group behavioral effects, Study 2 
   
 ASD NT 
 df F p df F p 
ACC       
Valence (2,26) 3.037 .065 (2,30) .41 .666 
Congruency (1,28) 8.307 .013* (1,15) 2.23 .156 
Valence * congruency (2,26) 3.320 .052 (2,30) .906 .415 
 
RT   
Valence (2,26) 19.78 .001** (1.34,20.10) 11.73 .001* 
Congruency (1,13) 15.78 .002* (1,15) 5.52 .033* 
Valence * congruency (2,26) 3.32 .052 (2,30) 8.51 .011* 
Note. Results for 2x3 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with two 
factors: valence (POS, NEG, NEUT) and congruency (CON, INCON) for both 
accuracy and response time (RT) for autism (ASD) and neurotypicals (NT).  
*p < .05, **p < .001 
 
 
Functional MRI Results 
Scenarios 
 
In order to verify that the task successfully engaged similar brain regions in 
both groups, whole brain analyses were calculated on all the scenarios 




both the autistic group and the controls recruited extensive areas of activation in 
bilateral temporal lobes (with ASD extending further dorsally to include TPJ, 
especially on the RH), precentral/postcentral gyri, left inferior temporal gyrus, and 
cerebellum. The autism group had additional medial frontal activations, in both 
dmPFC and vmPFC. Significant clusters in between-group tests were found only in 
the ASD > NT contrast, in precuneus and paracentral lobule (and right SMA), 
bilateral IFG, and right middle frontal gyrus. Details of these results are found in 
Appendix H, Table 1, and Figure 1.  
Emotional scenarios 
ASD. Turning to the main results, within-group tests revealed that the ASD 
group showed strong task-related activity in response to the EMO conditions in a 
large number of brain regions involved in language processing, mentalizing and 
emotion, bearing in mind that there is a good deal of structural and functional overlap 
within these networks, for example in temporal lobes bilaterally (Figure 10 and 
Appendix H, Table 2). Regions characteristically identified with language inferencing 
(Ferstl & Neumann, 2008) included dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) [(-10, 
50, 28), t=5.36], left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG) [(-46, 22, 20), t=5.07] and large 
extents of significant activity encompassing left superior temporal sulcus and left 
middle temporal gyrus (lSTS, lMTG) [(-44, -26, 12), t=9.29; (-62, -14, -4), t=7.50]. 
On the right, activations were in STS/Heschl’s gyrus [(50, -14, 6), t=9.89], and 
extended dorsally to include TPJ (see below). For regions typically identified with 
ToM (Mar, 2011), the autism group showed activity in right posterior temporal sulcus 




52, 30), t=5.27]. Regions involved with emotion included ventral medial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) [(0, 52, -12), t=6.28] and amygdala [(-30, -2, 22), t=3.84] and medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [(-8, 60, 18), t=3.65], the latter being implicated in both 
ToM and emotional processing.  
NT. Like the autism group, the neurotypical controls recruited areas more 
traditionally associated with language processing. In detail, task-related activations 
were found in dmPFC [(-2, 36, -24), t=5.21], and left IFG (-54, 24, 10), t=5.43], STS 
[(-54, -22, 0), t=8.72] and MTG [(-62, -32, 6), t=8.49]. Rightward temporal activity 
encompassed STS, MTG and anterior STS (aSTS) [(62, -16, -2), t=9.02; (62, 2, -16), 
t=8.90; (54, 8, -20), t=7.54]. In contrast with ASD, areas more commonly associated 
with mentalizing and/or emotion were not significantly engaged.  
 
 
Figure 10. Within-group neural activations, Study 2. (A) Contrast of emotion (A), neutral 
(B), negative (C) and positive (D) scenarios in autism (ASD; red), neurotypical (NT; 
green). Task-related activity is displayed using a cluster corrected threshold of p < .001.  
 
Between-group. The comparison of ASD > NT revealed activity in precuneus 




significantly greater activity for the neurotypical controls compared to the autism 
group for emotional scenarios. 
Negative scenarios 
 
ASD. In order to investigate whether or not the effect of valence had a 
differential contribution to those activations associated with emotional scenarios, 
within- and between-group tests were calculated for POS and NEG stories (Figures 
10 and 11, and Appendix H, Table 3). In ASD, both conditions recruited similar brain 
regions, except that dmPFC and two clusters in lIFG were associated only with NEG. 
Furthermore, like the emotional condition most activity was observed in language-
related brain areas for NEG, with the largest clusters of activation found in the 
temporal lobes. In the left hemisphere, the focal point of activity was centered in STG 
[(-50, -24, 6), t=11.21] and extended to MTG [(-62, -14, -4), t=8.78] and to TPJ. On 
the right, activity was focused in STS [(66, -26, 10), t=8.86]. As well, significant 
activations were found in lIFG (tri) [(-44, 26, 12), t=4.73], dmPFC [(10, 48, 24), 
t=5.79], and lIFG (orb) [(-52, 28, -4), t=5.38]. For areas typically associated with 
ToM, the precuneus [(6, -56, 36), t=5.16] was significantly engaged, and emotion-







Figure 11. Within-group valence-related activity, Study 2. (A) Contrast of negative (NEG; 
red) and positive (POS; green) scenarios, overlap yellow. Autism group (ASD) on left; 
neurotypical controls (NT) on right. Task-related activity is displayed using a cluster 
corrected threshold of p < .001. 
 
NT. Task-related activity for NEG in NT was found only in regions 
commonly associated with language processing. Specifically, the largest clusters of 
activity were in the temporal lobes. On the left, the strongest activation was in MTG 
[(-54, -22, 0), t=9.60] and extending to lSTG [(-62, -20, 6), t=9.14], and a smaller 
cluster in lIFG (tri) [NT (-54, 24, 10), t=5.04]. On the right, activity was focused in 
STS [(62, -16, -2), t=9.52] and including rMTG, [(62, 2, -16), 7.47].  
  Between-group. Like EMO, the direct comparison of ASD > NT revealed a 
significant cluster in precuneus [(6, -56, 36), t=5.17]. NT > ASD activations failed to 
reach significance.  
Positive scenarios 
 
ASD. Similar to negative, the POS stories were associated with language-




were also engaged. For the former, temporal lobes showed large areas of left 
hemisphere (LH) activation in STG [(-50, -24, 6), t=11.88], MTG [(-62, -42, 4), 
t=8.30] and IFG (tri) [(-46, 22, 20), t=4.98] and in the right hemisphere (RH) STG 
[(58, -16, 0), t=9.55]. A cluster in dmPFC was also significantly involved [(-8, 50, 
28), t=5.52]. For ToM-related areas, precuneus/PCC was significantly activated (for 
POS but not for NEG) [(-4, -50, 26), t=5.44], and for regions linked to emotion, a 
cluster in vmPFC was significant [(0, 54, -12), t=5.71].  
NT. For the neurotypical controls, the most noticeable results was in the 
medial frontal lobe, where both ventral- [(-2, 34, -24), t=6.18] and dorsal mPFC (as 
well as small parahippocampal cluster) were activated for POS scenarios, but not 
NEG. Beyond this, activity was similar to that seen in the POS condition for NT. 
Specifically, temporal activations included lSTG [(-50, -24, 4), t=10.35], lMTG [(-62, 
-32, 8), t=9.16] and lIFG (tri) [(-54, 24, 10), t=5.57], as well as rSTG [(62, -16, -2), 
t=9.81], rMTG [(62, 2, -16), t=9.75] and rSTS [(50, 18, -20), t=7.27]. Frontal activity 
was seen in dmPFC [(-10, 52, 34), 5.03].  
Between-group. In the comparison of ASD > NT, two clusters were 
significant, one in precuneus [(16, -52, 38), t=5.56] and one in superior/middle frontal 
gyrus [(24, 20, 44), t=4.73]. No significant results were revealed in the NT > ASD 
contrast. 
Neutral scenarios  
ASD. Scenarios of neutral (NEUT) valence (Figure 10 and Appendix H, Table 
4), or physical state stories, elicited similar temporal activations associated with 




group, rightward activations included STS [(52, -12, -6), t=9.39], and on the left, 
activity was in STS [(-44, -26, 12), t=11.26], MTG [(-62, -14, -4), t=7.90] and in IFG 
[(-44, 20, 24), t=4.31]. For ToM-related regions, the autism group again showed 
activity in precuneus [(24, -48, 12), t=3.96]; for emotion-related areas, both left [(-20, 
-8, -16), t=4.46] and right amygdala [(32, 0, -20), t=3.48] responded to NEUT stories.  
NT. Temporal activity for NT in response to the NEUT condition were 
focused in rSTS [(62, -16, -2), t=9.86] and raSTS [(62, 4, -10), t=7.87)], and also 
lSTS [(-62, -20, 6), t=9.55], lMTG [(-62, -32, 6), t=9.84] and lIFG [(-44, -40, -20), 
t=5.51].  
Between-group. No contrasts reached significance in group comparisons.  
ROI analysis TOM  
 
TOM EMO. Each set of ROI—TOM, NARR and TOM ∩ NARR—were used 
as implicit masks on 2-sample t-tests for EMO, NEG, POS, and NEUT (p < .002, k = 
10). Within TOM ROI (see Figure 10 and Table 15), the EMO contrast revealed large 
clusters of activation in bTPJ and bSTS for both groups. Activation in ASD was more 
extensive than controls in TPJ, especially on the left [L: ASD (-48, -70, 22), t=7.07; 
NT (-52, -64, 20), t=4.95; R: ASD (58, -54, 22), t=6.52; NT (48, -58, 22), t=3.95], 
whereas activations in STS were more similar in both groups [L: ASD (-54, -30, -4), 
t=5.36; NT (-54, -30, -4), t=5.44; R: ASD (52, -16, -12), t=5.84; NT (52, -16, -12), 
t=4.77]. Clusters were also identified in right dmPFC for both [ASD (8, 50, 26), 
t=3.79; NT (8, 56, 26), t=3.57]. Between-group tests revealed significant activations 
for ASD > NT, in mPFC [(0, 62, 12), t=3.40], rTPJ [(58, -54, 22), t=3.75], and 




TOM NEG. For NEG, regions in bilateral TPJ showed enhanced activity [L: 
ASD (-56, -58, 18), t=6.61; NT (-58, -50, 22), t=4.67; R: ASD (58, -54, 22), t=6.83; 
NT (52, -56, -24), t=4.02], as did right IFG [ASD (52, -16, -12), t=6.51; NT (52, -16, 
-12), t=4.93] and left STS [ASD (-54, -30, -4), t=5.69; NT (-54, -30, -4), t=4.88]. In 
ASD, a cluster was also revealed in precuneus/aCC [(6, -56, 36), t=5.16] and in rSTS 
[(6, 50, 24), t=5.23]. No regions were significant for NT that did not also appear in 
ASD. In ASD > NT, two significant clusters were revealed, in dmPFC [(6, -56, 36), 
t=5.17] and rTPJ [(60, -52, 22), t=3.90]. Results for NT > ASD failed to reach 
significance. 
 
Figure 12. Theory of mind ROI analyses, Study 2. All TOM regions of interest (Mar, 2011) 
are shown on a template image. Bar graphs show percent signal change in BOLD response 
to emotion (EMO; yellow), negative (NEG; red), positive (POS; green) and neutral 
(NEUT; blue) for those ROI yielding significant activation on the y-axis, separated by 
autism (ASD) and neurotypical (NT) groups on x-axis. Error bars show standard error. 
* p < .05 
 
TOM POS. Relative to controls, the ASD group also showed more extensive 
task-related activity for POS scenarios. Like NEG, both groups had significant 




[(6, 56, 20), t=3.84] and pCC [(0, -52, 30), t=5.07]. Between-group comparisons 
yielded no significant findings. 
TOM NEUT. For NEUT, activations were in bSTS [L: ASD (-54, -30, -4), 
t=5.13; NT (-54, -30, -4), t=5.71; R: ASD (50, -18, -10), t=6.32; NT (52, -16, -12), 
t=4.60] and amygdala [ASD (-28, -2, -22), t=4.67; NT (-28, -2, -22), t=4.10] in both 
groups, while two clusters in lTPJ [(-56, -60, 18), t=4.73; (-48, -70, 22), t=4.59] 
showed activity in ASD alone. Between-group tests failed to reach significance.  
ROI analysis NARR 
 
NARR EMO. For NARR ROI (see Figure 13 and Table 16) in the EMO 
contrasts, the largest clusters of activity for ASD and NT were in left STS [ASD (-50, 
-24, 6), t= 8.89; NT (-62, -20, 6), t=8.53]. Also in LH, IFG (triangularis) was 
recruited by both groups [ASD (-52, 28, -4), t=5.08; NT (-54, 24, 12), t=4.95]. In the 
RH, two separate STS clusters were engaged [ASD (58, -12, 4), t=8.43; (58, -8, -20), 
t=5.53; NT (60, -16, -2), t=8.38; (58, -10, -16), t=4.99], as well as pSTS [ASD (58, -
40, 6), t=5.34; NT (52, -42, 6), t=4.56], and aSTS [ASD (56, 6,-20), t=6.42; NT (54, 
8, -20), t=7.54]. Other clusters were identified for ASD, two in dmPFC [(-10, 48, 42), 
t=4.58; (-10, 56, 24), t=3.91] and one in rTPJ [58, -60, 18), t=6.32], while left 
precentral gyrus [(-48, 0, 52), t=4.26] was additionally recruited by NT. Between-




Table 15.                    
                    
ROI results: Theory of mind, Study 2 
                    
 ASD NT ASD > NT 
Region  Lat v x y z t Z v x y z t Z v x y z t Z 
EMO                    
Frontal                    
  dmPFC R 67 8 50 26 3.79 3.38 18 8 56 26 3.57 3.21       
Temporal                     
  TPJ L 336 -48 -70 22 7.07 5.31 133 -52 -64 20 4.95 4.16       
    a L a -56 -60 20 5.99 4.77 a -58 -50 22 4.43 3.82       
    a L a -42 -58 24 4.8 4.07 a -48 -54 22 4.02 3.54       
    a L a -54 -64 34 3.96 3.5 a -42 -64 24 3.99 3.52       
 L 17 -44 -72 38 4.17 3.65             
 R 243 58 -54 22 6.52 5.04 22 48 -58 22 3.95 3.49 17 58 -54 22 3.75 3.35 
  STS R 88 52 -16 -12 5.84 4.68 71 52 -16 -12 4.77 4.04       
  a R a 56 -8 -20 4.82 4.08 a 58 -10 -18 4.62 3.95       
  STS L 27 -54 -30 -4 5.36 4.41 19 -54 -30 -4 5.44 4.46       
Parietal                     
  pCC - 177 0 -52 30 5.27 4.36       24 6 -56 36 4.53 3.89 
  Precuneus L a -12 -54 34 4.22 3.68             
NEG                    
Frontal                    
  dmPFC R       10 6 52 28 3.55 3.2       
Temporal                    
  TPJ R 259 58 -54 22 6.83 5.2 21 52 -56 24 4.02 3.54 15 60 -52 22 3.9 3.46 
   a L 346 -56 -58 18 6.61 5.09 100 -58 -50 22 4.67 3.98       
   a L a -46 -68 22 6.59 5.08 a -52 -62 18 4.63 3.95       
   a L a -60 -52 26 4.31 3.74             
  MOcc L a -42 -56 26 4.7 4             
  a L a -54 -64 32 3.47 3.14             
  IFG R 81 52 -16 -12 6.51 5.04 62 52 -16 -12 4.93 4.15       
  a  R a 58 -10 -18 4.93 4.15 a 58 -10 -18 4.26 3.71       
  STS L 29 -54 -30 -4 5.69 4.6 13 -54 -30 -4 4.88 4.12       
  a R 77 6 50 24 5.23 4.33             




  ASD NT ASD > NT 
Region  Lat v x y z t Z v x y z t Z v x y z t Z 
Parietal                    
  Precuneus R 106 6 -56 36 5.16 4.29       42 6 -56 36 5.17 4.29 
  aCC L a -12 -54 34 4.14 3.63             
POS                    
Frontal                    
  dmPFC R 10 6 56 20 3.84 3.41             
   a R 12 10 54 30 3.71 3.32             
Temporal                    
  TPJ R 209 58 -60 18 7.25 5.4             
   a   R a 46 -56 26 4.64 3.96             
 L 263 -48 -70 22 6.95 5.26 71 -50 -66 20 5.39 4.43       
    a L a -56 -60 18 6.58 5.07 a -46 -56 22 3.51 3.17       
    a L a -54 -64 34 4.48 3.86             
    a L a -60 -52 24 3.52 3.18             
  MOcc L a -42 -62 24 5.29 4.37             
  IFG R 79 52 -16 -12 6.35 4.96 70 52 -16 -12 5.01 4.2       
  a R a 58 -10 -20 5.15 4.29 a 58 -10 -18 4.87 4.11       
  STS L 23 -54 -30 -4 5.81 4.66 21 -54 -30 -4 6.16 4.86       
  MOcc L 17 -44 -72 38 4.82 4.08             
Parietal                    
  pCC - 215 0 -52 30 5.07 4.24             
  a L a -12 -54 34 4.55 3.91             
NEUT                    
Temporal                     
  STS R 56 50 -18 -10 6.32 4.94 45 52 -16 -12 4.6 3.94       
   a R a 56 -8 -20 4.09 3.59 a 58 -10 -18 3.71 3.32       
 L 14 -54 -30 -4 5.13 4.27             
  TPJ L 21 -56 -60 18 4.73 4.02             
 R 33 58 -60 16 4.01 3.54             
Limbic                     
  Amygdala L       10 -28 -2 -22 4.1 3.6       
Note. T-values for signal increases in TOM ROI in emotion (EMO), negative (NEG), positive (POS) and neutral (NEUT) for autism (ASD), neurotypical (NT) and NT 
> ASD. No significant clusters were found in NT > ASD comparison. Laterality (Lat) right (R), left (L) or medial (‘-’), number of voxels in each cluster (v), XYZ 
coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold EMO, t = 3.24; NEG, t = 3.41; POS, t = 3.18; NEUT, t = 3.41; p < .002, k = 10.  




NARR NEG. For both ASD and NT, most extensive activations for negative 
stories were in lSTS (ASD (-50, -24, 6), t=11.21); NT (-62, -20, 6), t=9.14], with two 
much smaller clusters in rSTS [ASD (56, -12, 6), t=9.93; (58, -40, 6), t=6.06; NT (60, 
16, -2), t=8.91; (58, -10, -16), t=5.00]. Both groups also had significant clusters in 
lIFG [ASD (-46, 22, 20), t=4.80; NT (-52, 24, 10), t=4.65]. The autism group also 
showed significant activity in rTPJ [(56, -60, 18), t=6.02] and dmPFC [(-8, 56, 26), 
t=3.50], while the controls recruited a region in aSTS [(54, 6, -20), t=7.23] and 
precentral gyrus [(-48, 0, 52), t=3.93]. No significant activity was shown in between-
group tests. 
 
Figure 12. Narrative ROI analyses, Study 2. All NARR regions of interest (Mar, 2011) are 
shown on a template image. Bar graphs show percent signal change in BOLD response to 
emotion (EMO; yellow), negative (NEG; red), positive (POS; green) and neutral (NEUT; 
blue) for those ROI yielding significant activation on the y-axis, separated by autism 
(ASD) and neurotypical (NT) groups on x-axis. Error bars show standard error. 
 




Table 16.              
              
ROI results: Narrative, Study 2 
  ASD NT 
Region  Lat v x y z t Z v x y z t Z 
EMO              
Frontal              
  dmPFC L 11 -10 48 42 4.58 3.92       
 L 31 -10 56 24 3.91 3.47       
  Precentral gyrus  L       36 -48 0 52 4.26 3.71 
Temporal              
  STS L 1688 -50 -24 6 8.89 6.08 1558 -62 -20 6 8.53 5.94 
   a L a -62 -14 -4 7.50 5.51 a -62 -32 6 8.49 5.93 
   a L a -62 -42 4 7.36 5.44 a -52 -28 2 8.29 5.84 
   a L a -46 12 -26 7.12 5.34 a -62 -10 -12 8.08 5.76 
   a L a -64 -28 8 6.69 5.13 a -54 12 -14 7.22 5.38 
  STS R 303 58 -12 4 8.43 5.90 327 60 -16 -2 8.38 5.88 
  a R a 54 -22 2 6.91 5.24 a 54 -14 6 7.19 5.37 
  a R a 50 -32 8 6.18 4.87 a 58 -2 -2 6.96 5.26 
  a R a 58 -2 -6 5.64 4.57 a 54 -30 6 6.51 5.04 
  IFG (opercularis) R 278 56 6 -20 6.42 4.99 198 54 8 -20 7.54 5.53 
  a R a 40 20 -32 4.02 3.54 a 38 18 -34 4.67 3.98 
  a R a 48 6 -30 3.60 3.24       
  TPJ R 77 58 -60 18 6.32 4.94       
  STS R 51 58 -8 -20 5.53 4.51 22 58 -10 -16 4.99 4.19 
  pSTS R 36 58 -40 6 5.34 4.4 29 52 -42 6 4.56 3.91 
  IFG (triangularis) L 31 -52 28 -4 5.08 4.24 107 -54 24 12 4.95 4.16 
        a -56 32 6 4.39 3.8 
  IFG (opercularis) L 115 -46 22 20 5.07 4.24       
  a L a -54 26 12 4.35 3.77       
NEG              
Frontal               
  dmPFC L 24 -8 56 26 3.5 3.16       
  Precentral  L       14 -48 0 52 3.93 3.47 
Temporal               
  STS L 1680 -50 -24 6 11.21 6.85 1483 -62 -20 6 9.14 6.17 
   a L a -62 -14 -4 8.78 6.04 a -62 -32 6 8.68 6 
   a L a -62 -42 4 7.86 5.67 a -50 -26 4 8.6 5.97 




  ASD NT 
Region  Lat v x y z t Z v x y z t Z 
   a L a -46 12 -26 7.34 5.44 a -54 12 -14 6.45 5.01 
 R 305 56 -12 6 9.93 6.45 319 60 -16 -2 8.91 6.09 
   a R a 54 -30 6 7.82 5.65 a 58 -2 -2 6.95 5.26 
   a R a 62 -22 6 7.22 5.38 a 54 -30 6 6.75 5.16 
   a R a 58 -2 -6 6.22 4.89       
  MTG R 328 56 6 -20 7.17 5.36       
   a R a 50 14 -26 6.23 4.89       
   a R a 42 12 -34 4.25 3.7       
   a R a 50 4 -28 3.83 3.4       
  STS R 36 58 -40 6 6.06 4.8 15 58 -10 -16 5 4.19 
  TPJ R 77 56 -60 18 6.02 4.78       
  IFG (triangularis) L 40 -52 28 -4 5.38 4.42       
  STS R 52 58 -10 -16 5.28 4.36 30 52 -42 6 4.51 3.88 
   a R a 60 -2 -22 5.06 4.23       
  IFG (triangularis) L 107 -46 22 20 4.8 4.07 68 -52 24 10 4.65 3.97 
   a L a -54 26 12 4.73 4.02       
 L 13 -46 26 -8 3.66 3.28       
  IFG (opercularis)        193 54 6 -20 7.23 5.39 
   a        a 38 18 -34 4.71 4.01 
   a        a 50 16 -26 4.64 3.96 
POS              
Frontal               
  dmPFC L 13 -12 50 42 4.71 4 15 -10 48 42 4.33 3.76 
   L 32 -8 58 22 3.74 3.34       
  Precentral         47 -48 0 52 4.44 3.83 
Temporal               
  STS L 1688 -50 -24 6 11.88 7.04 1545 -58 -22 8 9.83 6.41 
   a L a -62 -14 -4 8.8 6.05 a -62 -32 8 9.16 6.18 
   a L a -62 -42 4 8.3 5.85 a -60 -14 -12 9.15 6.18 
   a L a -64 -26 8 8.09 5.76 a -52 -28 2 8.79 6.04 
   a L a -54 12 -14 6.86 5.21 a -54 12 -14 8.09 5.76 
 R 317 52 -12 4 10.59 6.66 334 60 -18 0 9.46 6.29 
   a R a 54 -22 2 8.32 5.86 a 52 -12 4 8.51 5.93 
   a R a 50 -32 8 7.69 5.59 a 58 -2 -2 7.3 5.42 
   a R a 58 -2 -6 6.39 4.98 a 50 -32 8 7.01 5.28 
  TPJ R 77 60 -62 16 7.63 5.57       




  ASD NT 
Region  Lat v x Region  L v x Region  L v x Region  L 
   a R a 40 20 -32 4.44 3.83 a 52 16 -26 5.8 4.66 
   a R       a 40 20 -32 3.8 3.39 
  STS R 36 56 -44 6 5.99 4.77 30 52 -42 6 4.71 4.01 
  MTG R 48 58 -8 -20 5.76 4.64 27 58 -8 -16 5.14 4.28 
  IFG (triangularis) L 88 -46 22 20 4.98 4.18 119 -54 24 12 5.04 4.22 
   a L       a -52 24 0 3.91 3.46 
NEUT              
Frontal               
  Precentral  L       27 -48 -2 52 4.15 3.63 
Temporal               
  STS L 1311 -50 -24 6 10.79 6.73 1264 -62 -32 6 9.84 6.42 
   a L a -64 -28 8 7.91 5.69 a -62 -20 6 9.55 6.32 
   a L a -62 -14 -4 7.90 5.68 a -52 -22 4 8.97 6.11 
   a L a -62 -40 4 7.03 5.29 a -58 -6 -14 7.57 5.54 
   a L a -52 8 -14 6.48 5.02 a -60 -10 -4 7.03 5.29 
  STS R 301 54 -14 6 10.42 6.61 335 62 -18 0 9.24 6.21 
   a R a 62 -22 6 7.37 5.45 a 54 -14 6 8.69 6.00 
   a R a 54 -30 6 7.30 5.42 a 58 -2 -2 7.06 5.31 
   a R a 58 -2 -6 6.48 5.02 a 54 -30 6 6.76 5.16 
  pSTS R 36 58 -40 6 5.81 4.67       
  IFG (opercularis) R 90 54 14 -20 5.70 4.61 77 56 8 -20 5.46 4.47 
 R       a 50 16 -24 4.18 3.65 
  IFG (triangularis) L 80 -46 24 20 4.85 4.10 94 -56 30 6 4.14 3.63 
   a L a -54 26 14 3.69 3.30 a -46 32 4 4.13 3.62 
  STS R 29 58 -10 -16 4.31 3.74 11 58 -10 -16 4.65 3.97 
  TPJ R 33 58 -60 16 4.01 3.54 20 52 -42 6 4.03 3.55 
Note. T-values for signal increases NARR ROI for emotion (EMO), negative (NEG), positive (POS) and neutral (NEUT) scenarios for ASD (autism group) and NT 
(neurotypical control group). No significant clusters were found in ASD > NT or NT > ASD comparisons. Laterality right (R) or left (L). Number of voxels in each cluster (v), 
XYZ coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold EMO, t = 3.24; NEG, t = 3.41; POS, t = 3.18; NEUT, t = 3.41; p < .002, k = 10.  






NARR POS. Neural activations in response to POS stories in the NARR 
regions of interest were highly similar between groups and also to the NEG condition. 
Extensive temporal activations were seen in lSTS [ASD (-50, -24, 6), t=11.88; NT     
(-58, -22, 8) t=9.83] for both groups, with smaller clusters in rSTS. Both ASD and 
NT also recruited bilateral aSTS [ASD (56, 6, -20), t=7.32); NT (56, 6, -20), t=7.90)], 
IFG (triangularis) [ASD ( -46, 22, 20), t=4.18; NT (-54, 24, 12), t=5.04)] and dmPFC 
[ASD (-12, 50, 42), t=4.71; NT (-10, 48, 42), t=4.33]. As with NEG, ASD engaged 
rTPJ [(60, -62, 16), t=7.63], and NT recruited precentral gyrus [(-48, 0, 52), t=4.44].  
Direct comparisons between groups failed to reach significance.         
NARR NEUT. In the NEUT contrast, narrative ROIs with the largest activity 
in both groups included STS bilaterally, with largest clusters in the left hemisphere 
[ASD (-50, -24, 6), t=10.93; NT (-62, -32, 6), t=9.84]. On the right, two separate  
clusters were shown in STS [ASD (54, -14, 6), t=10.42; (58, -10, -16), t=4.31; NT 
(62, -18, 0), t=9.24; (58, -10, -16), t=4.65], and TPJ [ASD (58, -10, 16), t=4.01; NT 
(52, -42, 6), t=4.03] for both groups, and the autistic participants also revealed 
rightward pSTS activity [(58, -40, 6), t=5.81]. Inferior/frontal clusters were also 
identified in both groups: left IFG (triangularis) (ASD (-46, 24, 20), t=4.85; NT (-56, 
30, 6), t=4.14], and right aSTS (ASD (54, 14, -20), t=5.70; NT (56, 8, -20), t=5.46]. 
Lastly, as in the EMO condition, left precentral gyrus was recruited in the control 
group [(-48, -2, 52), t=4.15]. Between-group contrasts yielded no significant results.  
ROI Analysis TOM ∩ NARR  
TOM ∩ NARR EMO. Within the ROIs associated with both ToM and 




bilaterally in both groups [ASD (-56, -58, 18), t=5.94; NT (-58, -52, 22), t=4.33], 
while right hemisphere clusters in both TPJ [(58, -60, 18), t=6.32] and MTG [(56, -8, 
-20), t=4.82] were additionally recruited by the ASD group. Between-groups test 
were not significant. 
TOM ∩ NARR NEG. Like EMO, NEG scenarios were associated with 
significant activity in lTPJ for both groups [ASD (-56, -58, 18), t=6.61; NT (-56, -52, 
20), t=4.48], while rTPJ [(56, -60, 18), t=6.02] and rMTG [(58, -10, -18), t=4.93] 
were also significantly engaged in the autism group. Between-group contrasts showed 
no effects. 
 
Figure 13. ToM ∩ NARR (ROI) analyses, Study 2. All regions of interest in ToM ∩ 
NARR (Mar, 2011) are shown on a template image. Bar graphs show percent signal 
change in BOLD response to EMO (yellow), NEG (red), POS (green) and NEUT (blue) for 
those ROI yielding  significant activation on the y-axis, separated by ASD and NT groups 
on x-axis. In right TPJ (*), activations to both EMO and NEUT for ASD are significantly 
greater than in NT. Error bars show standard error. 







Table 17.              
              
ROI results: TOM ∩ NARR, Study 2  
  ASD NT 
Region label L v x y z t Z v x y z t Z 
EMO              
Temporal               
  TPJ R 50 58 -60 18 6.32 4.94       
 L 24 -56 -58 18 5.94 4.74 18 -58 -52 22 4.33 3.75 
 L       a -52 -54 20 3.90 3.46 
  MTG R 11 56 -8 -20 4.82 4.08       
NEG              
Temporal               
  TPJ L 26 -56 -58 18 6.61 5.09 20 -56 -52 20 4.48 3.86 
 R 50 56 -60 18 6.02 4.78       
  MTG R 11 58 -10 -18 4.93 4.15       
POS              
Temporal              
TPJ R 50 58 -60 18 7.25 5.4       
 L 23 -56 -58 18 6.29 4.93       
MTG R 11 58 -10 -20 5.15 4.29       
NEUT              
Temporal              
  TPJ R 22 58 -60 16 4.01 3.54       
Note. We show t-values for signal increases in the conjunction of theory of mind and narrative (TOM ∩ NARR) regions of interest for emotion (EMO), 
negative (NEG), positive (POS) and neutral (NEUT) scenarios for ASD (autism group) and NT (neurotypical control group). No other contrasts revealed 
significant activations. Laterality (Lat) right (R) or left (L), number of voxels in each cluster (Voxel), XYZ coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are 
MNI space. Height threshold EMO, t = 3.24; NEG, t = 3.41; POS, t = 3.18; NEUT, t = 3.41; p < .002, k = 10.  




TOM ∩ NARR POS.  While the controls did not show any significant activity 
in clusters associated with both TOM and NARR, the autism participants showed 
significant activity in TPJ bilaterally [L (-56, -58, 18), t=6.29; R (58, -60, 18), t=7.25] 
and rMTG [(58, -10, -20), t=5.15]. Comparisons between groups were not significant.  
TOM ∩ NARR NEUT. For NEUT, a significant cluster was revealed for ASD 
in rTPJ [(58, -60, 16), t=4.01]. No significant between group effects were revealed. 
ROI statistical analyses 
 
Between-group. Between-group comparisons for TOM ∩ NARR ROI 
revealed significant group effect for valence, F(2, 56) = 3.890, p = .026, pairwise 
comparisons showed that NEG stories for ASD were significantly greater than NT in 
lTPJ, and in rTPJ, both POS and NEUT were greater for ASD compared to NT. 
While RM ANOVA failed to yield significant any group x condition interactions, but 
rTPJ neared significance, with a moderate effect size F(1,28) = 3.12, p = .089, r =.32.  
For TOM ROI, RM ANOVA revealed significant group x condition effects in 
precuneus for NEG, F(1,28) = 9.223, p = .005 and POS, F(1,28) = 5.601, p = .025, 
and in rTPJ for NEG, F(1,28) = 7.253, p = .012, and POS (F(1,28) = 8.068, p = .008). 
In both, ASD had enhanced activity relative to NT. No significant group * valence 
interactions were shown. 
No significant main effects were revealed for NARR ROI.  
Within-group. Follow-up contrasts within groups (corrected using Tukey’s 
test to control for multiple contrasts) showed that for TOM ∩ NARR, a significant 
effect of condition was shown lTPJ (F(2, 45) = 3.299, p = .046) for the NT group, 




condition was seen in midline structures for both groups, mPFC (ASD F(2, 39) = 
7.315, p = .002; NT F(2, 45) = 3.292, p = .046) and precuneus (ASD F(2, 39) = 
6.554, p = .004; NT F(2, 45) = 4.471, p = .017), where the effects were between 
conditions was driven by the deactivation in NEUT relative to activity in POS and 
NEG. Significant differences were also found in rTPJ (ASD F(2, 39) = 5.339, p = 
.009; NT F(2, 45) = 7.338, p = .002), where both POS and NEG had more activity 
than NEUT, and the same effect was seen for the control group in lTPJ (F(2, 45) = 
3.371, p = .043). Tests for NARR regions of interest failed to reach significance. 
 Brain-behavior relationships were explored by comparing the parameter 
estimates from within-group single sample t-tests for individual TOM ROI in POS, 
NEG and NEUT contrasts with scores from the cognitive and social-affective 
assessments. See Appendix I, Tables 1 (ASD) and 2 (NT) for summary correlations, 
and Figure 14 for illustrations of effects for social-affective assessments. 
(Correlations for cognitive measures are not illustrated due to significant relationships 
between cognitive and social-affective tests in the NT group.) Activations in the 
amygdala ROI for POS were significantly related to scores from Mind in the Eyes (r 
= .518, p = .029, n = 14), AQ (r = -.606, p = .022, n = 14) and EQ (r = .681, p = .007, 
n = 14). Herein, all tests shared the same trend, i.e., greater social-affective 
impairments predicted lower amygdala engagement. Other significant associations 
were between mPFC and the EQ (r = .640, p = .014, n = 14) (following the same 
pattern of greater impairments predicting lower activation), and rTPJ with WRAML 




better sentence repetition ability and more right temporal activity for POS scenarios. 
No significant correlations were shown in either NEG or NEUT contrasts for ASD.  
 
Figure 14. Brain-behavior correlations TOM ROI, Study 2. Scatterplots showing relationship 
between social-affective behavioral measure on x-axis and parameter estimates from 1-sample 
within group t-tests (y-axis) in autism (ASD, red ‘⃝’) and neurotypical controls (NT; green ‘∆’). 
Pink box: scores for Empathy Quotient (EQ) and rSTS (POS, A1; NEG, B1), amygdala (A2) and 
mPFC (A3) such that higher EQ scores indicate better ability to empathize and predict enhanced 
neural activation. Yellow box: the Autism Quotient (AQ) and amygdala (B2) and mPFC (B3), 
where higher scores indicate more autistic symptomatology and predict decreases in brain activity. 
Aqua box: scores from Mind in the Eyes (MinE) and rSTS (C1) and amygdala (C2), here higher 
scores specify better mentalizing abilities from judging photos of eyes and predict greater BOLD 
activation. Each scatterplot shows a correlation significant in at least one group (ASD, ‘*’; NT, ‘*’), 
with the other group plotted for between-group comparisons. Outline around each plot indicates 
contrast in which significant correlations occurred, positive (POS; green), negative (NEG; red), or 
neutral (NEUT; blue). 
 
The control group had significant correlation tests for POS stories in rSTS, 




16), and EQ (r = .645, p = .007, n = 16); in each, greater impairment correlated with 
lower neural activations. Other significant relationships were found between IQ and 
rTPJ (r = -.526, p = .036, n = 16), and EQ and mPFC (r = .568, p = .022, n = 16). In 
each of these regions, ability was reflected in lower neural responses. In contrast, in 
the test between WJIII and amygdala (r = .535, p = .033, n = 16), where better oral 
language skills correlated with enhanced activations. 
 Also in NT, for NEG scenarios a significant correlation was revealed between 
EQ and rSTS (r = .532, p = .034, n = 16), such that (like POS) greater ability 
predicted enhanced neural activity. Lastly, for NEUT stories, AQ was negatively 
related to mPFC activation (r = -.518, p = .040, n = 16), i.e., greater impairments 
were suggestive of lower activations.   
Target probe results 
 
For the response epoch, between-group comparisons revealed similar neural 
activations in both groups, and these were predominantly in occipital- and motor 
regions. There was a significant interaction effect in the negative congruent (NegCon) 
& incongruent (NegIncon) conditions however, perhaps mirroring the behavioral 
effects in response time (see Figure 9). The largest areas with significant interaction 
effects were both located in mPFC [(-4, 48, 40), F=21.77); (-4, 34, 54), F=18.59)] 
and included aCC, followed by frontal right angular gyrus [(44, 50, 26), F=23.96] and 
aCC [(12, 46, 2), F=26.61]. In each, the ASD group had greater activations to the 
NegIncon compared to the NegCon stories, while the NT group showed the reverse, 





Figure 15. Interaction effect in target probe, Study 2. Regions showing significant 
activation in negative congruent (NegCon; green) and negative incongruent (NegIncon; 
red) interaction. Task-related activity is displayed using a threshold of p < .001 corrected 
with cluster extent FWE threshold (p<0.05) for F-statistic maps. Coordinates in Montreal 
Neurologic Institute (MNI) space. Error bars show standard error.  
 
Table 18. 
       
        
Interaction effect: negative congruent & incongruent probe, Study 2 
        
Region label Lat voxels x y z F Z 
ASD        
Frontal        
  aCC R 96 12 46 2 26.61 4.83 
  dmPFC - 635 -4 48 40 21.77 4.37 
   a L a -10 60 20 21.77 4.33 
   a R a 14 46 46 18.38 4.01 
   a L a -12 40 40 20.48 4.24 
  aCC L a -10 42 12 16.51 3.79 
  dmPFC - 178 -4 34 54 18.59 4.03 
   a R a 6 26 50 15.64 3.69 
   a L a -14 26 60 15.10 3.62 
Parietal        
  Angular gyrus R 114 44 -50 26 23.96 4.58 
Note. We show F-values for signal increases for the interaction effect in negative 
congruent (NegCon) and negative incongruent (NegIncon) target probe condition. 
Laterality (Lat) right (R) or left (L), number of voxels in each cluster (Voxel), XYZ 
coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold F = 11.22, 
p < .001 corrected with cluster extent FWE threshold (p<0.05).  





In the present study, the performance of autistic individuals was compared to 
a neurotypical group while they listened to short vignettes and made judgements 
concerning the feelings of the protagonist. The scenarios were devoid of explicitly 
emotional words and/or prosody, and as such required the listener to infer such states 
from the contextual information alone. Neural activations were characterized during 
two epochs: hearing the scenarios (POS, NEG, or NEUT), and also during the 
response to a related T/F question. Accuracy and response time were recorded. For 
both ASD and NT, behavioral and neural results show participants’ reactions varied 
depending on valence and also congruency, but with differential effects. With respect 
to the behavioral effects, both groups showed overall faster and more accurate 
responses to EMO relative to NEUT scenarios, as well as for CON compared to 
INCON judgments. However, in comparison to the controls, the ASD group showed 
greater difficulty (i.e., slower and less accurate responses) for INCON judgements, 
especially in the NEG and NEUT conditions of valence. Brain responses of the ASD 
group also differed from controls. Here, the main findings reveal similar patterns 
between groups, but increased activation in individuals with ASD in regions 
associated with theory of mind processing for emotional but not neutral scenarios, 
especially right TPJ and precuneus where significant between-group effects were 
shown. In contrast, no significant effects were seen in ROIs associated with narrative 
comprehension. Brain-behavior correlations showed that greater recruitment of rSTS 
was related to better social abilities in controls, but this effect was not seen in ASD. 




skills predicted greater activations, but for autism. Overall, these results suggest that 
making language-based emotional ToM inferences engage social-affective brain 
regions differentially depending on valence in autistic individuals.  
Emotional facilitation in ASD, but inflated effect of congruency    
In line with previous research, it was predicted that the autism group would 
show overall slower response times to the T/F target, but otherwise would exhibit 
similar characteristics to the control group, specifically: 1) accurate identification, 2) 
faster responses to emotional compared with neutral scenarios, and 3) faster responses 
to congruent relative to incongruent targets. The findings generally support these 
predictions, suggesting that individuals with autism are able to use information from 
verbal scenarios to infer the feelings of a protagonist, even when devoid of 
emotionally explicit language. However, there are differential effects between 
patterns seen in RTs and accuracy scores, showing that congruency judgments were 
particularly challenging, especially in terms of accuracy when deciding on responses 
that were incongruent with the expected emotional state implied by the negative and 
neutral scenarios.  
A chief finding from these behavioral results was that response times 
generally indicated that emotional scenarios were more salient than neutral for ASD, 
in line with previous research showing emotional facilitation effects in typical 
participants (faster RT and greater accuracy to emotional stimuli) (Eviatar & Zaidel, 
1991; Herbert et al., 2005; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Kissler & Koessler, 2011; 
Kousta et al., 2009; Kuchinke, Võ, Hofmann, & Jacobs, 2007). These results 




this may be due to task differences. The response epoch required participants to 
respond to a three-word T/F question (“He felt happy.”). As such, the task is similar 
to other receptive language studies where autistic individuals show competence 
(Catarino et al., 2011; Downs & Smith, 2004; Hillier & Allinson, 2002; Lartseva, 
Dijkstra, & Buitelaar, 2015; Loveland et al., 1997; Rieffe et al., 2000; Rieffe et al., 
2007). By contrast, studies investigating affective language showing a lack of 
emotional facilitation effects in ASD involve memory or more complicated detection 
processes (Beversdorf et al., 1998; Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, 2009a, 
2009b; Gaigg, Gardiner, & Bowler, 2008; Grossman et al., 2000; Han et al., 2014; 
Kennedy et al., 2006; Lindner & Rosén, 2006; but see South et al., 2008).  
A second key finding lies within the differential effects seen in accuracy for 
congruency judgments. The overall trend for both groups showed that CON was 
processed more easily than INCON, consistent with literature regarding conflict 
monitoring in neurotypical groups (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ochsner et al., 2009). 
However, the ASD group had significantly greater difficulty judging the INCON 
responses for NEG and NEUT relative to controls, and also to the POS condition. 
Interestingly, they showed the opposite pattern for accuracy in POS, where PosIncon 
had slightly higher accuracy scores than PosCon (but results were not significant). 
Within-group ANOVA results (Table 14) reveal that for accuracy in the ASD group, 
there was a main effect of congruency, and the main effect for both valence and 
valence x congruency neared significance. In contrast, within-group comparisons for 
NT revealed greater similarities for accuracy across conditions, suggesting the 




Task difficulty may also proffer an explanation for the lower accuracy the autistic 
group showed in the NegIncon and NeutIncon judgments. Autistic individuals show 
increased impairment in the face of inconsistencies or when faced with multiple cues 
(Downs & Smith, 2004; Fink et al., 2014; Grossman et al., 2000; Hobson & Lee, 
1989; Lindner & Rosén, 2006). The fact that the same pattern was not seen between 
the PosCon and PosIncon condition may have several explanations. Firstly, there may 
be an enhanced effect of familiarity or predictability in the positive scenarios and/or 
target response words for the autistic participants, facilitating both the congruent and 
incongruent responses. Data from Study 1 as well as the controls in Study 2 suggests 
positive scenarios were the easiest, even in the incongruent condition.  
Another reason for the differential accuracy effects may be the effect of 
positive and negative valence, but research delineating the two in autism are scarce 
(many studies using only negative and neutral stimuli, e.g., Beversdorf et al. 1998). 
One study reveals intact abilities for identifying positive emotional words but not 
negative (Rieffe et al., 2007), but in a lexical decision task, RTs were equivalent to 
both positive and negative words (Lartseva et al., 2015). Further, an investigation 
using pictures failed to show enhanced recall for either positive or negative pictures 
in autistic individuals (Deruelle et al., 2008). In typical participants, there seems to be 
a facilitation effect for positive over negative valence: positive words are recalled 
more often than neutral (Kissler, Herbert, Winkler, & Junghofer, 2009; but see 
Kissler, Herbert, Peyk, & Junghofer, 2007) and positive words are identified more 
quickly than negative (Dahl, 2001; Estes & Adelman, 2008; Kissler & Koessler, 




in detection tasks, negative faces evoked faster reactions than positive (Ohman, 
Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001), and responses to negative words were faster than 
positive, and were identified with greater accuracy (Nasrallah, Carmel, & Lavie, 
2009). More research concerning the differential effects of valence is necessary to 
disentangle the saliency of positive and negative in autism.  
In light of the contradictory behavioral literature regarding emotional 
language understandings in autism, these results generally support the notion of intact 
abilities understanding others’ feelings from the language context, even when not 
explicitly stated, and without prosodic cues. Furthermore, they add to the evidence 
suggesting that the verbal domain is a relative strength in autism while processing 
emotional information in comparison with non-verbal cues (Downs & Smith, 2004; 
Egan, Brown, Goonan, Goonan, & Celano, 1998; Fink et al., 2014; Loveland et al., 
1997). To be clear, the wide variability in the behavioral responses in the ASD group, 
particularly for the incongruent judgments in the negative and neutral conditions, 
suggest that there may be phenotypic differences within ASD for both emotional 
valence and/or task difficulty.  
Increased task-related activation in TOM network in ASD 
 During the EIT, participants listened to short stories describing a protagonist’s 
internal state, be it emotional or physical. Several cognitive processes are important in 
making a correct inference. These include (but are not limited to) semantic 
knowledge, to accurately comprehend the words; empathy/mentalizing abilities, to 
understand how a person would feel given the situation described, and—for the 




of these processes are contingent upon the neural mechanisms needed for memory. 
Initial predictions were that autistic individuals would show less task-related 
activation in social-affective regions for emotional scenarios along with relatively 
more activations in brain areas associated with language. However, the results do not 
support these predictions, but in fact show the opposite trend. While listening to 
scenarios, the autism group showed enhanced BOLD activity relative to the control 
group in the emotional conditions, in two regions associated with ToM processing 
(rTPJ and pCC). Regions associated with narrative processing (NARR ROIs, not 
intersecting with TOM ROIs) failed to show differential activation between groups. 
One explanation for this may be that increases in task difficulty are associated with 
greater activations in relevant brain regions (Durston, Thomas, Worden, Yang, & 
Casey, 2002; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). If this is the case, the demands of 
making affective inferences may be more burdensome for ASD relative to NT 
individuals. Past studies investigating right temporal involvement during mentalizing 
offer inconsistent results; for example, two language-based studies show the same 
pattern as the present study (Mason et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2006), while two others 
present a lack of differentiation (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Lombardo, 
Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011). Wang et al. (2006) show similar 
increases for ASD in bTPJ (as well as mPFC) during irony comprehension, and 
suggest increases in ToM regions are due to more effortful processing during a task 
that explicitly requires attention to social cues. Mason et al. (2008) also show 
increases in right posterior temporal regions while reading sentences (intentional, 




right language areas from their LH homologues as the autistic participants fail to 
differentiate between experimental and control conditions. In contrast, others have 
shown reduced differentiation between mentalizing and control conditions in rTPJ. 
For example, one paradigm used animated shapes depicting three different patterns of 
movement: goal-directed, movement with intention, or random (Castelli et al., 2002). 
While viewing animations with intentional movement, the control group showed 
differential activation in bTPJ (as well as mPFC, bSTS and baSTS), whereas the ASD 
group had relative decreases in all regions. Another investigation used lexical stimuli 
that varied by ‘self ‘or ‘other’ and ‘mentalizing’ or ‘physical’ judgments, and while 
controls showed increased activation in rTPJ for mentalizing, ASD failed to show the 
same (Lombardo et al., 2011). As all conditions of EIT stories require inferring the 
state of the protagonists, and our results show both significant between-group and 
with-in group differences in rTPJ, these increases may be due to the increased 
demands required both by inferring complex language and, more importantly, by the 
implied emotional valence.  
 The heightened activity in the precuneus for ASD relative to controls in  
response to the emotional scenarios may also be attributed to more effortful 
processing, as this region has a central role in a number of integrated tasks (see 
Cavanna & Trimble, 2006 for review), including visual-spatial imagery (Addis, 
McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, 
Salih, & Greenlee, 2002), self-processing (Blakemore, Den Ouden, Choudhury, & 
Frith, 2007; Den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 2005; Kircher et al., 2002; 




1995;  Gallagher et al., 2000; Lundstrom et al., 2003; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & 
Buckner, 2005). Episodic memories are a subdivision of “declarative” or “explicit” 
memories, which allow for recall of personal events (as opposed to general 
knowledge, or semantic memory) (Squire, 2009; Tulving et al., 1994). In autism, one 
study showed a similar pattern to the current research, wherein the autism group had 
increased differential activation in precuneus while matching emotional faces to 
words relative to controls, despite a lack of behavioral differences (Wang et al., 
2004). By contrast, other investigations show the opposite pattern (Kennedy et al., 
2006; Martineau, Andersson, Barthélémy, Cottier, & Destrieux, 2010). For example, 
decreased precuneus activity was shown in ASD versus controls while observing 
facial expressions compared to mimicking them (Martineau et al., 2010), and 
Kennedy et al. (2006) showed that autistic individuals failed to show a “deactivation” 
in precuneus during a resting-state scan versus task, whereas the control group 
displayed this effect. A recent meta-analysis showed that ASD participants have 
“robust” grey matter decreases in bilateral precuneus compared to controls, and that 
this volume decrease is statistically higher in right precuneus in adults with ASD 
relative to teens (Via, Radua, Cardoner, Happé, & Mataix-Cols, 2011). Thus, the age 
and/or precuneus volume (right and left independently), may have a differential effect 
on neural activations across a variety of tasks in autism. 
The group with autism also displayed enhanced activity in subcortical areas 
important for general and emotional memories, for example the hippocampus (LaBar 
& Cabeza, 2006). Past studies have shown an overlap between network for ToM and 




vmPFC, IFG, and amygdala] (Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010; 
Spreng & Grady, 2009). Furthermore, while not correlated with one another, the 
hippocampus and rTPJ are functionally correlated with this network (Spreng & Mar, 
2012). Spreng & Mar (2012) propose that the overlap between these regions supports 
the integration of personal information with interpersonal information, thus 
facilitating personal experiences to inform social knowledge. Similarly, Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner (2007) put forward the concept of the “prospective brain,” wherein 
structures important for past memories, envisioning the future and mental simulation 
(mPFC, precuneus, lateral temporal cortex, and medial temporal lobe) are 
functionally related to one another and also to the hippocampal formation. In this 
model, memory contributes to one’s ability to simulate—or conceive—future events, 
and similarly to understand others’ minds (ToM). Behavioral evidence shows 
memory impairments for emotional words and sentences in autism (Beversdorf et al., 
1998; Gaigg & Bowler, 2009a, 2008), and also for emotional experiences (Losh & 
Capps, 2006). As such, emotional memory deficiencies may also contribute to 
increased neural activations in mentalizing regions in autism. 
 Lastly, the heightened response observed in ToM regions for ASD may also 
be associated with the overlap between the ToM network and regions shown to be 
connected during the brain’s “resting state,” or the default mode network (DMN), i.e., 
mPFC, pCC, and angular gyrus/TPJ (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; 
Raichle et al., 2001). In autism, there is evidence of reduced connectivity in 
associated DMN regions along with aberrant activations within the network (Assaf et 




2009). Together, the present findings suggest that in autism, language-related 
emotional information is processed differently from neutral stimuli in “mentalizing” 
brain regions, and enhanced neural activations in these areas may suggest increased 
task-related difficulty. 
Enhanced neural response to emotion in ASD  
 When processing individual emotions, both groups revealed significantly 
more neural activity in response to emotional stories relative to neutral in rTPJ, mPFC 
and precuneus, and additionally in dmPFC in ASD. Furthermore, in lTPJ and bSTS 
the same pattern emerged, but with non-significant differences. Emotion research in 
neurotypical individuals shows that regions associated with social-affective 
processing respond to emotional linguistic stimuli, including: the rostral aCC 
(Whalen et al., 1998), PFC (Hynes et al., 2006; Maratos, Dolan, Morris, Henson, & 
Rugg, 2001), and bilateral amygdala (Ferstl, Rinck, & Von Cramon, 2005; Isenberg 
et al., 1999; Kiehl et al., 2001; Strange, Henson, Friston, & Dolan, 2000). Past 
research is mixed regarding neural response to emotion in ASD. For example, in 
studies of facial recognition (see Harms et al., 2010 for review), some studies show a 
reduced response (particularly in amygdala and prefrontal regions) to emotion in 
faces (Ashwin et al., 2007; Critchley et al., 2000; Piggot et al., 2004; Wang et al., 
2006), while others indicate intact abilities (Adolphs et al., 2001; Hall, Szechtman, & 
Nahmias, 2003; Loveland, Steinberg, Pearson, Mansour, & Reddoch, 2008; 
Neumann, Spezio, Piven, & Adolphs, 2006; Ogai et al., 2003; Rutherford & Towns, 
2008). For emotional prosody, reduced responses are shown in ASD (Tesink et al., 




individuals are able to differentiate emotional from neutral affect in verbal scenarios 
that lack explicit emotional words and prosody.  
Another novel finding is that autistic individuals showed task-related 
differentiation between the effect of POS and NEG emotional valence, as illustrated 
in Figure 11. While it is unwise to draw conclusions from a limited sample, there is a 
delineation between regions where POS evoked higher response than NEG in medial 
structures (mPFC, amygdala and precuneus), and NEG > POS in bilateral temporal 
regions (TPJ and STS). These responses follow the same pattern as the results from 
NEG > POS and POS > NEG in Study 1 (Figure 7). Research in neurotypical 
individuals shows that medial frontal regions are associated with social cognition and 
emotion (Adolphs, 2003; Adolphs, 2003b), and negative emotions often are 
associated with more medial- and dorsal medial PFC (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; 
Lamm et al., 2011), while positive valence relates to more to vmPFC (Wager et al., 
2008). A recent meta-analysis shows this same effect, and suggests that the dmPFC is 
responsive to negative feedback and cognition, while the vmPFC is associated with 
positive feedback and social-affective acceptance (Crone, 2014). While the current 
results point to differential activation patterns in for positive and negative stimuli in 
autism, further research will be needed to investigate the effect of valence in medial 
frontal areas in ASD.  
ASD traits predict decreased activation in amygdala and mPFC 
For the independently selected ROI, amygdala and mPFC were significantly 
correlated with symptom severity in the autism group for three social-affective 




That is, greater autistic traits were positively correlated with less neural activity in 
these two regions. For the Empathy Quotient (EQ, Figure 14: A2) those with the most 
impairment (low scores) had comparatively less amygdala activity, and also less 
activation in mPFC (Figure 14: A3). For the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test—
which also evaluates empathy—lower abilities (low scores) correlated with decreases 
in amygdala activations (Figure 14: C2). Both regions were also significantly 
correlated with autistic symptoms expressed in the Autism Quotient index (AQ), 
where greater symptomatology (higher scores) was associated with reduced neural 
response in both amygdala and mPFC (Figure 14: B2, B3). These significant 
correlations occurred in the BOLD responses to the POS condition.  
Not surprisingly, brain regions associated with empathizing in the 
neurotypical population vary depending on the nature of the task and stimuli, and past 
studies have shown differential effects between cognitive- and emotional empathy. 
For example, making empathic judgments during verbal tasks is associated with 
elevations in superior- and inferior FG, middle temporal gyri and precuneus (Farrow 
et al., 2001). Another language-based study compared emotionally-charged moral and 
non-moral judgments (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002). During 
moral judgments, enhanced activations were shown in medial orbito-frontal regions, 
laSTS and lSTS. However, the emotional non-moral condition activated amygdala, 
orbital frontal gyrus, and lingual gyri. Emotional regions (amygdala and aCC) also 
showed significant signal increases while participants imitated emotional facial 
expressions, relative to viewing the same (Carr et al., 2003). Empathy for negative 




with aCC and insula (Lamm et al., 2011; Singer et al., 2004). In a direct comparison 
of ToM and empathy, cartoons showing mentalizing elicited lateral orbito-frontal 
regions, mPFC, STG and cuneus, while those describing empathy evoked activations 
in additional “emotional” regions: paracingulate, aCC, pCC and amygdala (Völlm et 
al., 2006); this overlap between ToM and emotional networks has also been shown 
during emotional prosody judgments (Hervé, Razafimandimby, Jobard, & Tzourio-
Mazoyer, 2013). 
Summarily, the significant increases observed in brain-behavior relationships 
in mPFC and amygdala for empathy measures may suggest a more “typical” 
activation pattern for autistic individuals during emotional empathy. The fact that 
these relationships were significant only in the POS contrast—which behavioral 
scores suggest were easiest to infer—adds some evidence to this proposition.   
Right STS does not modulate according to ASD symptomatology  
For the NT group, right STS showed significant increases related to greater 
social skills, whereas the ASD group showed no effect in this region. A large body of 
literature on neurotypical individuals has associated rSTS with aspects of  social 
cognition (see Redcay, 2007 for review), including processing language (Kriegstein 
& Giraud, 2004; Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2009), facial expressions (Narumoto, 
Okada, Sadato, Fukui, & Yonekura, 2001), eye gaze (Pelphrey, Viola, & McCarthy, 
2004), body movements/gestures (Kircher et al., 2009; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & 
Kanwisher, 2004), and intentions (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004). Research in 
autism suggests impaired activation in rSTS in response to social stimuli (see 




2006 for reviews). Specifically, whereas neural activations in neurotypical 
participants differentiate between social and non-social stimuli in this region, autistic 
individuals fail to show the same pattern, e.g., while watching goal-directed and 
mental state animations (Castelli et al., 2002), listening to voices versus other sounds 
(Gervais et al., 2004), perceiving intentional gaze shifts (Pelphrey, Morris, & 
McCarthy, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence of increased specialization of rSTS 
for social stimuli with age (Blakemore et al., 2007; Redcay, 2008). A challenge for 
future research will be to investigate the differential effects of the brain-behavior 
relationships shown in the present study.  
Cognitive reappraisal regions activated during response epoch in ASD 
 Results related to neural activations for the response epoch include a 
significant interaction effect for NegCon (NT > ASD) and NegIncon (ASD > NT) in 
superior mPFC, aCC, and right angular gyrus. With the exception of aCC, these 
results fail to support the predicted regions associated with cognitive control/error 
monitoring (dlPFC, paCC, rIPL, pCC, precuneus, insula; Botvinick et al., 2001). 
However, these results are suggestive of the behavioral responses, where the autism 
group displayed greatest difficulty (via slower and less accurate responses) in both 
NegIncon and NeutIncon. The brain regions where the interaction elicited significant 
activations are associated with emotion and ToM/social processing (rostral aCC, 
dmPFC, mPFC, and lpSTS), where dmPFC is highly associated with negative valence 
(Lamm et al., 2011; Singer et al., 2004).  
 In studies of cognitive control of emotion (see Ochsner & Gross, 2005 for 




regulate an ongoing emotional response. “Reappraisal” is one type of controlled 
regulation, involving the reinterpretation of an emotional stimuli to change one’s 
emotional response to the same (Gross, 1998), and medial prefrontal and aCC regions 
are shown to be differentially involved during reappraisal of negative emotion 
depending on the stimuli and nature of the task (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Cognitive 
reappraisal strategies were key during the incongruent trials of the EIT. For example, 
for this negative scenario: “The man's boss made him work late, so he hit traffic on 
the way to the airport. When he finally pulled off onto the airport exit, he was out of 
gas. He missed his flight” the incongruent response is: “He felt love.” And in autism, 
the enhanced neural response mPFC and aCC during such negative incongruent trials 
possibly suggests more effortful cognitive reappraisal. The fact that the autism group 
showed similar behavioral difficulties in NeutIncon conditions, but that the same 
condition failed to show a group x condition interaction neural effect, may be due to 
the lack of emotional information in the neutral condition. More research is needed to 
determine the differential effect that valence has on cognitive control in autism.  
Conclusion and future directions 
The research presented herein represent the first cohort of a larger data 
collection effort that is underway; the intention is to add five to ten more participants 
per group to increase statistical power. This is crucial given the heterogeneity in 
autism and the fact that autistic traits occur on a continuum in the neurotypical 
population. Nevertheless, the results of the present study are compelling, and suggest 
that autistic individuals are able to correctly identify others’ feelings from language 




neurotypical individuals, their neural activations show enhanced response to 
conditions of valence (positive and negative) compared to neutral in areas associated 
with mentalizing. However, in contrast to controls, the autism group showed overall 
greater brain activations, possibly suggesting that for them, the task is more effortful. 
As decreased functional connectivity has been associated with increases in activation, 
performing a functional connectivity analysis will be an important next step in 
determining the relationship between regions where enhanced activation was 
observed. Increasing the sample size will also allow for more detailed between-group 
comparisons of possible interactions between the conditions of valence and brain 
activity. Another consideration will be to control for individual variance, both in 
behavioral analyses and in terms of neural activity. Variability in cognitive 
performance (accuracy and RT on EIT task), social abilities, grey matter volume 
differences and the use of psychostimulants during the fMRI scan5 will be important 
factors to explore. The question of differences in the neurotypical samples between 
Study 1 and Study 2 should also be addressed, especially if these differences are 
exacerbated with increased sample size. In terms of ROI analyses, it may be fruitful 
to perform a modified analysis by extracting parameter estimates from each 
participant individually for the scenario epoch, as opposed to the group average 
approach employed in Study 2. Likewise, an FIR (Finite Impulse Response) analysis 
would reveal possible differences between groups in the temporal unfolding of the 
haemodynamic response during the extensive story epochs. An item analysis—
investigating the effects of individual emotions—would also add to the literature 
                                                 




regarding emotional understandings in autism. Furthermore, an item-analysis may 
also help determine the important question of whether the EIT scenarios truly evoke 
emotional inferences (as suggested herein), or rather invoke more general theory of 
mind processes, not specific to emotion.  
Regarding the theoretical models presented in the first Chapter, this research 
lends limited support to the idea that “weak central coherence” (WCC) or difficulty 
making global inferences (Happé & Frith, 2006) may be at the root of understanding 
emotions in the context of language for autistic individuals. As a whole, the autistic 
participants were able to make correct judgments in about 95% of the congruent 
probes, contradicting other findings showing impairments in understanding inferential 
language (Dennis et al., 2001; López & Leekam, 2003). However, their accuracy 
judgments showed that they had greater difficulties with the incongruent items, 
especially for negative and neutral scenarios (where accuracy was ~87% for both). 
Difficulties with “mixed messages”—as represented by the incongruent items—may 
be reflected in real life social situations, where autistic individuals often struggle to 
quickly and successfully interpret inconsistent verbal information that includes 
innuendos, sarcasm and humor. This interpretation should be used with caution, 
however, as the same pattern was not observed for incongruent positive items.   
In terms of the second theory presented—impairment of complex 
processing—the findings provide mixed support. Specifically, the behavioral findings 
fail support the notion of weakness in complex language and complex memory in 
autism (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998). However, the differential neural results 




inasmuch as this model was refined to predict that autism is a disorder of neural 
connectivity (Minshew & Williams, 2007). Functional connectivity analyses (to be 
calculated on a larger sample) will help clarify this stance.  
The findings of this research are most consistent with the proposal that the 
social deficits in autism result from weaknesses in mentalizing, or ToM (Frith & 
Frith, 1999; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2001). Even though the autistic individuals 
showed abilities in task performance, their relative increases in neural activations 
relative to the neurotypical group, especially in regions shown to be associated with 
mentalizing, suggest impairments in understanding what others are thinking or 
feeling. The fact that there was more differentiation between the emotional conditions 
than the neutral condition in these regions suggests that emotional valence may 
require additional resources. As mentioned above, future analyses will be useful in 
determining whether the EIT taps emotional processes or more general 
understandings of what others are thinking.  
Overall, these findings represent an important first step toward uncovering 
relative social-affective abilities in the language context in autistic individuals, 
despite irregular neural responses. The experimental approach the Emotional 
Inference Task provides greater precision with respect to deriving implicit emotional 
states and the underlying neural correlates. Moreover, such tasks have not been done 
in individuals with ASD, particularly in the context of fMRI. The findings from this 
and future work may be used to design effective intervention strategies and 
therapeutic practices for autistic individuals and their loved ones, for example by 




information as a crutch or tool in place of facial expressions which have a higher 
degree of variability and nuance. Successful remediation often employs areas of 










Stimuli from Van Lanker et al. (1991) and Hobson and Lee (1989) 
 







Emotional items Abstract items Social-related 
items 
hurt hot wagon horror time accident 
disappointed round bicycle delighted sharing sharing 
scared messy flower  disagreement horror dentist 
sad big picture surprise delivering delivering 
happy old carrot greeting delighted tugging 
mean furry glass snarling disagreement teacher 
furious heavy bed embracing pair disagreement 
lively gentle eye  surprise waiter 
guilty thirsty drum  greeting greeting 
surprised clean bus  snarling entertainer 
lazy square camera  isolation isolation 
angry broken brush  predatory applauding 
sleepy dirty piano  triplet predatory 
tired fat book  adjustable stunt  
loving soft hand  parallel lecturing 
hurt hot wagon  catastrophe departing 
disappointed round bicycle  departing embracing 
scared messy flower   portable accident 
sad big picture  coniferous sharing 
happy old carrot  filtration dentist 













Appendix B: Pilot study 
 
 As novel stimuli were generated for this research, a pilot study was conducted 
prior to conducting the fMRI studies to generate norms and determine the most 
suitable items.  
Sentence construction  
The initial corpus was composed of 36 short scenarios with implied negative 
emotional context, 36 with positive context, and 36 story passages describing the 
protagonist’s physical state (see Table 1 for examples).  The sentences were 
constructed such that the information related to the feeling- or physical state appeared 
as close to the beginning as possible, and the same state was inferred throughout the 
story.  All sentences were designed to be consistent with a target emotional- or 
physical state fitting the response, “He/she felt xxx.”  Target emotion words around 
which the positive and negative target sentences were created were selected Mind 
Reading software (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Hill, 2004), a program that 
includes over 400 emotion words; target words chosen were rated as familiar to  
95% of 15-16 year olds (Baron-Cohen, Golan, Wheelwright, Granader, & Hill, 2010). 
Words forming the basis of the neutral target sentences related to a bodily state or 
physical condition and lacking an emotional dimension in the sentential context.  
Table 2 presents the target words for all scenarios.  
Sentence production  
Passages were recorded by an adult female using Praat recording software 




Weenink, 2012).  A natural tone of voice was used, lacking prosody and affective 
intonations that would be consistent with the emotion portrayed (or lack thereof).  
Initial recordings were normalized for intensity by calculating the average of all files 
(72.45 db total, range 67.81 to 77.15) and scaling all recordings to this average. To 
verify the absence of prosodic cues, an acoustic analysis was conducted 
to evaluate the utterances on the activation dimension (high vs. low energy) using 
PRAAT software (Boersma & Weenink, 2004). Particular attention was paid to F0, 
the main parameter reflecting emotion in prosody, with negative emotions 
characterized by a low, monotonous F0 pattern and positive emotions by higher, more 
wide-ranging F0 (Bänziger & Scherer, 2005; Scherer, 1986). Single factor analysis of 
variance failed to reveal differences between conditions for either mean F0 (ANOVA; 
F(2,69) = .68, p = > .05) or F0 range (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.63, p = > .05). The 
stories had an average duration of 11.02 sec (range 9.74-11.74 sec).  
Table 1. 
Sample scenarios for pilot study 
Condition Scenario 
Negative The woman could not get over the idea that her ex-boyfriend did not 
want to be with her anymore.  Hearing that he was dating someone new 
made the situation even worse. 
Positive The young man had waited so long for his favorite band to come to 
town that he could hardly sleep the night before the concert.  He 
planned to arrive early to get autographs.   
PhyState After the race, the jockey was covered head to toe, and he couldn't see 
through his goggles.  Days of rain had saturated the track, so the horses 
kicked up great clods as they ran. 
Note.  A total of 108 sentences were constructed, 36 each negative-, positive- and 








Target words for each condition in emotional inference task 
 
Negative Positive Physical State 
Feeling Scenarios Feeling Scenarios Feeling Scenarios 
Angry 3 Excited 4 Dirty 6 
Disappointed 3 Happy 2 Hot 3 
Disgust 3 Love 5 Wet 3 
Frustrated 3 Overjoyed 3 Tired 2 
Jealous 3 Proud 3 Hungry 2 
Sad 3 Relieved 3 Cold 3 
Scared 3 Romantic 2 Sore 5 
Upset 3 Welcomed 2   
Note. Positive and negative scenarios were created around emotionally valent target 
words chosen from the Mind Reading software program (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2003).  Physical state scenarios were designed to project a bodily state or physical 
condition, but not an emotional dimension in the sentential context.  The numbers 
under “Scenarios” reflects the final corpus. 
 
Sentence selection 
Nineteen typically developing adults (11 F; 18.1-22.5 years of age) recruited 
from the University of Maryland performed a cloze task procedure to assess the 
precision of the contexts in evoking particular emotional states. Additionally, stories 
were rated for valence and familiarity. For the task, participants were seated in front 
of a computer monitor on which a horizontal scale was displayed: -3 (negative) to +3 
(positive), with 0 being the anchor for neutral. As they listened to each scenario using 
headphones, subjects were asked to move the computer mouse far to the left if they 
felt it was highly negative or similarly to the right for highly positive. For less intense 
feelings, they were asked to keep the mouse closer to the midline (0). Participants 
were asked to commence the movement of the mouse at the time when they identified 
the valence of the story, and after listening to the story, they typed a word that best fit 




entering a number from 1 (not at all likely to happen) to 7 (very likely to happen) in 
response to: “Could you imagine this actually happening to you or someone close to 
you?” Participants could choose to hear the story again if they desired. Each subject 
responded to all 108 scenarios. 
The criteria used for sentence selection were a) positive and negative 
scenarios were deemed appropriate if they received 100% agreement from all 
participants (target word or a synonym), b) physical state stories were deemed 
accurate if response was consistent with the physical state or a neutral emotion was 
supplied, e.g., "satisfied." Furthermore, among those stories meeting the consistency 
criteria, those judged to have highest (for positive), lowest (for negative) and most 
neutral (for physical state) valence ratings were selected. Valence ratings were 
collected on a scale of -3 to +3, -3 being most negative and +3 most positive. The 
average valence for negative stories = -2.48, for positive stories = 2.52, and for 
neutral stories = -1.80 (see Table 3 for complete results). In total, 72 sentences were 
chosen, 24 in each condition. For the fMRI paradigm, congruent and incongruent 
response conditions were created for each of the scenarios in the form of a true-false 
statement, for example, “She felt happy.”  The corpus of scenarios and their 






















Negative  1107 100.00 -2.49 4.40 7434 41.70 
Positive 1102 100.00 2.52 5.25 7721 50.00 
Neutral 1112 89.71 -1.80 4.47 9432 67.00 
Total 1104 96.57  4.71 8193 52.70 
Note.  Parameters for final scenario stimuli chosen from pilot study, including a) 
average duration, b) consistency of responses from the cloze task, c) average 
valence (scale: -3 to +3), d) familiarity (scale: 1 to 7), e) average response time, and 
f) percent of stories with male protagonists. 
  
Stimuli norming  
 To determine consistency between conditions  (Table 4) in the final stimuli 
were submitted to Coh-Metrix version 3.0, an on-line database that calculates text 
coherence on a wide range of measures (McNamara, Louwerse, Cai, & Graesser, 
2005). For stories, means and standard deviations were calculated for five measures: 
number of sentences, words per sentence, narrativity, syntactic simplicity, and words 
before main verb. The first two measures are self-explanatory, and did not differ 
when tested by a single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 2.69, p < .05) 
for number of sentences or (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.90, p < .05) for words per 
sentence.  Narrativity is a measure closely affiliated with every day oral conversation; 
this measure is highly affiliated with word familiarity, world knowledge, and oral 
language.  Non-narrative, unfamiliar texts lie at the other end of the spectrum.  




factor analysis of variance (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.52, p < .05) for z-scores and 
(ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.36, p <.05) for percentile.   
Table 4. 
 
Norming results for story stimuli  
 
 Valence 
 Positive Negative Neutral 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Sentences    
Number sentences 2.04 (.62) 2.33 (.56) 2.0 (.42) 
Words per sentence 33.13 (2.85) 33.46 (2.78) 31.96 (2.76) 
Narrativity 64.83 (37.94) 73.82 (31.24) 57.04 (36.19) 
Syntactic simplicity 17.56 (21.87) 30.44 (31.37) 32.98 (23.35) 
Words before main verb 5.90 (5.98) 4.01 (2.71) 4.55 (1.90) 
Content words    
Frequency 2.19 (.24) 2.26 (.27) 2.18 (.28) 
Age of acquisition 276.62 (51.20) 286.88 (67.24) 280.80 (61.05) 
Familiarity 583.76 (12.61) 583.89 (12.15) 580.62 (12.65) 
Concreteness 443.52* (39.54) 425.26* (46.81) 463.63* (36.37) 
Meaningfulness  472.45* (24.31) 447.75* (28.63) 453.82* (17.49) 
Imagability 479.74* (32.50) 453.79* (42.93) 488.95* (34.39) 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) calculated using Coh-Metrix version 
3.0 (McNamara et al., 2005).  Narrativity = highly associated with word familiarity, world 
knowledge, and oral language. Syntactic simplicity = the degree to which the sentences in 
the text contain fewer words and use familiar syntactic structures. Words before main verb 
= mean number of words before the main verb of the main clause in sentence; good index 
of working memory load.  Frequency = average word frequency for content words 
(CELEX). Age of acquisition compiled by Gilhooly and Logie (1980) higher scores = word 
is learned later. Familiarity = rating (on a 7-point scale) of how familiar a word seems to an 
adult. Concreteness = index of how concrete or non-abstract a word is. Meaningfulness 
from Toglia and Battig (1978), higher scores = word is closely related to others. 
Imagability = how easy it is to construct a mental image of the word. 
*p < .05 
 
 
Syntactic simplicity reflects the degree to which the sentences contain fewer 
words and use simple, familiar syntactic structures (as opposed to complex structures 
with more words).  Scenarios did not differ in terms of syntactic simplicity tested by a 
single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.81, p < .05) for z-scores and 
(ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.48, p <.05) for percentile. Words before main verb calculates 




measure provides a good index of working memory load. No differences were found 
when tested by a single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 1.46, p < 
.05).  
Content words in the scenarios were also submitted for analysis on six 
measures: frequency, age of acquisition, familiarity, concreteness, meaningfulness 
and imagability (Table 4).  Single factor analysis of variance failed to reveal 
differences between conditions for frequency (ANOVA; F(2,69) = .54, p < .05), age 
of acquisition (ANOVA; F(2,69) = .84, p < .05), or familiarity (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 
.54, p < .05). Differences were revealed in the remaining measures, however. Content 
words differed significantly in terms of concreteness (a measure of how “non-
abstract” a word is) tested by a single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA; 
F(2,61.0) = 6.12, p < .05). Planned comparisons revealed that content words in 
neutral stories were significantly more concrete those in negative stories t(69) = 3.23, 
p < .05 and emotional (positive and negative) stories together t(69) = 2.84, p < .05.  
Content words also differed significantly in terms of meaningfulness (ANOVA; 
F(2,69) = 6.18, p < .05.  Planned comparisons revealed that content words in positive 
stories were significantly more meaningful those in negative stories t(45.3) = 3.04, p  
< .05, neutral stories t(40.9) = 2.81, p < .05, and negative and neutral stories together 
t(42.7) = 3.34, p < .05. Lastly, content words differed significantly in terms of 
imagability (index of how easy it is to create a mental image of the word) (ANOVA; 
F(2,69) = 5.86, p < .05).  Planned comparisons revealed that content words in 
negative stories scored significantly lower in terms of imagability than those in 




Additionally, emotional stories combined had lower imagability ratings than neutral 
stories t(69) = 2.41, p < .05.   
 Content words from the target probes were similarly analyzed for consistency 
on five measures: length, frequency, familiarity, concreteness and imagability (Table 
5). Single factor analysis of variance failed to reveal differences between conditions 
for length (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 3.47, p < .05),  frequency (ANOVA; F(2,69) = .82, p 
< .05),  familiarity (ANOVA; F(2,69) = 3.0, p < .05), concreteness (ANOVA; F(2,69) 




Norming results for content words in target probe  
 
 Valence 
 Positive Negative Neutral 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Length  6.75 (1.83) 6.88 (2.90) 4.26 (1.11) 
Frequency  1.47 (.70) 1.06 (.61) 1.36 (.69) 
Familiarity 292.38 (313.89) 413.0 (256.61) 596.0 (29.08) 
Concreteness  167.88 (179.97) 169.13 (182.94) 340.43 (233.76) 
Imagability 248.0 (267.82) 324.38 (204.55) 497.71 (42.03) 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) calculated using Coh-Metrix version 
3.0 (McNamara et al., 2005).  Frequency = average word frequency for content words 
(CELEX). Age of acquisition compiled by Gilhooly & Logie (1980) higher scores = word 
is learned later. Familiarity = rating (on a 7-point scale) of how familiar a word seems to an 
adult. Concreteness = index of how concrete or non-abstract a word is. Meaningfulness 
from Toglia & Battig (1978), higher scores = word is closely related to others. Imagability 
= how easy it is to construct a mental image of the word. 
















Neg1 The woman could not get over the idea that her 
ex-boyfriend did not want to be with her 
anymore.  Hearing that he was dating someone 
new made the situation even worse. 
jealous overjoyed 
Neg2  The girl tried hard to smile when only her sister 
was accepted to Yale. The twins were both top 
students, and had both applied to many of the 
same prestigious schools.   
disappointed romantic 
Neg3 The girl's name was not among those who made 
the cheerleading squad.  All of her friends were 
chosen, as well as two other girls who were not 
very agile and had messed up on their routines.  
disappointed welcomed 
Neg4 No one visited the woman when she was 
hospitalized with pneumonia.  The phone didn't 
ring, and she received no flowers or cards.  
During visiting hours her room was silent.    
sad romantic 
Neg5 As usual, the girl was the last one picked for the 
team.  She was left standing alone, as the losing 
captain waved her over.   Even the skinny new 
kid was picked before she was. 
sad loved 
Neg6 The babysitter took the toddler to the park to play, 
and when she turned around he was gone.  She 
quickly searched the playground, and then raced 
across the field to search the woods. 
scared relieved 
Neg7 Just as the man raised the forkful of fried rice to 
his mouth, he noticed something moving on his 
plate.  He dropped his fork when the black 
cockroach scurried out of his food. 
disgust love 
Neg8 The reporter arrived at the scene of the overturned 
bus on Route 1.  He saw people moaning and 
blood all over the road.  His stomach turned as 
medics covered a victim. 
disgust loving 
Neg9 The computer screen was still black, even after 
the man had spent two hours on the phone with 
the service department, restored the factory 
settings, and installed a new hard drive. 
frustrated excited 
Neg10 When the woman got her silk sweater back from 
her roommate, it reeked of cigarette smoke and 
had underarm stains.  Even after paying to have it 
dry-cleaned, it wasn’t the same. 
angry proud 
Neg11 Because she had detention, the girl missed the 
pool party.  The whole class was there, including 
her friends who also skipped class.  The girl sat in 
the classroom glaring at the proctor. 
angry relieved 
Neg12 The man's boss made him work late, so he hit 
traffic on the way to the airport.  When he finally 
pulled off onto the airport exit, he was out of gas.  
He missed his flight. 
frustrated love  










Neg13 His grandfather's death came suddenly.  When the 
boy heard the news, he remembered the old man's 
deep laugh, his gentle hands and the chair that 
would now be empty on holidays. 
sad excited 
Neg14 Her boyfriend unexpectedly broke up with her, 
without even making a phone call.  He simply 
sent a text message to her phone, saying that it 
was over, and not to contact him anymore.  
upset excited 
Neg15 The student had worked for days on his essay 
when his computer crashed.  He had not made a 
back-up copy, and it was due in two days.  
Without this he would fail the class. 
frustrated happy 
Neg16 It snowed so hard on her wedding day that the 
couple could not make it to the church.  Many 
guests were unable to come, and the caterers 
cancelled.  Months of planning were ruined. 
disappointed proud 
Neg17 The boy threw down his backpack, stomped down 
the hallway, snarled at his sister then slammed his 
bedroom door.  When his mother knocked and 
asked him to come out, he demanded to be left 
alone. 
angry relieved 
Neg18 The girl saw that her new bike was gone when 
she returned to the bike rack. She had locked it 
up, but found that her lock was left dangling.  It 
was a birthday present, and she had only had it 
for three months. 
upset love 
Neg19 Late at night, the girl woke up when she heard 
scratching at her window.  Soon after she heard 
shuffling sounds, and the neighbor's dog barking.  
Then, the door handle jiggled. 
scared proud 
Neg20 The toilet in the public restroom had overflowed 
all over the floor. When the unsuspecting woman 
stepped into the stall, she was met with an 
indescribable sight and stench that caused her to 
back away. 
disgust overjoyed 
Neg21 The elevator came to a violent stop and the lights 
went out.  As the man felt his way along the wall, 
hoping to find the emergency call button, the 
elevator began jerking again. 
scared happy 
Neg22 The woman's dog had not eaten in two days, and 
when she came home she found him lying on his 
side, unable to move.  She wrapped him in a 
blanket, and took him to the vet. 
upset excited 
Neg23 The man walked into the bar and saw his 
girlfriend talking and laughing with three other 
men.  She was wearing a tight dress he didn't 
recognize, and was openly flirting with them. 
jealous overjoyed 
Neg24 The young man watched as the girl he had been 
talking to all evening eyed the new guy entering 
the gym.  He was tall, handsome, and confident, 
and approached the girl smiling.  
jealous welcomed 
    










Pos1 At her new school, the girl's friends 
complimented her clothes, showed her around 
campus, helped her with homework when she was 
absent, and invited her out on weekends. 
welcomed sad 
Pos2 The woman found an invitation to the state dinner 
at the White House in her mailbox.  She quickly 
phoned her friends with the news, and turned her 
attention to buying a new gown. 
overjoyed disappointed 
Pos3 The young man had waited so long for his 
favorite band to come to town that he could 
hardly sleep the night before the concert.  He 
planned to arrive early to get autographs.   
excited disgust 
Pos4 His first day on the job, the intern mounted the 
steps on Capitol Hill two at a time.  He had 
wanted to be a politician, and now he pushed 
open the doors with a broad smile. 
proud disappointed 
Pos5 The young mother held her baby gently in her 
arms and gazed at his small face.  As he clasped 
his small hand around her finger, she studied each 
nail and his delicate skin. 
loving frustrated 
Pos6 When his advisor informed him that he had had 
passed his exams with high marks and had 
enough credits to graduate, the young man left the 
office with his head held high.   
proud jealous 
Pos7 The girl nestled into the sofa at her father’s side, 
and he closed his arm around her.  It was one of 
her favorite times of the day, and she opened the 
book for him to read. 
happy angry 
Pos8 The little boy's grandma brings him special treats 
when she visits, and when he goes to her house, 
the fresh-baked smell of his favorite cookies 
greets him as he opens the door. 
happy frustrated 
Pos9 When he returned to work after his surgery, the 
man's locker was decorated with streamers and 
get well signs, and flowers waited on the table.  
His co-workers embraced him warmly. 
welcomed upset 
Pos10 The woman's doctor told her she was cancer free.  
After battling cancer for four years, this long-
awaited news meant that she could reclaim her 
life and think about her future. 
relieved disappointed 
Pos11 The young man walked along the beach with his 
girlfriend, holding her hand and whispering in her 
ear.  In the moonlight, he looked into her eyes and 
asked her to marry him. 
romantic angry 
Pos12 The woman planned a candlelight dinner for her 
husband.  She placed fresh-cut flowers on the 
table, prepared his favorite meal, and tucked a 
love poem under his napkin. 
romantic angry 
Pos13 The young man gazed at his date and found 
himself thinking of a future with her.  She was 
everything he dreamed of: smart, funny, and 
pretty.  He smiled and squeezed her hand. 
love disgust 










Pos14 On her wedding day, the bride looked into her 
husband's eyes and told him that he would always 
be her one and only.  Hearing the same words 
from him made her complete. 
love frustrated 
Pos15 On their anniversary, the man told his wife that he 
would marry her all over again.  She had made 
his life complete, as a supportive partner and 
mother to their children.  
love upset 
Pos16 The young man couldn't believe his luck. His 
friend had gotten several tickets to the Super 
Bowl, and he offered one to him. He could hardly 
wait to see his favorite team play for the 
Lombardi trophy. 
excited scared 
Pos17 When the teacher announced there would be no 
homework for the rest of the week, the girl could 
hardly believe it. Her afternoons and evenings 
would be free for her to relax, watch TV, and play 
with her dog.  
relieved scared 
Pos18 The man won the national tournament. He held 
the trophy high above his head and smiled for his 
family and the cameras.  The years and years of 
practice, hard work and discipline had paid off in 
the end. 
proud sad 
Pos19 When she saw the large envelopes from Harvard 
and MIT in her mailbox, the young woman 
quickly ripped them open and read 
“Congratulations, welcome to the class of 2012.” 
overjoyed jealous 
Pos20 The woman opened the small box and found the 
most exquisite, glittering diamond ring. She 
looked into her boyfriend's damp eyes then 
wrapped her arms tightly around him, vowing 
never to let him go. 
loved disgust 
Pos21 The young man had finished his exams and 
turned in his final paper.  He walked across the 
quad with a spring in his step as he left campus 
for six weeks of relaxation.   
relieved scared 
Pos22 Finally, the new release of the 'Call of Duty' 
video game hit the stores.  The boy bought a 
copy, invited his friend over, ripped off the 
cellophane wrapper and inserted the disk.   
excited upset 
Pos23 The girl's dad was finally coming home.  He had 
been fighting in Afghanistan, but all she cared 
about was seeing his face in that doorway.   Her 
heart beat rapidly as she waited. 
overjoyed jealous 
Pos24 The woman boarded the plane for Australia, a 
place she had always hoped to visit.  As an avid 
scuba diver, diving off the Great Barrier Reef 
would be like a dream come true. 
excited sad 
Phys1 After the race, the jockey was covered head to 
toe, and he couldn't see through his goggles.  
Days of rain had saturated the track, so the horses 
kicked up great clods as they ran.  
dirty clean 










Phys2 Even after scrubbing her hands twice, the 
gardener had earth packed under her nails and 
smeared on her face.  She had been planting bulbs 
in the damp soil all morning. 
dirty clean 
Phys3 The drought had reduced the ranch to a barren 
landscape. After a day of riding, the cowboy's 
skin and clothing were grey-brown and his white 
horse was the color of the earth. 
dirty clean 
Phys4 The man hadn't bathed properly or washed his 
clothes for the two months he had hiked the 
Appalachian Trail.  When he emerged from the 
woods, he noted that people backed away from 
him. 
filthy clean 
Phys5 Rain had turned the baseball field into a slippery 
mess, so when the boy slid into home base, his 
white uniform turned dark brown all along  one 
side, along with his arm. 
dirty clean 
Phys6 The man's skin and clothing were black with soot 
when he emerged from the coal mine.  Under his 
safety helmet, his hair was matted, and he left a 
black trail when he walked. 
filthy clean 
Phys7 The archeologist had worked all day in the sun.  
Her lips were cracked and her hands were red and 
raw.  Her hat had been ineffective against the 
baking sun in the desert. 
hot cold 
Phys8 The temperature had not gone below 100 degrees 
for days. The man's air conditioner was broken, 
and opening the windows only increased the 
temperature inside his apartment. 
hot cold 
Phys9 It was so humid in Bangkok that the man 
loosened his tie and took off his jacket after the 
meeting.  Even so, by the time he reached the 
hotel he had to change his clothes. 
hot cold 
Phys10 It started to drizzle as the boy biked home, but the 
rain quickly grew stronger.  By the time he got to 
his house, his t-shirt was see-through and his 
jeans were plastered to his legs. 
wet dry 
Phys11 The boy had intended on washing his Golden 
Retriever outside with the hose, but after the dog 
shook vigorously, it was difficult to see who had 
gotten the bath. 
wet dry 
Phys12 The soccer game was only half way over when it 
began to rain. By the time it ended, the boy's hair 
stuck to his head and his shoes made squishing 
sounds when he walked.   
wet dry 
Phys13 The swimmer had been training three times per 
day for weeks as he prepared for the Olympic 
trials.  After a particularly long work-out, he 
could hardly lift his swim bag. 
tired energetic 
Phys14 The woman's legs gave away as she crossed the 
finish line after the long race. She had attempted 
to stumble over to the grass to sit down, but 
simply collapsed before she got there.  










Phys15 The teenager was growing like a weed.  Each day 
after football practice, he rummaged through the 
refrigerator, taking out meats, cheeses, tomatoes 
and lettuce to make himself a hearty sandwich.  
hungry full 
Phys16 It was seven pm, and the young woman had not 
eaten anything since breakfast that morning. On 
her way home from work, she stopped at a drive 
through and ordered enough food for a small 
family. 
hungry full 
Phys17 The boy had been playing in the snow all 
morning, without noticing the sinking 
temperatures.  When he came in, his fingers and 
toes were blue, and his cheeks were bright red.   
cold hot 
Phys18 Shivering in his thin t-shirt and shorts, the boy 
hurried home from soccer practice at the park.  
The temperature had dropped at least 10 degrees 
since he came, and snowflakes were dancing on 
the air.  
cold hot 
Phys19 The temperature dropped to below zero when the 
sun went down.  Shivering, he rubbed his hands 
together briskly. His windbreaker and cap were 
no match for these conditions. 
cold hot 
Phys20 The old man's hands were swollen and his skin 
was cracked.  Years of working as a stone mason 
had created thick callouses and he had large 
knuckles from arthritis.   
sore pain free 
Phys21 After running the marathon, the woman could 
barely get out of bed, and when she did she took 
small, halting steps.  When she went up or down 
stairs she took one at a time. 
sore pain free 
Phys22 The old woman had difficulty moving her neck 
and back, and noticed increased difficulty getting 
out of bed in the morning.  She applied heating 
cream to her joints. 
sore pain free 
Phys23 After getting her wisdom teeth out, the girl could 
only eat ice cream.  Slowly, she began to eat soft 
foods, carefully avoiding the places where her 
teeth had been. 
sore pain free 
Phys24 After surgery to repair the torn ligament in her 
knee, the young woman had physical therapy.  
After each session, she walked slowly and 
gingerly to protect her knee.  













Brain activity associated with all stories, Study 1 
   
 Left Right 
Region label x y z t d x Y z t d 
Frontal           
 dmPFC -8 50 34 11.17 2.91 8 56 24 6.05 1.58 
 -6 56 26 6.54 1.70      
  MFG -44 4 60 9.12 2.37      
 -40 0 62 8.87 2.31      
  vmPFC -2 28 -22 10.23 2.66 2 54 -14 8.23 2.17 
 -2 44 -20 9.97 2.60      
  SMA -4 4 64 9.27 2.41      
 -6 -20 66 8.74 2.28      
  Precentral gyrus  -50 -4 50 10.33 2.69 56 -4 52 7.41 1.93 
 -38 2 52 8.83 2.30 48 -16 68 6.34 1.65 
 -36 0 48 8.53 2.22 26 -12 78 6.34 1.65 
 -44 -12 40 6.56 1.71 24 -24 62 5.86 1.53 
 -44 -10 66 5.92 1.54      
  Paracentral lobule -12 -38 66 8.72 2.27 8 -22 60 9.43 2.46 
 -8 -38 66 7.96 2.07 4 -28 62 7.94 2.07 
      10 -28 66 7.88 2.05 
      12 -26 72 7.23 1.88 
        12 -34 56 7.11 1.85 
  Insula      46 -6 18 7.09 1.85 
        60 26 26 6.18 1.61 
Temporal           
  aSTS -48 10 -14 16.81 4.38 50 16 -18 16.45 4.28 
      58 14 -22 14.71 3.83 
      42 26 -32 12.93 3.37 
      48 -18 8 12.24 3.19 
      34 4 -20 6.04 1.57 
  STS -58 -28 10 20.00 5.21 60 -6 -2 22.75 5.92 
 -62 -14 6 19.37 5.04 62 -10 2 18.76 4.88 
 -60 -16 0 19.06 4.96 64 -16 6 14.84 3.86 
 -46 -32 6 18.48 4.81 48 -28 8 14.29 3.72 
 -56 -10 -6 18.38 4.79      
 -58 -26 4 18.31 4.77      
 -54 -34 4 17.69 4.61      
 -46 -30 2 17.56 4.57      
 -54 -4 -14 17.55 4.57      
 -56 -10 0 17.25 4.49      
 -54 -18 10 16.11 4.19      
 -48 -24 8 15.98 4.16      
 -68 -24 10 15.93 4.15      
 -60 -2 0 15.85 4.13      
 -50 -16 4 15.43 4.02      
  Middle temporal pole -28 18 -38 8.05 2.10      
  MTG      50 -24 2 18.59 4.84 
      58 -34 2 18.44 4.80 




      58 -22 -4 14.04 3.66 
      58 12 -18 13.91 3.62 
      64 2 -16 13.55 3.53 
      50 -6 -14 13.18 3.43 
      44 -38 2 13.09 3.41 
      54 -68 24 6.13 1.60 
      62 -60 18 5.68 1.48 
  IFG -22 4 -42 6.25 1.63 26 -32 -18 7.85 2.04 
  ITG      46 -48 -22 7.46 1.94 
      40 -20 -14 6.47 1.68 
Parietal           
  Postcentral gyrus -62 -8 38 6.89 1.79 62 -14 48 8.31 2.16 
 -58 -12 46 6.84 1.78 56 -14 58 6.29 1.64 
 -56 -14 56 5.70 1.48 26 -32 66 6.25 1.63 
      50 -22 68 5.95 1.55 
      70 -14 50 5.81 1.51 
  Angular gyrus      42 -62 26 7.04 1.83 
Occipital           
  SOcc      14 -96 16 6.87 1.79 
      16 -90 24 6.86 1.79 
  MOcc      16 -88 18 6.95 1.81 
       20 -94 14 6.37 1.66 
      26 -90 14 5.78 1.50 
  Cuneous -10 -94 18 6.48 1.69      
 -14 -90 16 6.23 1.62      
  Lingual gyrus -14 -62 -10 6.29 1.64      
Subcortical           
  Hippocampus      16 -28 -6 7.74 2.02 
  Parahippocamal gyrus      18 -32 -10 6.58 1.71 
      26 6 -30 5.79 1.51 
  Calcarine -14 -82 18 5.73 1.49 14 -48 6 7.42 1.93 
  Mid cingulate -6 -10 44 6.36 1.66      
 -18 -32 50 6.03 1.57      
Cerebellum           
  Cerebellum lob VIIa crus II -18 -76 -38 9.82 2.56 20 -78 -38 16.97 4.42 
  Cerebellum lob VIIa crus I -58 -50 -28 7.33 1.91 16 -70 -26 14.50 3.78 
  Cerebellum lob VIII -24 -62 -50 6.18 1.61 24 -70 -52 10.97 2.86 
  Cerebellum lob IX -4 -54 -42 7.74 2.02 8 -52 -40 8.10 2.11 
  Cerebellum lob VI      32 -64 -20 7.02 1.83 
Note. We show t-values for signal increases associated with emotion using Positive 
+ Negative vs. Neutral, signal increases associated with neutral using Neutral vs. 
Positive + Negative.   Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold: t = 6.14, P < 
















Brain activity associated with true-false response, Study 1 
   
 Left Right 
Region label x y z t d x y z t d 
Congruent probe           
Frontal           
  Insula -38 0 6 8.94 4.10 46 2 4 7.48 3.43 
Temporal           
  Superior temporal pole -56 14 -6 9.55 4.38 60 12 -6 8.21 3.77 
  Fusiform gyrus -30 -68 0 8.35 3.83 56 16 -10 7.51 3.45 
 -40 -68 -20 8.68 3.98      
 -38 -46 -10 8.38 3.85      
 -36 -50 -8 7.71 3.54      
  Insula -54 -14 18 8.92 4.09      
  Middle temporal gyrus -36 -56 0 7.48 3.43      
  Inferior temporal gyrus -46 -38 -12 7.54 3.46      
  Heschl’s gyrus -32 -30 2 7.48 3.43      
 -32 -24 -6 7.47 3.43      
Parietal           
  Postcentral gyrus -22 -34 74 7.91 3.63      
  Angular gyrus -46 -62 38 7.73 3.55      
Occipital           
  Middle occipital -34 -68 8 10.13 4.65      
  Lingual gyrus -14 -92 -10 8.62 3.96 8 -84 -6 9.38 4.30 
 -18 -90 -12 8.58 3.94 18 -86 -10 8.99 4.12 
      10 -70 -10 7.58 3.48 
  Inferior occipital -28 -74 2 9.02 4.14 24 -92 -8 8.15 3.48 
 -40 -70 -4 8.52 3.91 20 -92 -6 8.08 3.48 
 -44 -74 -10 8.32 3.82      
  Calcarine -4 -84 -10 7.65 3.51      
Subcortical           
  Putamen -24 8 14 12.76 5.85 26 6 2 9.13 4.19 
 -30 -2 0 11.59 5.32 28 2 -6 8.68 3.98 
 -28 -2 6 10.9 5.00 22 2 -10 8.61 3.95 
 -26 8 -2 10.83 4.97 26 -2 -8 8.25 3.79 
 -28 2 -8 10.18 4.67 26 0 14 8.31 3.81 
 -24 -12 8 9.88 4.53 22 -2 18 8.09 3.71 
 -26 -8 -6 9.67 4.44 30 -8 4 8.26 3.79 
 -28 -10 14 9.38 4.30      
 -14 2 12 9.36 4.29      
 -26 -16 12 9.15 4.20      
 -30 -4 14 8.94 4.10      
 -28 -14 4 8.83 4.05      
 -38 0 -2 8.67 3.98      
  Thalamus -20 0 -12 9.02 4.14      
  Pallidium -30 -10 -12 8.64 3.96      
Cerebellum           
  Cerebellum lobule VI      28 -68 -22 10.24 4.70 
      24 -70 -22 9.71 4.46 
      22 -56 -20 8.4 3.85 
      30 -52 -28 8.38 3.85 
  Cerebellum crus I      26 -66 -34 10.09 3.85 
      28 -78 -26 8.84 4.06 
       22 -78 -28 8.56 3.93 




      46 -58 -30 8.15 3.74 
       6 -82 -18 7.99 3.67 
      44 -68 -22 7.67 3.52 
  Cerebellum lobule VIIb      28 -72 -40 8.46 3.88 
  Cerebellum crus II      30 -76 -40 8.42 3.86 
      12 -76 -34 7.92 3.63 
  Cerebellum lobule VIII      10 -62 -34 9.63 4.42 
      8 -68 -46 7.49 3.44 
  Cerebellum lobules IV/V      28 -38 -28 7.84 3.60 
      28 -42 -26 7.69 3.53 
      16 -48 -16 7.6 3.49 
Incongruent probe            
Frontal           
  Frontal superior gyrus -20 52 30 8.12 3.72      
 -22 52 26 8.04 3.69      
  Insula      40 0 2 8.29 3.80 
Temporal           
  Superior temporal pole -54 14 -4 9.28 4.26      
 -50 18 -12 8.2 3.76      
  Inferior temporal gyrus -44 -38 -10 8.52 3.91      
 -38 -46 -14 8.41 3.86      
  Fusiform gyrus -32 -74 -18 7.9 3.62 40 -60 -20 7.51 3.45 
  Middle temporal gyrus      68 -40 -6 7.51 3.45 
Parietal            
  Angular gyrus -52 -52 32 7.74 3.55      
 -56 -52 30 7.6 3.49      
Occipital           
  Middle occipital gyrus -32 -94 -8 11.09 5.09 20 -98 4 8.01 3.68 
  Inferior occipital gyrus -30 -92 -12 9.34 4.29 22 -94 -8 8.25 3.79 
  Lingual gyrus -14 -34 -4 7.52 3.4 22 -86 -16 7.64 3.5 
Subcortical           





20 2 -12 9.97 
4.57 
 -30 -4 -14 7.49 3.44 24 -6 -10 7.53 3.46 
  Putamen -24 14 -12 8.01 3.68 30 10 -6 9.11 4.18 
 -26 10 -12 7.94 3.64 16 12 -4 8.53 3.91 
 -22 10 14 7.53 3.46 20 10 -8 8.21 3.77 
      30 6 -2 7.87 3.61 
      26 -2 14 7.83 3.59 
      26 4 16 7.54 3.46 
      22 20 0 7.48 3.43 
  Caudate      18 6 16 8.17 3.75 
      22 -6 22 7.85 3.60 
           
  Hippocampus -26 -32 -4 7.8 3.58      
Cerebellum           
  Cerebellum lobule VI -20 -72 -20 8.15 3.74 34 -42 -34 7.63 3.50 
 -24 -76 -20 7.89 3.62 32 -40 -36 7.6 3.49 
 -20 -76 -22 7.83 3.59      
 -36 -52 -24 8.16 3.74      
 -20 -72 -20 8.15 3.74      
 -38 -66 -20 7.73 3.55      
 -38 -70 -16 7.57 3.47      
  Cerebellum crus I -22 -66 -36 7.99 3.67 28 -72 -34 7.94 3.64 
      46 -68 -22 8.19 3.76 
  Cerebellum lobule VIII -24 -62 -50 8.08 3.71      
 -26 -48 -52 7.61 3.49      




           
Note. We show t-values for signal increases associated with the true/false response in 
congruent trials and incongruent trials separately.  Coordinates are MNI space. Height 









Figure 1. IQ scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scales (WASI) or 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS); A: Full-Scale; B: Verbal-IQ and Matrix-IQ. 
Higher scores indicate more ability. Boxplot shows range, range between which the 
middle 50% of scores fall, median, upper quartile, lower quartile, and mean (blue ◊) for 
autism (ASD: red) and neurotypical (NT: green) groups.  
* p < .05 
 
 
Figure 2. Language measures. A: WRAML-2 Wide Range Assessment of Memory and 
Learning (Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003) scaled (age-adjusted) scores, higher scores are 
consistent with better sentence repetition abilities. B: WJIII, Oral Language 
Comprehension (test 15) from the Woodcock Johnson III Ability Tests (Woodcock et al., 
2001) scores, higher scores are consistent with better language abilities. Boxplot shows 
range, range between which the middle 50% of scores fall, median, upper quartile, lower 
quartile, and mean (blue ◊) for autism (ASD: red) and neurotypical (NT: green) groups.  






Figure 3. Autism trait measures. A: Autism Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
measures autistic characteristics in adults. B: Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) 
(Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) measures early development in language use and social 
functioning. Scores ≥ 15 suggest autistic characteristics. On both, higher scores indicate 
more symptoms.  Boxplot shows range, range between which the middle 50% of scores 
fall, median, upper quartile, lower quartile, and mean (blue ◊) for autism (ASD: red) and 
neurotypical (NT: green) groups.  




Figure 4. Empathy measures. A: Reading the Mind in the Eyes-Revised (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) measures empathic abilities through photographs of eye 
regions. B: Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). On both, higher 
scores are indicative of better empathizing abilities. Boxplot shows range, range between 
which the middle 50% of scores fall, median, upper quartile, lower quartile, and mean 
(blue ◊) for autism (ASD: red) and neurotypical (NT: green) groups.  






Figure 5. A: Anxiety scores derived from the STAI, State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, 2010); higher scores suggest higher levels of anxiety. B: Alexithymia scores 
derived from the TAS-20, Toronto Alexithymia Scales (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994; Bagby, 
Taylor, et al., 1994). Scores ≥ 61 suggest high alexithymia; scores ≤ 51 = low 
symptomatology. Boxplot shows range, range between which the middle 50% of scores 
fall, median, upper quartile, lower quartile, and mean (blue ◊) for autism (ASD: red) and 
neurotypical (NT: green) groups.  





Figure 6. Loneliness scores derived from the UCLA Loneliness Questionnaire (Russell, 
1996). Higher scores are indicative of higher degree of loneliness. Boxplot shows range, 
range between which the middle 50% of scores fall, median, upper quartile and lower 
quartile for autism (ASD: red) and neurotypical (NT: green) groups. Boxplot shows range, 
range between which the middle 50% of scores fall, median, upper quartile, lower quartile, 








Autism Quotient (AQ) 
 
Instructions 
“Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree putting an “X” under your response.” Response choices 
include “strongly agree,” “slightly agree” “slightly disagree” and “slightly agree.” 
Test items 
1. I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own. 
2. I prefer to do things the same way over and over again. 
3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind. 
4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things. 
5. I often notice small sounds when others do not. 
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar strings of information. 
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it 
is polite. 
8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look like. 
9. I am fascinated by dates. 
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of several different people’s conversations. 
11. I find social situations easy. 
12. I tend to notice details that others do not. 
13. I would rather go to a library than a party. 
14. I find making up stories easy. 
15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things. 
16. I tend to have very strong interests which I get upset about if I can’t pursue. 
17. I enjoy social chit-chat. 
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a word in edgeways. 
19. I am fascinated by numbers. 
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters’ intentions. 
21. I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction. 
22. I find it hard to make new friends. 
23. I notice patterns in things all the time. 
24. I would rather go to the theatre than a museum. 
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is disturbed. 
26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going. 
27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is talking to me. 
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than the small details. 
29. I am not very good at remembering phone numbers. 
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, or a person’s appearance. 





32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once. 
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak. 
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously. 
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke. 
36. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at their 
face. 
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly. 
38. I am good at social chit-chat. 
39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the same thing. 
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving pretending with other 
children. 
41. I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g. types of car, types of 
bird, types of train, types of plant, etc.). 
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else. 
43. I like to plan any activities I participate in carefully. 
44. I enjoy social occasions. 
45. I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions. 
46. New situations make me anxious. 
47. I enjoy meeting new people. 
48. I am a good diplomat. 
49. I am not very good at remembering people’s date of birth. 
50. I find it very easy to play games with children that involve pretending. 








Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) 
 
Instructions 
“Please respond to the following questions to the best of your recollection with regards to 
your childhood (that is, when you were about 4-5 years old).” Response choices are “yes” 
or “no.” 
Test items  
1. Were you able to talk using short phrases or sentences?   
2. Did you have to and fro conversations that involved taking turns or building on what 
is said? 
3. Did you ever use odd phrases or say the same thing over and over in almost exactly 
the same way (either phrases that you heard other people use or ones that you made 
up)? 
4. Did you ever use socially inappropriate questions or statements? For example, did 
you ever regularly ask personal questions or make personal comments at awkward 
times? 
5. Did you ever get your pronouns mixed up (e.g. saying you or she/he for I)?  
6. Did you ever use words that you invented or made up yourself; put things in odd, 
indirect ways; or use metaphorical ways of saying things (e.g., saying hot rain for 
steam)? 
7. Did you ever say the same thing over and over in exactly the same way?  
8. Did you ever have things that you had to do in a very particular way or order, or 
rituals that you insisted on going through? 
9.  Did your facial expressions usually seem appropriate to the particular situation?  
10. Did you ever use others' hands like a tool or as if they were part of your body (e.g., 
pointing with someone's finger or putting someone's hand on a doorknob to get them 
to open the door)? 
11. Did you ever have any interests that you were preoccupied with that might seem odd 
to other people (e.g., traffic lights, drainpipes, or timetables)? 
12. Were you ever more interested in parts of an object, rather than in using the object as 
it was intended (e.g., spinning the wheels of a car)? 
13. Did you ever have any special interests that were unusual in their intensity but were 
otherwise appropriate for your age and peer group (e.g., trains or dinosaurs)? 
14. Were you ever unusually interested in the sight, feel, sound, taste, or smell of things 
or people? 
15. Did you ever have any mannerisms or odd ways of moving your hands or fingers, 
such as flapping or moving your fingers in front of your eyes? 
16 Did you ever have any complicated movements of your whole body, such as 
spinning or repeatedly bouncing up and down? 
17. Did you ever injure yourself deliberately, such as biting your arm or banging your 
head? 





19. Did you have any particular friends or a best friend?   
20. Did you ever talk with others just to be friendly (rather than to get something)?  
21. Did you ever spontaneously copy other people or what they were doing (such as 
vacuuming, gardening, or mending things)? 
22. Did you ever spontaneously point at things just to show others (not because you want 
them)? 
23. Did you ever use gestures, other than pointing or pulling someone's hand, to let 
others know what you wanted? 
24. Did you nod your head to indicate yes?  
25. Did you shake your head to indicate no?   
26. Did you usually look people directly in the face when doing things with them or 
talking with them? 
27. Did you smile back if someone smiled at you?   
28. Did you ever show people things that interested you to engage their attention?  
29. Did you ever offer to share things other than food?   
30. Did you ever want others to join in your enjoyment of something?   
31. Did you ever try to comfort others if they were sad or hurt?   
32. If you wanted something or wanted help, did you look at others and use gestures 
with sounds or words to get their attention? 
33. Did you show a normal range of facial expressions?   
34. Did you ever spontaneously join in and try to copy the actions of others in social 
games (such as “The Mulberry Bush” or “London Bridge is Falling Down”)? 
35. Did you play any pretend or make-believe games?   
36. Were you interested in other children of approximately the same age who you did 
not know? 
37. Did you respond positively when another child approached you?   
38. If someone came into a room and started talking to you without calling your name, 
did you usually look up and pay attention? 
39. Did you ever play imaginative games with another child in such a way that each 
child understood what the other was pretending? 
40. Did you play cooperatively in games that needed some form of joining in with a 
group of other children (such as hide-and-seek or ball games)? 







Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
 
Instructions 
“Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree putting an “X” under your response.” Response choices 
include “strongly agree,” “slightly agree” “slightly disagree” and “slightly agree.” 
Test items 
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation. 
2. I prefer animals to humans.  
3. I try to keep up with the current trends and fashions.  
4. I find it difficult to explain to others things that I understand easily, when they 
don’t understand it first time. 
5. I dream most nights.  
6. I really enjoy caring for other people.  
7. I try to solve my own problems rather than discussing them with others.  
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation.  
9. I am at my best first thing in the morning.  
10. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point home in a discussion.  
11. It doesn’t bother me too much if I am late meeting a friend.  
12. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend not to bother with 
them.  
13. I would never break a law, no matter how minor.  
14. I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite.  
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts rather than on what my 
listener might be thinking. 
16. I prefer practical jokes to verbal humor.  
17. I live life for today rather than the future.  
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to see what would happen.  
19. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another.  
20. I tend to have very strong opinions about morality.  
21. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much.  
22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes.  
23. I think that good manners are the most important thing a parent can teach their 
child.  
24. I like to do things on the spur of the moment.  
25. I am good at predicting how someone will feel.  
26. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable.  
27. If I say something that someone else is offended by, I think that that’s their 
problem, not mine.  
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if I didn’t 
like it.  





30. People often tell me that I am very unpredictable.  
31. I enjoy being the center of attention at any social gathering.  
32. Seeing people cry doesn’t really upset me.  
33. I enjoy having discussions about politics.  
34. I am very blunt, which some people take to be rudeness, even though this is 
unintentional.  
35. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing.  
36. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what 
they are thinking.  
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their experiences rather than my own.  
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain.  
39. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people’s feelings.  
40. I can’t relax until I have done everything I had planned to do that day.  
41. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying.  
42. I get upset if I see people suffering on news programs.  
43. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very 
understanding.  
44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person doesn’t tell me.  
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly become bored with them and move on to 
something else.  
46. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far with teasing.  
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big rollercoaster.  
48. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t always see why.  
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to make an effort to join 
in.  
50. I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film.  
51. I like to be very organized in day-to-day life and often make lists of the chores I 
have to do.  
52. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively.  
53. I don’t like to take risks.  
54. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about.  
55. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion.  
56. Before making a decision I always weigh up the pros and cons.  
57. I don’t consciously work out the rules of social situations.  
58. I am good at predicting what someone will do.  
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems.  
60. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I don’t agree with it. 
Note. Two types of questions are included on the EQ (Simon Baron-Cohen & 








Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
  
Instructions 
“Using the scale provided as a guide, indicate how much you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements by circling the corresponding number. Response choices 
include: “strongly disagree,” “moderately disagree,” “neither disagree nor agree,” 
“moderately agree,” and “strongly agree.” 
Test items  
1. I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling. 
2. It is difficult for me to find the rights words for my feelings 
3. I have physical sensations that even doctors don’t understand. 
4. I am able to describe my feelings easily. 
5. I prefer to analyze problems rather than just describe them. 
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry. 
7. I am often puzzled by sensations in my body. 
8. I prefer to just let things happen rather than to understand why they turned out that 
way. 
9. I have feelings that I can’t quite identity. 
10. Being in touch with emotions is essential. 
11. I find it hard to describe how I feel about people. 
12. People tell me to describe my feelings more. 
13. I don’t know what’s going on inside me. 
14. I often don’t know why I am angry. 
15. I prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than their feelings. 
16 I prefer to watch “light” entertainment shows rather than psychological dramas. 
17. It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost feelings, even to my close friends. 
18. I can feel close to someone, even in moments of silence. 
19. I find examination of my feelings useful in solving personal problems. 
20. Looking for hidden meanings in movies or play distracts from their enjoyment. 
















Table 5.   
   
Reading the mind in the Eyes (MinE) 
   
Instructions 
“For each set of eyes, choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but 
please choose just one word, the word you consider to be most suitable. Before making 
your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the task as 
quickly as possible but you will not be timed. If you really don’t know what a word means 
you can look it up in the definition handout.” 
Test items  




irritated  bored 
   
 2  




arrogant  annoyed 
   
 3  
joking  flustered 








 4  




amused  relaxed 
 5  




worried  friendly 
 6  




impatient  alarmed 
 7  




uneasy  dispirited 
   
   




   
 8  




shy  excited 
 9  




horrified  preoccupied 
 10  




bored  aghast 
 11  




regretful  flirtatious 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 12  




skeptical  dispirited 
 13  




threatening  shy 
 14  




depressed  accusing 
 15  




encouraging  amused 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 16  




encouraging  sympathetic 
 17  




playful  aghast 
 18  




aghast  bored 
 19  




sarcastic  tentative 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 20  




guilty  horrified 
 21  




confused  panicked 
 22  




insisting  imploring 
 23  




defiant  curious 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 24  




excited  hostile 
 25  




despondent  interested 
 26  




hostile  anxious 
 27  




arrogant  reassuring 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 28  




affectionate  contented 
 29  




irritated  reflective 
 30  




hostile  disappointed 
 31  




joking  dispirited 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 32  




bewildered  alarmed 
 33  




fantasizing  concerned 
 34  




distrustful  terrified 
 35  




insisting  contemplative 
   
   
   
   
   




   
 36  




suspicious  indecisive 
Note. Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). A 
glossary of definitions is provided to participants for reference if needed. Correct 






































State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait (STAIT) 
 
Instructions 
“A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below.  
Read each statement and then, from the choices listed below, choose the best response 
based on how you GENERALLY feel.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not 
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe 
how you generally feel.” 
Test items  
1. I feel pleasant. 
2. I feel nervous and restless. 
3. I feel satisfied with myself. 
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. 
5. I feel like a failure. 
6. I feel rested. 
7. I am calm, cool, and collected. 
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them. 
9. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter. 
10. I am happy. 
11. I have disturbing thoughts. 
12. I lack self-confidence. 
13. I feel secure. 
14. I make decisions easily. 
15. I feel inadequate. 
16 I am content. 
17. Some unimportant thoughts run through my mind and bother me. 
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind. 
19. I am a steady person. 
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests. 












UCLA Loneliness Questionnaire (UCLA) 
  
Instructions  
“Indicate how often each of the statements below is descriptive of you.” Response choices: 
“I often feel this way,” “I sometimes feel this way,” I rarely feel this way,” and “I never 
feel this way.” 
Test items 
1 I am unhappy doing so many things alone. 
2. I have nobody to talk to. 
3. I cannot tolerate being so alone. 
4. I lack companionship. 
5. I feel as if nobody really understands me. 
6. I find myself waiting for people to call or write. 
7. There is no one I can turn to. 
8. I am no longer close to anyone. 
9. My interests and ideas are not shared by those around me. 
10. I feel left out. 
11. I feel completely alone. 
12. I am unable to reach out and communicate with those around me. 
13. My social relationships are superficial. 
14. I feel starved for company. 
15. No one really knows me well. 
16. I feel isolated from others. 
17. I am unhappy being so withdrawn. 
18. It is difficult for me to make friends. 
19. I feel shut out and excluded by others. 
20. People are around me but not with me. 






Appendix G: Behavioral results, Study 2 
 
Table 1.  
 
Accuracy and response time results, Study 2 
 
 ASD NT   
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(28) Cohen’s d 
Accuracy (% correct)     
  PosCon 96.43 (9.64) 97.74 (6.67) -0.44 -0.16 
  PosIncon 98.20 (3.58) 95.50 (10.16) 1.00 0.37 
  NegCon 94.64 (10.64 94.76 (11.81) -0.03 -0.01 
  NegIncon 87.89 (21.02) 95.28 (10.61) -1.24 -0.45 
  NeutCon 96.41 (5.41) 96.16 (4.54) 0.14 -0.05 
  NeutIncon 86.30 (19.49) 93.23 (9.67) -1.21 -0.44 
Response time (sec)     
  PosCon 1.23 (.31) 1.13 (.41) 1.21 0.44 
  PosIncon 1.34 (.41) 1.13 (.24) 1.75 0.64 
  NegCon 1.40 (.26) 1.22 (.22) 2.01 0.74 
  NegIncon 1.57 (.52) 1.23 (.24) 2.34 0.86 
  NeutCon 1.42 (.43) 1.23 (.32) 1.42 0.52 
  NeutIncon 1.66 (.43) 1.45 (.34) 1.53 0.56 
Note.  Means (standard deviations) of EIT accuracy and response time (correct items only; 
5.46% of data removed). 72 items were distributed evenly over the 3 conditions (36 each 











Figure 1.  Within- and between-group scenario-related activity, Study 2. (A) 
Contrast of all scenarios (POS+NEG+NEUT) in autism (ASD; red), neurotypical 
control group (NT; green), and overlap yellow. (B) Regions showing differential 
activation between groups related to all story conditions; ASD > NT (red), NT > 
ASD (green). Task-related activity is displayed using a cluster corrected threshold 





Table 1  
 
Within- and between group scenario-related brain activations, Study 2 
        
Region label Lat Vol x y z t Z 
ASD        
Frontal        
  IFG (triangularis) L 203 -44 20 24 5.59 4.54 
  a L a -52 22 18 4.71 4.01 
  IFG (opercularis) L a -52 12 20 4.61 3.94 
  IFG (triangularis) L 203 -44 20 24 5.59 4.54 
  SMA - 96 0 4 66 5.50 4.49 
  IFG (orbitalis) L 157 -50 26 -6 5.24 4.34 
  Precentral gyrus R 101 52 -2 48 5.15 4.29 
  Postcentral gyrus R a 56 -8 38 3.76 3.36 
 L 87 -30 -28 66 5.10 4.25 
  Paracentral lob L a -8 -34 74 4.16 3.64 
  Postcentral gyrus L a -18 -28 74 4.15 3.63 
  SMA R 81 6 -16 72 5.02 4.20 
  Precentral gyrus R a 12 -22 78 3.72 3.33 
  vmPFC (rectus) - 161 0 46 -20 4.66 3.98 
   a - a 2 28 -26 4.45 3.84 
   a L a -6 34 -20 3.58 3.22 
  dmPFC L 107 -8 50 34 4.54 3.90 
   a L a -10 42 46 4.10 3.60 
   a L a -10 42 46 4.10 3.60 
  Postcentral gyrus L 81 -52 -6 46 4.29 3.73 
Temporal        
  STS R 7062 48 -16 6 11.11 6.82 
  a R a 58 -14 0 9.74 6.39 
  Lingual gyrus R a 12 -28 -6 9.38 6.26 
  pSTS R a 66 -28 10 9.34 6.24 
  STS R a 56 -22 8 8.69 6.00 
  Heschl's gyrus L 6452 -44 -22 12 10.97 6.78 
  STS L a -56 -22 10 10.57 6.66 
  MTG L a -62 -16 -2 8.03 5.74 
  a L a -66 -38 10 7.95 5.70 
  STS L a -48 -16 2 7.39 5.46 
Cerebellum        
  Cerebellum lob VI L 648 -14 -68 -24 6.71 5.14 
  Cerebellum Crus 2 L a -16 -74 -38 6.55 5.06 
  Cerebellum lob VI L a -20 -56 -22 5.02 4.21 
  Cerebellum Crus 2 L a -12 -82 -32 5.00 4.19 
  a L a -26 -82 -38 4.63 3.96 
  R 558 22 -80 -40 6.42 4.99 
  Cerebellum lob VI R a 18 -68 -30 5.64 4.57 
  Cerebellum lob VIII R a 22 -68 -40 4.98 4.18 
  Cerebellum lob VIII L 143 -24 -58 -52 6.29 4.93 
   a L a -14 -62 -50 4.46 3.84 
         
NT        
Frontal        
  Precentral gyrus L 183 -48 -4 54 6.17 4.86 
  a  L a -46 -12 60 4.17 3.65 




Region label Lat Vol x y z t Z 
  Precentral gyrus R a 52 -20 58 4.90 4.13 
   a  R a 52 6 48 4.27 3.72 
   a  R a 56 -4 46 4.09 3.59 
  IFG (triangularis) L 256 -58 32 8 5.57 4.53 
  a  L a -58 22 18 4.51 3.88 
  a L a -52 22 0 4.44 3.83 
Temporal        
  STS L 4541 -54 -22 0 9.75 6.39 
  a  L a -62 -20 6 9.39 6.26 
  a  L a -42 -22 6 8.72 6.01 
  a  L a -62 -32 6 8.63 5.98 
  a  L a -52 -8 -6 7.56 5.54 
  MTG R 3554 62 -18 0 8.64 5.98 
  Heschl's gyrus R a 48 -16 6 8.64 5.98 
  MTG R a 62 2 -16 8.28 5.84 
  aSTS R a 48 18 -20 7.59 5.55 
  MTG R a 64 -12 -10 7.55 5.53 
Cerebellum        
  Cerebellum crus 2 R 232 20 -80 -40 6.47 5.02 
  Cerebellum lob VI R a 20 -70 -28 4.92 4.14 
  Cerebellum crus 2 L 103 -20 -76 -38 5.54 4.51 
         
ASD > NT        
Frontal        
  IFG  L 133 -28 26 28 5.63 4.57 
  a L a -26 16 22 4.79 4.06 
  Precuneus R 123 8 -52 36 5.58 4.54 
  a - a 4 -56 46 3.81 3.39 
  SMA R 122 8 -18 72 5.19 4.31 
  a R a 14 -12 60 4.41 3.81 
  Paracentral lob - a -4 -28 68 3.67 3.29 
  IFG (opercularis) R 105 52 16 34 4.99 4.19 
  m frontal R 101 24 18 46 4.78 4.05 
  a R a 30 22 56 4.34 3.76 
Cerebellum         
  Cerebellum crus 2 L 137 -36 -72 -44 4.66 3.98 
  Cerebellum crus 1 L a -36 -64 -30 4.6 3.94 
  Cerebellum crus 2 L a -28 -82 -40 3.5 3.16 
Note. We show t-values for signal increases for the average effect of all stories (POS+NEG+NEUT) 
in autism (ASD), neurotypical (NT), ASD > NT. NT > ASD results not significant. Laterality (Lat), 
right (R), left (L) and medial (‘-’). Number of voxels in each cluster (Voxel), XYZ coordinates, t-
values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold t = 3.41 p < .001 cluster 
corrected.  









Within- and between group emotion-related brain activations, Study 2 
        
Region label Lat voxels x y z t Z 
ASD        
Frontal        
  vmPFC  - 361 0 52 -12 6.28 4.92 
  vmPFC (rectus) R a 6 24 -22 4.67 3.98 
  a - a 0 32 -20 3.90 3.46 
  dmPFC  L 282 -10 50 28 5.36 4.41 
  a L a -12 40 42 5.05 4.22 
  mPFC L a -8 60 18 3.65 3.27 
  Precentral gyrus R 101 54 -2 48 5.09 4.24 
  Postcentral gyrus R a 58 -8 38 4.71 4.01 
  IFG (triangularis) L 204 -46 22 20 5.07 4.24 
  a L a -54 26 12 4.35 3.77 
Subcortical        
  Hippocampus R 668 20 -6 -16 8.40 5.89 
  Thalamus L a -12 -28 0 6.88 5.22 
  Lingual gyrus R a 14 -26 -8 6.64 5.11 
  Parahippocampus R a 20 -16 -18 6.30 4.93 
  Vermis R a 4 -36 -6 4.74 4.03 
  Hippocampus L 201 -22 -8 -14 6.52 5.04 
  a L a -30 -18 -14 5.39 4.42 
  Parahippocampus L a -12 -4 -20 3.86 3.43 
  Amygdala  L a -30 -2 -22 3.84 3.41 
Temporal        
  Heschl’s gyrus R 5789 50 -14 6 9.89 6.44 
  a R a 42 -22 10 7.83 5.65 
  pSTS R a 54 -26 10 7.79 5.63 
  a R a 66 -22 8 7.68 5.59 
  a R a 62 2 -10 7.22 5.38 
  STS L 5825 -44 -26 12 9.29 6.23 
  a L a -48 -14 0 8.20 5.81 
  MTG L a -62 -14 -4 7.50 5.51 
  a L a -62 -42 4 7.36 5.44 
  a L a -70 -28 6 7.35 5.44 
Parietal        
  Precuneus R 228 8 -54 38 5.48 4.48 
  pCC - a 0 -52 30 5.27 4.36 
  Precuneus L a -12 -54 34 4.22 3.68 
  a  a 16 -50 32 4.00 3.52 
Cerebellum        
  Cerebellum lob VI R 245 16 -68 -24 5.88 4.70 
  Cerebellum Crus 2 R a 26 -82 -34 4.71 4.01 
  a R a 16 -74 -38 4.01 3.54 
  Cerebellum lob VIII L 329 -18 -70 -38 5.48 4.48 
  Cerebellum Crus 2 L a -14 -80 -34 4.99 4.18 
  Cerebellum Crus 1 L a -16 -70 -26 4.82 4.08 
  Cerebellum lob XIIb L a -16 -78 -44 4.05 3.56 
        
NT        
Frontal        




Region label Lat voxels x y z t Z 
  a L a -52 22 0 3.65 3.27 
  dmPFC (rectus) - 154 -2 36 -24 5.21 4.32 
  a - a -4 46 -20 4.54 3.90 
Temporal        
  STS R 3621 62 -16 -2 9.02 6.13 
  MTG R a 62 2 -16 8.90 6.08 
  Heschl's gyrus R a 48 -16 6 8.67 6.00 
  aSTS R a 54 8 -20 7.54 5.53 
  STS L 4792 -54 -22 0 8.72 6.01 
  a  L a -62 -20 6 8.53 5.94 
  MTG L a -62 -32 6 8.49 5.93 
  a  L a -58 -16 -12 8.20 5.81 
  Heschl's gyrus L a -36 -28 14 7.90 5.68 
        
ASD > NT        
Parietal         
  Precuneus R 143 8 -54 38 5.33 4.39 
Note. We show t-values for signal increases for the average effect of emotional stories (EMO) in 
autism (ASD), neurotypical (NT) control group, and ASD > NT. No clusters survive in NT > ASD 
comparison. Laterality (Lat), right (R), left (L) or medial (‘-’), number of voxels in each cluster 
(Voxel), XYZ coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold t = 
3.24, p < .001 cluster corrected.  






Table 3.        
        
Within- and between-group valence-related brain activations, Study 2 
        
Region label Lat voxels x y z t Z 
NEGATIVE        
ASD        
Frontal         
  vmPFC (rectus) - 289 2 48 -20 5.93 4.73 
  a L a -8 46 -18 4.87 4.11 
  a - a 2 32 -18 3.91 3.46 
  dmPFC R 430 10 48 24 5.79 4.66 
  a L a -8 48 24 5.22 4.33 
  a L a -8 48 40 5.03 4.21 
  IFG (orbitalis) L 117 -52 28 -4 5.38 4.42 
  a L a -40 32 -10 3.72 3.32 
  Postcentral gyrus R 132 58 -8 38 5.09 4.25 
  Precentral gyrus R a 54 -2 48 4.81 4.07 
  IFG (triangularis) L 239 -44 20 22 4.91 4.14 
  a L a -54 26 12 4.73 4.02 
Temporal        
  Heschl’s gyrus R 5909 50 -14 6 12.24 7.14 
  a R a 42 -22 10 9.64 6.35 
  STG R a 66 -26 10 8.86 6.07 
  a R a 54 -26 10 8.77 6.03 
  a R a 62 2 -10 8.30 5.85 
   L 6173 -50 -24 6 11.21 6.85 
  a L a -48 -14 0 9.78 6.40 
  MTG L a -62 -14 -4 8.78 6.04 
  a L a -62 -40 6 8.17 5.79 
  a L a -70 -28 6 8.10 5.77 
Parietal        
  Precuneus R 111 6 -56 36 5.16 4.29 
  a R a 16 -52 36 3.58 3.22 
Limbic         
  Hippocampus R 503 22 -6 -16 10.50 6.63 
  a R a 16 -22 -14 7.01 5.29 
  a R a 14 -24 -4 6.76 5.17 
  Amygdala R a 32 0 -16 4.56 3.91 
  a R a 6 -32 -8 4.15 3.63 
   L 245 -22 -8 -14 7.02 5.29 
  a L a -30 -4 -20 5.09 4.24 
  Hippocampus L a -30 -18 -14 5.68 4.59 
  a L a -34 -28 -12 4.05 3.56 
Sub lobar        
  Thalamus L 114 -12 -28 2 6.52 5.04 
  vmPFC (rectus)  L a -8 -28 -8 4.49 3.86 
Cerebellum        
  Cerebellum VI R 361 16 -66 -26 6.55 5.06 
  Cerebellum crus 2 R a 24 -78 -40 5.58 4.54 
  Cerebellum crus 1 R a 28 -66 -40 4.10 3.60 
  a R a 22 -80 -26 3.61 3.42 
  Cerebellum IX L 136 -8 -54 -42 5.85 4.69 
  a - a 4 -50 -42 5.09 4.25 




Region label Lat voxels x y z t Z 
  Cerebellum XIIb L a -16 -78 -44 4.83 4.09 
  Cerebellum VI L a -16 -72 -26 4.40 3.81 
  Cerebellum crus 2 L a -24 -78 -30 3.76 3.35 
NT        
Frontal         
  IFG (triangularis) L 126 -54 24 10 5.04 4.22 
Temporal         
  STG R 3311 62 -16 -2 9.52 6.31 
  a R a 58 -2 -2 6.95 5.26 
  a R a 54 -30 6 6.75 5.16 
  Heschl’s gyrus R a 48 -16 6 8.87 6.07 
  MTG R a 62 2 -16 7.47 5.50 
 L 4237 -54 -22 0 9.20 6.19 
  a L a -62 -32 6 8.68 6.00 
  a L a -60 -8 -12 7.74 5.61 
  STS L a -62 -20 6 9.14 6.17 
  a L a -36 -34 12 8.09 5.76 
Parietal         
  Postcentral gyrus R 99 54 -14 54 5.79 4.66 
  a R a 60 -6 42 4.58 3.93 
  Precentral gyrus R a 54 2 46 3.70 3.31 
Cerebellum        
  Cerebellum crus II R 127 18 -78 -38 5.01 4.20 
  Cerebellum VI R a 18 -70 -26 4.32 3.75 
  Cerebellum crus II L 107 -22 -76 -36 5.00 4.19 
ASD > NT        
Parietal        
  Precuneus R 113 6 -56 36 5.17 4.29 
  a R a 16 -52 38 4.43 3.83 
        
POSITIVE        
ASD        
Frontal        
  Precentral gyrus R 146 56 -2 48 5.85 4.69 
  Postcentral gyrus R a 56 -8 38 4.37 3.78 
  vmPFC (orbitalis) - 466 0 54 -12 5.71 4.61 
  a L a -6 46 -14 5.51 4.5 
  vmPFC (rectus) R a 6 44 -16 5.49 4.48 
  a - a 0 34 -22 4.42 3.82 
  a R a 6 22 -22 4.27 3.72 
  dmPFC L 242 -8 50 28 5.52 4.50 
  a L a -12 48 42 5.19 4.31 
  a L a -10 58 16 3.79 3.38 
  IFG (triangularis) L 168 -46 22 20 4.98 4.18 
Temporal         
  Heschl’s gyrus R 6382 50 -14 6 14.17 7.61 
  a R a 40 -24 10 10.30 6.57 
  STG R a 58 -16 0 9.55 6.32 
  a R a 54 -26 10 9.40 6.27 
  a R a 66 -28 10 9.21 6.20 
 L 6416 -50 -24 6 11.88 7.04 
  a L a -48 -14 0 9.90 6.44 
  a L a -62 -14 -4 8.80 6.06 




Region label Lat voxels x y z t Z 
  MTG L a -62 -42 4 8.30 5.85 
Limbic          
  Hippocampus R 582 16 -26 -8 8.21 5.81 
  a L a -16 -26 -6 7.22 5.38 
  a R a 20 -6 -16 6.98 5.27 
  Lingual gyrus R a 10 -30 0 6.01 4.77 
  Parahippocampus R a 20 -16 -18 5.57 4.53 
  Hippocampus L 186 -22 -12 -16 6.39 4.98 
  a L a -30 -18 -14 3.96 3.50 
  pCC - 357 -4 -50 26 5.44 4.46 
  Precuneus (parietal) R a 8 -54 38 5.04 4.22 
  a R a 16 -50 30 4.70 4.00 
  a L a -16 -54 34 4.55 3.91 
Cerebellum         
  Cerebellum VIII L 335 -18 -72 -38 5.65 4.58 
  Cerebellum VI L a -16 -72 -26 5.02 4.20 
  Cerebellum crus II L a -12 -84 -32 4.71 4.01 
  a L a -26 -82 -36 3.89 3.45 
NT        
Frontal         
  vmPFC (rectus) - 368 -2 34 -24 6.18 4.87 
  a L a -6 48 -18 5.61 4.56 
  a - a -2 16 -28 5.41 4.44 
  a - a 4 42 -22 5.08 4.24 
  vmPFC (orbitalis) - a 0 54 -12 4.63 3.96 
  IFG (triangularis) L 161 -54 24 10 5.57 4.53 
  a L a -52 22 0 3.97 3.51 
  dmPFC L 95 -10 52 34 5.03 4.21 
Temporal         
  Heschl’s gyrus R 3769 48 -16 6 11.34 6.89 
  STG R a 62 -16 -2 9.81 6.41 
  a R a 58 -2 -2 7.30 5.42 
  MTG R a 62 2 -16 9.75 6.39 
  aSTS R a 50 18 -20 7.27 5.41 
  STG L 5091 -50 -24 4 10.35 6.59 
  a L a -62 -20 6 9.64 6.35 
  a L a -36 -26 12 9.55 6.32 
  a L a -58 -16 -12 9.34 6.24 
  MTG L a -62 -32 8 9.16 6.18 
Limbic         
  Hippocampus R 93 22 -16 -16 5.65 4.58 
  Parahippocampus R a 14 -4 -22 4.19 3.66 
ASD > TD        
Frontal         
  SFG R 110 24 20 44 4.73 4.02 
  MFG R a 28 14 52 3.96 3.50 
Parietal        
  Precuneus L 103 16 -52 38 5.56 4.53 
Cerebellum         
  Cerebellum crus II L 118 -8 -84 -30 4.97 4.18 
Note. We show t-values for signal increases for the average effect of negative (NEG) and positive 
(POS) for ASD (autism), NT (neurotypical) control groups, and ASD > NT. NT > ASD contrasts 




cluster (Voxel), XYZ coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height 
threshold POS t = 3.18; NEG t = 3.41, p < .001 cluster corrected.  






Table 4.        
        
Within group neutral-related brain activations, Study 2 
        
Region label Lat voxels x y z t Z 
ASD        
Frontal        
  IFG L 200 -44 20 24 4.31 4.31 
  a L a -54 26 14 3.30 3.30 
  IFG (opercularis) L a -52 12 20 4.03 4.03 
Temporal        
  Heschl’s gyrus R 4242 50 -14 6 13.46 7.45 
  a R a 42 -22 10 10.72 6.71 
  STS R a 52 -12 -6 9.39 6.26 
  a R a 66 -28 10 9.30 6.23 
  a R a 54 -26 10 8.36 5.87 
  STS L 4796 -44 -26 12 11.26 6.87 
  a L a -54 -24 10 10.10 6.50 
  a L a -48 -14 0 9.31 6.23 
  a L a -64 -28 8 7.91 5.69 
  MTG L a -62 -14 -4 7.90 5.68 
Parietal        
  Precuneus R 138 24 -48 12 3.96 3.96 
Limbic        
  Hippocampus  R 261 20 -10 -18 5.26 5.26 
  a R a 30 -12 -18 3.53 3.53 
  Amygdala R a 32 0 -20 3.48 3.48 
   L 146 -20 -8 -16 4.46 4.46 
Cerebellum        
  Cerebellum lob crus 2 L 111 -18 -74 -40 4.66 4.66 
        
NT        
Temporal-Parietal        
 Heschl’s gyrus R 3010 50 -14 6 10.63 6.68 
 STS R a 62 -16 -2 9.86 6.43 
  a R a 58 -2 -2 7.06 5.31 
  a R a 54 -30 6 6.76 5.16 
  aSTS R a 62 4 -10 7.87 5.67 
  MTG L 3867 -62 -32 6 9.84 6.42 
  a L a -54 -22 0 9.49 6.30 
  STS L a -62 -20 6 9.55 6.32 
  a L a -52 -6 -6 7.96 5.71 
  Heschl’s gyrus L a -38 -30 14 8.57 5.96 
Temporal        
  IFG L 184 -44 -40 -20 5.51 4.49 
  ITG L a -36 -36 -14 3.97 3.51 
Note. We show t-values for signal increases for the average effect of neutral stories (NEUT) in 
autism (ASD) and neurotypical (NT) control group. No clusters survive in between-group 
comparisons. Laterality (Lat), right (R) or left (L), number of voxels in each cluster (Voxel), XYZ 
coordinates, t-values and z-scores. Coordinates are MNI space. Height threshold t = 3.41, p < .001 
cluster corrected.  





Appendix I: Brain-behavior correlation tables, Study 2 
Table 1 
          
Brain-behavior correlations: TOM ROI and ASD (n = 14) 
          
  Region of interest 
Cond Measure dmPFC mPFC Amyg Prec lTPJ lSTS rTPJ rSTS 
POS IQ -.101 .231 .277 .112 .370 .505 .273 .177 
 WRAML -.381 .056 .052 -.273 .423 .011 .650* .271 
 WJIII -.340 .134 .312 -.152 .461 .471 .421 .399 
 M in E .230 .310 .581* .170 .128 .487 -.173 .045 
 AQ .067 -.389 -.606* -.126 .112 -.084 .217 .068 
 EQ .022 .640* .681** .337 .166 .410 .086 .027 
 SCQ .000 -.048 -.357 -.041 -.005 -.091 -.025 .121 
 STAIT -.243 -.237 -.030 .102 -.174 -.276 .090 -.001 
 TAS-20 .131 -.479 -.469 -.079 -.131 -.369 .413 .146 
 ADOS-C .218 -.293 -.045 -.440 -.433 -.071 -.257 -.065 
 ADOS-S .481 -.343 -.272 -.227 -.178 .059 .016 .282 
 ADOS-CM .408 -.347 -.199 -.329 -.294 .010 -.094 .161 
NEG IQ -.272 -.393 .029 -.431 -.303 .399 -.120 .049 
 WRAML -.378 .011 -.185 -.300 .313 -.121 .481 -.063 
 WJIII -.356 -.266 -.077 -.457 -.106 .250 -.008 .198 
 M in E .303 -.248 .207 -.250 -.306 .454 -.497 -.055 
 AQ -.286 .046 -.218 .006 .122 -.092 .437 .132 
 EQ .108 -.218 .160 -.108 -.157 .360 -.217 -.264 
 SCQ -.207 .091 -.327 .222 .179 .039 .253 .278 
 STAIT -.103 .228 .426 .129 .011 -.337 .205 -.093 
 TAS-20 -.210 -.038 -.206 .090 .090 -.470 .498 -.144 
 ADOS-C .334 -.157 -.364 -.235 -.138 -.072 -.103 -.167 
 ADOS-S .150 -.230 -.495 -.048 -.033 .026 .194 .034 
 ADOS-CM .235 -.216 -.477 -.127 -.078 -.012 .087 -.045 
NEUT IQ -.300 -.369 -.025 -.417 -.240 .365 -.049 .022 
 WRAML -.402 -.149 -.015 -.497 -.079 .095 .325 .035 
 WJIII -.366 -.259 -.099 -.453 -.083 .242 .021 .191 
 M in E .287 -.208 .147 -.226 -.201 .409 -.446 -.096 
 AQ -.286 .044 -.222 .003 .137 -.091 .469 .136 
 EQ .122 -.248 .203 -.125 -.279 .419 -.291 -.251 
 SCQ -.210 .095 -.342 .225 .225 .038 .279 .280 
 STAIT -.119 .262 .409 .150 .109 -.400 .284 -.114 
 TAS-20 -.188 -.101 -.137 .055 -.097 -.419 .436 -.109 
 ADOS-C .346 -.176 -.358 -.248 -.224 -.051 -.146 -.158 
 ADOS-S .171 -.270 -.476 -.070 -.154 .079 .145 .058 
 ADOS-CM .254 -.250 -.461 -.147 -.193 .031 .036 -.026 
Note. Autism group (ASD) brain-behavior correlations for positive (POS), negative (NEG) and 
neutral (NEUT) conditions (Cond) for TOM regions of interest: dmPFC, dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; Amyg, amygdala; l, left; Prec, precuneus; r, right; STS, 
left superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporal parietal junction. Assessments (Measure): IQ, Full 
scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scales (WASI) or Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scales (WAIS); WRAML, Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning age-adjusted scaled 
scores (Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003); WJIII, Oral Language Comprehension (test 15) from the 






(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001); SCQ, Social Communication 
Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003); EQ, Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004); M in E, Reading the Mind in the Eyes-Revised (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001); TAS-20, Toronto Alexithymia Scales (Bagby, Parker, et al., 
1994; Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994); STAIT, State Trait Anxiety Inventory  (Spielberger, 2010); 
ADOS, Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord et al., 2000); ADOS-C, communication 
scores; ADOS-S, social scores; ADOS-CM, combined communication and social scores.   






          
Brain-behavior correlations: TOM ROI and NT (n = 16) 
          
  Region of interest 
Cond Measure dmPFC mPFC Amyg Prec lTPJ lSTS rTPJ rSTS 
POS IQ -.310 .047 .283 -.133 .023 .197 -.526* .306 
 WRAML .160 .452 -.003 .252 .185 .317 -.226 .652** 
 WJIII .127 .356 .535* .067 .318 .271 -.302 .294 
 M in E .005 .287 .257 .136 -.082 .330 -.297 .502* 
 AQ .083 -.231 -.102 -.163 .440 .231 .394 -.080 
 EQ .206 .568* -.014 .205 .062 .221 -.145 .645** 
 SCQ -.155 -.480 .040 -.023 .047 .038 .177 -.352 
 STAIT .085 -.068 -.151 -.209 .160 .214 .453 -.049 
 TAS-20 -.119 -.118 -.360 .315 -.137 .030 .228 -.046 
NEG IQ -.367 .079 .034 -.113 -.168 .178 -.288 .324 
 WRAML -.026 .093 -.103 -.103 -.060 .147 -.290 .452 
 WJIII .081 .327 .241 .190 .201 .269 .019 .344 
 M in E .080 .398 .003 .125 -.116 .333 .028 .491 
 AQ -.063 -.313 .032 -.339 .406 .225 .152 .008 
 EQ .174 .212 -.229 -.033 -.052 .061 -.015 .532* 
 SCQ -.161 -.298 .263 -.042 .181 .129 .114 -.192 
 STAIT -.146 -.212 -.204 -.413 .133 .210 .116 -.127 
 TAS-20 -.258 -.420 -.059 -.148 -.127 -.017 -.200 -.155 
NEUT IQ -.426 .125 .055 -.263 -.211 .094 -.345 .056 
 WRAML -.121 .091 -.130 -.317 -.157 .035 -.362 .101 
 WJIII .019 .359 .301 -.061 .034 .126 -.154 .041 
 M in E -.105 .115 .002 -.184 -.381 .202 -.433 .132 
 AQ -.212 -.518* -.037 -.481 -.013 .072 -.180 -.101 
 EQ .080 .263 -.209 -.169 .064 .049 -.048 .354 
 SCQ -.221 -.436 .179 -.090 -.184 .076 -.090 -.232 
 STAIT -.022 -.364 .015 -.221 .040 .252 -.044 .183 
 TAS-20 -.187 -.383 -.057 .032 -.108 .103 .028 .021 
Note. Neurotypical group (NT) brain-behavior correlations for positive (POS), negative (NEG) 
and neutral (NEUT) conditions (Cond) for TOM regions of interest: dmPFC, dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; Amyg, amygdala; l, left; Prec, precuneus; r, 
right; STS, left superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporal parietal junction. Assessments (Measure): 
IQ, Full scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scales (WASI) or Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scales (WAIS); WRAML, Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning age-
adjusted scaled scores (Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003); WJIII, Oral Language Comprehension (test 
15) from the Woodcock Johnson III Ability Tests (Woodcock et al., 2001); AQ, Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001); SCQ, Social 
Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003); EQ, Empathy Quotient (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004); M in E, Reading the Mind in the Eyes-Revised (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001); TAS-20, Toronto Alexithymia Scales (Bagby, Parker, et al., 
1994; Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994); STAIT, State Trait Anxiety Inventory  (Spielberger, 2010). 









aCC.  anterior cingulate cortex 
ADOS-R.  Autism Diagnostic Observational Scale - Revised 
ANOVA.  analysis of variance 
ASD.  autism spectrum disorder  
aSTS.  anterior superior temporal sulci 
aTP.  anterior temporal pole  
AQ.  Autism Quotient 
ART.  artifact detection tool  
b.  bilateral  
BOLD.  blood oxygenated level dependent 
CC.  cingulate cortex   
CON.  congruent  
d.  dorsal 
db.  decibel 
dl.  dorsolateral 
dmPFC.  dorsal medial prefrontal cortex  
EB.  multiband 
EIT.  Emotional Inference Task 
EMO.  emotional 




EQ.  Empathy Quotient 
IFG.  inferior frontal gyrus 
INCON.  incongruent 
IPL.  inferior parietal lobe 
F.  F-statistic 
FIR.  finite impulse response 
fMRI.  functional magnetic resonance imaging    
FOV.  field of view 
FWE.  family-wise error rate 
FWHM.  full width half maximum 
F0.  frequency 
GLM.  general linear model 
l.  left 
L.  left 
Lat.  laterality 
LH.  left hemisphere 
Lob. lobule 
m. medial 
M.  middle 
M.  mean 
mm.  millimeter 
mCC. medial cingulate cortex  




mPFC.  medial prefrontal cortex  
MPRAGE.  magnetized-prepared, rapid gradient-echo 
msec.  millisecond 
MVPA. multivoxel pattern analysis 
MTG.  middle temporal gyrus  
n.  sample size 
NARR.  narrative ROI map  
NEG.  negative 
NegCon.  negative congruent 
NegIncon.  negative incongruent  
NEUT.  neutral 
NeutCon.  neutral congruent  
NeutIncon.  neutral incongruent 
NT.  neurotypical  
Occ.  occipital 
op.  opercularis 
p.  posterior 
p.  p-value 
PC.  precuneus 
pCC.  posterior cingulate cortex 
POS.  positive 
PosCon.  positive congruent 




pSTS.  posterior superior temporal sulci 
QOL.  quality of life 
r.  right 
R.  right 
RH.  right hemisphere 
RM.  repeated measures 
ROI.  region of interest 
RT.  response time 
SCQ.  Social Communication Questionnaire 
SE.  standard error 
SD.  standard deviation 
SMA.  supplemental motor area 
SMG.  secondary somatosensory regions 
SPM12.  Statistical Parametric Mapping 
STAIT.  State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
STG. superior temporal gyrus 
STS.  superior temporal sulcus  
t.  t-score 
T/F.  true/false 
TAS-20.  Toronto Alexithymia Scale (20-item) 
ToM.  Theory of Mind  
TOM.  theory of mind ROI map 




tri.  triangularis 
v.  ventral  
vmPFC.  ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
WAIS.  Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
WASI.  Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
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